The influenza virus is a global threat to human health causing unpredictable yet recurring pandemics, the last four emerging over the course of a hundred years. As our knowledge of influenza virus ...evolution, distribution, and transmission has increased, paths to pandemic preparedness have become apparent. In the 1950s, the World Health Organization (WHO) established a global influenza surveillance network that is now composed of institutions in 122 member states. This and other surveillance networks monitor circulating influenza strains in humans and animal reservoirs and are primed to detect influenza strains with pandemic potential. Both the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the WHO have also developed pandemic risk assessment tools that evaluate specific aspects of emerging influenza strains to develop a systematic process of determining research and funding priorities according to the risk of emergence and potential impact. Here, we review the history of influenza pandemic preparedness and the current state of preparedness, and we propose additional measures for improvement. We also comment on the intersection between the influenza pandemic preparedness network and the current SARS-CoV-2 crisis. We must continually evaluate and revise our risk assessment and pandemic preparedness plans and incorporate new information gathered from research and global crises.
Of the Orthomyxoviridae family of viruses, only influenza A viruses are thought to exist as multiple subtypes and has non-human maintenance hosts. In April 2011, nasal swabs were collected for virus ...isolation from pigs exhibiting influenza-like illness. Subsequent electron microscopic, biochemical, and genetic studies identified an orthomyxovirus with seven RNA segments exhibiting approximately 50% overall amino acid identity to human influenza C virus. Based on its genetic organizational similarities to influenza C viruses this virus has been provisionally designated C/Oklahoma/1334/2011 (C/OK). Phylogenetic analysis of the predicted viral proteins found that the divergence between C/OK and human influenza C viruses was similar to that observed between influenza A and B viruses. No cross reactivity was observed between C/OK and human influenza C viruses using hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays. Additionally, screening of pig and human serum samples found that 9.5% and 1.3%, respectively, of individuals had measurable HI antibody titers to C/OK virus. C/OK virus was able to infect both ferrets and pigs and transmit to naive animals by direct contact. Cell culture studies showed that C/OK virus displayed a broader cellular tropism than a human influenza C virus. The observed difference in cellular tropism was further supported by structural analysis showing that hemagglutinin esterase (HE) proteins between two viruses have conserved enzymatic but divergent receptor-binding sites. These results suggest that C/OK virus represents a new subtype of influenza C viruses that currently circulates in pigs that has not been recognized previously. The presence of multiple subtypes of co-circulating influenza C viruses raises the possibility of reassortment and antigenic shift as mechanisms of influenza C virus evolution.
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DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Evolution and ecology of influenza A viruses Yoon, Sun-Woo; Webby, Richard J; Webster, Robert G
Current topics in microbiology and immunology,
01/2014, Volume:
385
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Wild aquatic bird populations have long been considered the natural reservoir for influenza A viruses with virus transmission from these birds seeding other avian and mammalian hosts. While most ...evidence still supports this dogma, recent studies in bats have suggested other reservoir species may also exist. Extensive surveillance studies coupled with an enhanced awareness in response to H5N1 and pandemic 2009 H1N1 outbreaks is also revealing a growing list of animals susceptible to infection with influenza A viruses. Although in a relatively stable host-pathogen interaction in aquatic birds, antigenic, and genetic evolution of influenza A viruses often accompanies interspecies transmission as the virus adapts to a new host. The evolutionary changes in the new hosts result from a number of processes including mutation, reassortment, and recombination. Depending on host and virus these changes can be accompanied by disease outbreaks impacting wildlife, veterinary, and public health.
The outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) emerged in China and rapidly spread worldwide. To prevent SARS-CoV-2 ...dissemination, understanding the in vivo characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 is a high priority. We report a ferret model of SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission that recapitulates aspects of human disease. SARS-CoV-2-infected ferrets exhibit elevated body temperatures and virus replication. Although fatalities were not observed, SARS-CoV-2-infected ferrets shed virus in nasal washes, saliva, urine, and feces up to 8 days post-infection. At 2 days post-contact, SARS-CoV-2 was detected in all naive direct contact ferrets. Furthermore, a few naive indirect contact ferrets were positive for viral RNA, suggesting airborne transmission. Viral antigens were detected in nasal turbinate, trachea, lungs, and intestine with acute bronchiolitis present in infected lungs. Thus, ferrets represent an infection and transmission animal model of COVID-19 that may facilitate development of SARS-CoV-2 therapeutics and vaccines.
