George W. Bush has launched a revolution in American foreign policy. He has redefined how America engages the world, shedding the constraints that friends, allies, and international institutions ...impose on its freedom of action. He has insisted that an America unbound is a more secure America. How did a man once mocked for knowing little about the world come to be a foreign policy revolutionary? In America Unbound, Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay dismiss claims that neoconservatives have captured the heart and mind of the president. They show that George W. Bush has been no one's puppet. He has been a strong and decisive leader with a coherent worldview that was evident even during the 2000 presidential campaign. Daalder and Lindsay caution that the Bush revolution comes with significant risks. Raw power alone is not enough to preserve and extend America's security and prosperity in the modern world. The United States often needs the help of others to meet the challenges it faces overseas. But Bush's revolutionary impulse has stirred great resentment abroad. At some point, Daalder and Lindsay warn, Bush could find that America's friends and allies refuse to follow his lead. America will then stand alone-a great power unable to achieve its most important goals.
Makes proposals for how to forge a new international consensus on the use of force, including its preemptive use, to address today's interrelated threats of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, ...and humanitarian crises. Considers how these strategies could be best legitimized and made palatable to domestic and international communities.
Winning Ugly Ivo H. Daalder; Michael E. O’hanlon
05/2004
eBook
After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and ...political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
This book examines the debate within the North Atlantic Alliance about the strategic concept of "Flexible Response" and its implications for the evolution of NATO's theater nuclear posture and ...employment doctrine from 1967 to the present Why did the members of NATO disagree about the meaning of Flexible Response even after its formal adoption in 1967? What accounts for the differences within the Alliance regarding the role of theater nuclear forces (TNF) in NATO strategy How, despite these differences, were the NATO members able time and again to achieve a consensus on what nuclear forces should be deployed in Western Europe and on which doctrine should govern their employment in case of war.
The greater Middle East region is beset by a crescent of crises, stretching from Pakistan through Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Together, these five crises pose the ...most pressing security challenges faced by the United States and its European allies -ranging from terrorism and weapons proliferation to the rise of fundamentalism and the lack of democracy. Until now, Europe and the United States have approached these issues (indeed, the Middle East as a whole) in differing ways, with little effective coordination of policy. In fact, how best to deal with the greater Middle East has emerged as one of the most contentious issues in U.S.-European relations. The need for a common approach to the region is more evident than ever. This book brings together some of Europe and America's leading scholars and practitioners in an effort to develop a common approach to resolving the five major crises in the region. European and American authors provide succinct and fact-filled overviews of the different crises, describe U.S. and European perspectives on the way forward, and suggest ways in which the United States and Europe can better cooperate. In the conclusion, the editors synthesize the different suggestions into a roadmap for U.S.-European cooperation for addressing the challenges of the Greater Middle East in the years ahead. Contributors include Stephen Cohen (Brookings Institution), James Dobbins (RAND), Toby Dodge (University of London), Martin Indyk (Saban Center at Brookings), Kenneth Pollack (Saban Center at Brookings), Jean-Luc Racine (Center for the Study of India and South Asia), Barnett Rubin (New York University), Yezid Sayigh (University of Cambridge), and Bruno Tertrais (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique).
The end of atlanticism Daalder, Ivo H.
Survival (London),
07/2003, Volume:
45, Issue:
2
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Atlanticism--in which American and European foreign policy centres around the transatlantic alliance--has ended. Other concerns, both global and local, and different means for addressing them have ...now come to the fore. Nothing in the new structure of relations preordains an end to the transatlantic cooperation and partnership. The future course of relations will be determined above all by America's policy towards Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Wise policy can help forge a new, more enduring strategic partnership, through which the two sides of the Atlantic cooperate in meeting the many major challenges and opportunities of our evolving world together. But a policy that takes Europe for granted, that routinely ignores or even belittles European concerns, may force Europe to conclude that the costs of continued alliance outweigh its benefits.
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If current headlines are to be believed, the United States and Europe are not just drifting apart. The question is, how serious is the rift? There are major differences between them-including ...differing regional priorities, diverging issue agendas and fundamentally different approaches to meeting the challenges of the post-Cold War period. These differences suggest that the US-European relationship will continue to drift. Although continued drift has its costs (notably in the missed opportunities for cooperation on a host of international issues), the US and Europe should recognize that this change in the terms and nature of their relationship is made possible by the very success of their fifty years of partnership, which has produced a Europe that today is more peaceful, democratic, and united than at any time in history.
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George W. Bush has launched a revolution in American foreign policy. He has redefined how America engages the world, shedding the constraints that friends, allies, and international institutions ...impose on its freedom of action. He has insisted that an America unbound is a more secure America. How did a man once mocked for knowing little about the world come to be a foreign policy revolutionary? In America Unbound, Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay dismiss claims that neoconservatives have captured the heart and mind of the president. They show that George W. Bush has been no one's puppet. He has been a strong and decisive leader with a coherent worldview that was evident even during the 2000 presidential campaign. Daalder and Lindsay caution that the Bush revolution comes with significant risks. Raw power alone is not enough to preserve and extend America's security and prosperity in the modern world. The United States often needs the help of others to meet the challenges it faces overseas. But Bush's revolutionary impulse has stirred great resentment abroad. At some point, Daalder and Lindsay warn, Bush could find that America's friends and allies refuse to follow his lead. America will then stand alone—a great power unable to achieve its most important goals.
The Balkans are a European problem. Washington should acknowledge Europe's contribution to date and let it assume even more responsibility in the future.
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10.
Putting Europe first Daalder, Ivo H; Goldgeier, James M
Survival (London),
04/2001, Volume:
43, Issue:
1
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
For more than 50 years, the United States has pursued a policy toward Europe that aimed at strengthening the democratic core: first in the West and, once the Berlin Wall came down, in the East. The ...immediate challenge for the Bush administration is to ensure that the process started at the end of the Cold War will be brought to fruition, so that a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe, stretching from the Atlantic to beyond the Urals, will finally have been created. That implies clear policy choices: Washington should fully support the development of a strong Europe; NATO enlargement must continue; Russia cannot be left to its own devices, but must be encouraged into a cooperative partnership; and some American troops will have to remain in the Balkans for quite some time. In effect, this requires a continuation of the Clinton administration's strategy of putting Europe - and not NATO or Russia - first.
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