Humans often cooperate with strangers, despite the costs involved. A long tradition of theoretical modeling has sought ultimate evolutionary explanations for this seemingly altruistic behavior. More ...recently, an entirely separate body of experimental work has begun to investigate cooperation’s proximate cognitive underpinnings using a dual-process framework: Is deliberative self-control necessary to reign in selfish impulses, or does self-interested deliberation restrain an intuitive desire to cooperate? Integrating these ultimate and proximate approaches, we introduce dual-process cognition into a formal game-theoretic model of the evolution of cooperation. Agents play prisoner’s dilemma games, some of which are one-shot and others of which involve reciprocity. They can either respond by using a generalized intuition, which is not sensitive to whether the game is one-shot or reciprocal, or pay a (stochastically varying) cost to deliberate and tailor their strategy to the type of game they are facing. We find that, depending on the level of reciprocity and assortment, selection favors one of two strategies: intuitive defectors who never deliberate, or dual-process agents who intuitively cooperate but sometimes use deliberation to defect in one-shot games. Critically, selection never favors agents who use deliberation to override selfish impulses: Deliberation only serves to undermine cooperation with strangers. Thus, by introducing a formal theoretical framework for exploring cooperation through a dual-process lens, we provide a clear answer regarding the role of deliberation in cooperation based on evolutionary modeling, help to organize a growing body of sometimes-conflicting empirical results, and shed light on the nature of human cognition and social decision making.
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•Psychologists and philosophers hotly debate ‘sparse’ vs. ‘rich’ views of awareness.•Work on change blindness suggests that visual awareness is especially sparse.•Work on iconic memory suggests that ...in-the-moment awareness is richer than reports.•We reconcile these themes by combining these two paradigms for the first time.•We can be aware of statistical information without perceiving individuals.
Do we see more than we can report? Psychologists and philosophers have been hotly debating this question, in part because both possibilities are supported by suggestive evidence. On one hand, phenomena such as inattentional blindness and change blindness suggest that visual awareness is especially sparse. On the other hand, experiments relating to iconic memory suggest that our in-the-moment awareness of the world is much richer than can be reported. Recent research has attempted to resolve this debate by showing that observers can accurately report the color diversity of a quickly flashed group of letters, even for letters that are unattended. If this ability requires awareness of the individual letters’ colors, then this may count as a clear case of conscious awareness overflowing cognitive access. Here we explored this requirement directly: can we perceive ensemble properties of scenes even without being aware of the relevant individual features? Across several experiments that combined aspects of iconic memory with measures of change blindness, we show that observers can accurately report the color diversity of unattended stimuli, even while their self-reported awareness of the individual elements is coarse or nonexistent—and even while they are completely blind to situations in which each individual element changes color mid-trial throughout the entire experiment. We conclude that awareness of statistical properties may occur in the absence of awareness of individual features, and that such results are fully consistent with sparse visual awareness.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPUK, ZRSKP
•Representations of normality are central to many aspects of cognition.•Four studies explored the factors that influence normality representations.•Both descriptive and prescriptive judgments ...influenced normality representations.
