Does political inclusion produce ideological moderation? Schwedler argues that examining political behaviour alone provides insufficient evidence of moderation because it leaves open the possibility ...that political actors might act as if they are moderate while harbouring radical agendas. Through a comparative study of the Islamic Action Front party in Jordan and the Islah party in Yemen, she argues that the IAF in Jordan has become more moderate through participation in pluralist political processes, while the Islah party has not. The variation is explained in part by internal group organization and decision-making processes, but particularly by the ways in which the IAF has been able to justify its new pluralist practices on Islamic terms while the Islah party has not. Based on nearly four years of field research in Jordan and Yemen, Schwedler contributes both an important theory of ideological moderation and detail about these powerful Islamist political parties.
Recent years have seen a surge of studies that examine the inclusion-moderation hypothesis with reference to political Islam: the idea that political groups and individuals may become more moderate ...as a result of their inclusion in pluralist political processes. Most of these interventions adopt one of three foci: (1) the behavioral moderation of groups; (2) the ideological moderation of groups; and (3) the ideological moderation of individuals. After a discussion of various definitions of moderate and radical, the concept of moderation, and the centrality of moderation to studies of democratization, the author examines the scholarship on political Islam that falls within each approach. She then examines several studies that raise questions about sequencing: how mechanisms linking inclusion and moderation are posited and how other approaches might better explain Islamist moderation. Finally, she offers a critical analysis of the behavior-ideology binary that animates many of these models and suggests some fruitful paths for future research.
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Protest has been a key method of political claim-making in Jordan from the late Ottoman period to the present day. More than moments of rupture within normal-time politics, protests have been central ...to challenging state power, as well as reproducing it - and the spatial dynamics of protests play a central role in the construction of both state and society. With this book, Jillian Schwedler considers how space and geography influence protests and repression, and, in challenging conventional narratives of Hashemite state-making, offers an in-depth study of rebellion in Jordan.
How has the Jordanian state sought to police protests through control of material space? How have other changes to the built environment limited possibilities for protests? This article articulates ...the beginnings of a new typology for understanding how changes to the built environment can create obstacles to protests. I identify three distinct changes that have affected spaces of protest: (1) the spatial expansion of the city to accommodate population growth, absorb two major waves of refugees since 2003, and facilitate massive foreign investment in urban megaprojects; (2) infrastructural development, including urban sprawl, new bypass roads and overpasses, and the services necessary for the construction of megaprojects; and (3) the policing of spaces where protests had previously taken place, in part by rendering them inaccessible. I draw on archival material, elite interviews, and ethnographic observation of protests in Amman, Jordan.
How has the Jordanian state sought to police protests through control of material space? How have other changes to the built environment limited possibilities for protests? This article articulates ...the beginnings of a new typology for understanding how changes to the built environment can create obstacles to protests. I identify three distinct changes that have affected spaces of protest: (1) the spatial expansion of the city to accommodate population growth, absorb two major waves of refugees since 2003, and facilitate massive foreign investment in urban megaprojects; (2) infrastructural development, including urban sprawl, new bypass roads and overpasses, and the services necessary for the construction of megaprojects; and (3) the policing of spaces where protests had previously taken place, in part by rendering them inaccessible. I draw on archival material, elite interviews, and ethnographic observation of protests in Amman, Jordan.