People’s beliefs about normality play an important role in many aspects of cognition and life (e.g., causal cognition, linguistic semantics, cooperative behavior). But how do people determine what sorts of things are normal in the first place? Past research has studied both people’s representations of statistical norms (e.g., the average) and their representations of prescriptive norms (e.g., the ideal). Four studies suggest that people’s notion of normality incorporates both of these types of norms. In particular, people’s representations of what is normal were found to be influenced both by what they believed to be descriptively average and by what they believed to be prescriptively ideal. This is shown across three domains: people’s use of the word “normal” (Study 1), their use of gradable adjectives (Study 2), and their judgments of concept prototypicality (Study 3). A final study investigated the learning of normality for a novel category, showing that people actively combine statistical and prescriptive information they have learned into an undifferentiated notion of what is normal (Study 4). Taken together, these findings may help to explain how moral norms impact the acquisition of normality and, conversely, how normality impacts the acquisition of moral norms.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPUK, ZRSKP
The low-grade oral infection chronic periodontitis (CP) has been implicated in coronary artery disease risk, but the mechanisms are unclear. In this study, a pathophysiological role for blood ...dendritic cells (DCs) in systemic dissemination of oral mucosal pathogens to atherosclerotic plaques was investigated in humans. The frequency and microbiome of CD19(-)BDCA-1(+)DC-SIGN(+) blood myeloid DCs (mDCs) were analyzed in CP subjects with or without existing acute coronary syndrome and in healthy controls. FACS analysis revealed a significant increase in blood mDCs in the following order: healthy controls < CP < acute coronary syndrome/CP. Analysis of the blood mDC microbiome by 16S rDNA sequencing showed Porphyromonas gingivalis and other species, including (cultivable) Burkholderia cepacia. The mDC carriage rate with P. gingivalis correlated with oral carriage rate and with serologic exposure to P. gingivalis in CP subjects. Intervention (local debridement) to elicit a bacteremia increased the mDC carriage rate and frequency in vivo. In vitro studies established that P. gingivalis enhanced by 28% the differentiation of monocytes into immature mDCs; moreover, mDCs secreted high levels of matrix metalloproteinase-9 and upregulated C1q, heat shock protein 60, heat shock protein 70, CCR2, and CXCL16 transcripts in response to P. gingivalis in a fimbriae-dependent manner. Moreover, the survival of the anaerobe P. gingivalis under aerobic conditions was enhanced when within mDCs. Immunofluorescence analysis of oral mucosa and atherosclerotic plaques demonstrate infiltration with mDCs, colocalized with P. gingivalis. Our results suggest a role for blood mDCs in harboring and disseminating pathogens from oral mucosa to atherosclerosis plaques, which may provide key signals for mDC differentiation and atherogenic conversion.
This study demonstrates that changes in mindfulness predict subsequent changes in well-being in a data set including individuals who recently engaged in psychedelic use.
The timing of thoughts and perceptions plays an essential role in belief formation. Just as people can experience in-the-moment perceptual illusions, however, they can also be deceived about how ...events unfold in time. Here, we consider how a particular type of temporal distortion, in which the apparent future influences “earlier” events in conscious awareness, might affect people’s most fundamental beliefs about themselves and the world. Making use of a task that has been shown to elicit such reversals in the temporal experience of prediction and observation, we find that people who are more prone to think that they predicted an event that they actually already observed are also more likely to report holding delusion-like beliefs. Moreover, this relationship appears to be specific to how people experience prediction and is not explained by domain-general deficits in temporal discrimination. These findings may help uncover low-level perceptual mechanisms underlying delusional belief or schizotypy more broadly and may ultimately prove useful as a tool for identifying those at risk for psychotic illness.
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What can be done to combat political misinformation? One prominent intervention involves attaching warnings to headlines of news stories that have been disputed by third-party fact-checkers. Here we ...demonstrate a hitherto unappreciated potential consequence of such a warning: an
implied truth effect
, whereby false headlines that
fail
to get tagged are considered validated and thus are seen as
more
accurate. With a formal model, we demonstrate that Bayesian belief updating can lead to such an implied truth effect. In Study 1 (
n
= 5,271 MTurkers), we find that although warnings do lead to a modest reduction in perceived accuracy of false headlines relative to a control condition (particularly for politically concordant headlines), we also observed the hypothesized implied truth effect: the presence of warnings caused untagged headlines to be seen as more accurate than in the control. In Study 2 (
n
= 1,568 MTurkers), we find the same effects in the context of decisions about which headlines to consider sharing on social media. We also find that attaching verifications to some true headlines—which removes the ambiguity about whether untagged headlines have not been checked or have been verified—eliminates, and in fact slightly reverses, the implied truth effect. Together these results contest theories of motivated reasoning while identifying a potential challenge for the policy of using warning tags to fight misinformation—a challenge that is particularly concerning given that it is much easier to produce misinformation than it is to debunk it.
This paper was accepted by Elke Weber, judgment and decision making.
Do people know when, or whether, they have made a conscious choice? Here, we explore the possibility that choices can seem to occur before they are actually made. In two studies, participants were ...asked to quickly choose from a set of options before a randomly selected option was made salient. Even when they believed that they had made their decision prior to this event, participants were significantly more likely than chance to report choosing the salient option when this option was made salient soon after the perceived time of choice. Thus, without participants' awareness, a seemingly later event influenced choices that were experienced as occurring at an earlier time. These findings suggest that, like certain low-level perceptual experiences, the experience of choice is susceptible to "postdictive" influence and that people may systematically overestimate the role that consciousness plays in their chosen behavior.
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