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•SARS-CoV-2-infected ferrets exhibit elevated body temperature and virus replication•SARS-CoV-2 is shed in nasal washes, saliva, urine and feces•SARS-CoV-2 is effectively transmitted to naive ferrets by direct contact•SARS-CoV-2 infection leads acute bronchiolitis in infected ferrets
The outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) rapidly spreads, leading to a pandemic infection. Kim et al. show that ferrets are highly susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection and effectively transmit the virus by direct or indirect contact, recapitulating human infection and transmission.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
Neuraminidase is one of the two surface glycoproteins of influenza A and B viruses. It has enzymatic activity that cleaves terminal sialic acid from glycans, and that activity is essential at several ...points in the virus life cycle. While neuraminidase is a major target for influenza antivirals, it is largely ignored in vaccine development. Current inactivated influenza virus vaccines might contain neuraminidase, but the antigen quantity and quality are varied and not standardized. While there are data that show a protective role of anti-neuraminidase immunity, many questions remain unanswered. These questions, among others, concern the targeted epitopes or antigenic sites, the potential for antigenic drift, and, connected to that, the breadth of protection, differences in induction of immune responses by vaccination versus infection, mechanisms of protection, the role of mucosal antineuraminidase antibodies, stability, and the immunogenicity of neuraminidase in vaccine formulations. Reagents for analysis of neuraminidase-based immunity are scarce, and assays are not widely used for clinical studies evaluating vaccines. However, efforts to better understand neuraminidase-based immunity have been made recently. A neuraminidase focus group, NAction!, was formed at a Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance meeting at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, MD, to promote research that helps to understand neuraminidase-based immunity and how it can contribute to the design of better and broadly protective influenza virus vaccines. Here, we review open questions and knowledge gaps that have been identified by this group and discuss how the gaps can be addressed, with the ultimate goal of designing better influenza virus vaccines.
Emerging influenza viruses are a serious threat to human health because of their pandemic potential. A promising target for the development of novel anti-influenza therapeutics is the PA protein, ...whose endonuclease activity is essential for viral replication. Translation of viral mRNAs by the host ribosome requires mRNA capping for recognition and binding, and the necessary mRNA caps are cleaved or "snatched" from host pre-mRNAs by the PA endonuclease. The structure-based development of inhibitors that target PA endonuclease is now possible with the recent crystal structure of the PA catalytic domain. In this study, we sought to understand the molecular mechanism of inhibition by several compounds that are known or predicted to block endonuclease-dependent polymerase activity. Using an in vitro endonuclease activity assay, we show that these compounds block the enzymatic activity of the isolated PA endonuclease domain. Using X-ray crystallography, we show how these inhibitors coordinate the two-metal endonuclease active site and engage the active site residues. Two structures also reveal an induced-fit mode of inhibitor binding. The structures allow a molecular understanding of the structure-activity relationship of several known influenza inhibitors and the mechanism of drug resistance by a PA mutation. Taken together, our data reveal new strategies for structure-based design and optimization of PA endonuclease inhibitors.
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DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
The BA.2 sublineage of the SARS-CoV-2 Omicron variant has become dominant in most countries around the world; however, the prevalence of BA.4 and BA.5 is increasing rapidly in several regions. BA.2 ...is less pathogenic in animal models than previously circulating variants of concern
. Compared with BA.2, however, BA.4 and BA.5 possess additional substitutions in the spike protein, which play a key role in viral entry, raising concerns that the replication capacity and pathogenicity of BA.4 and BA.5 are higher than those of BA.2. Here we have evaluated the replicative ability and pathogenicity of BA.4 and BA.5 isolates in wild-type Syrian hamsters, human ACE2 (hACE2) transgenic hamsters and hACE2 transgenic mice. We have observed no obvious differences among BA.2, BA.4 and BA.5 isolates in growth ability or pathogenicity in rodent models, and less pathogenicity compared to a previously circulating Delta (B.1.617.2 lineage) isolate. In addition, in vivo competition experiments revealed that BA.5 outcompeted BA.2 in hamsters, whereas BA.4 and BA.2 exhibited similar fitness. These findings suggest that BA.4 and BA.5 clinical isolates have similar pathogenicity to BA.2 in rodents and that BA.5 possesses viral fitness superior to that of BA.2.
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EMUNI, FIS, FZAB, GEOZS, GIS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, MFDPS, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, SBMB, SBNM, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK, VKSCE, ZAGLJ
Are We Ready for Pandemic Influenza? Webby, Richard J.; Webster, Robert G.
Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science),
11/2003, Volume:
302, Issue:
5650
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
During the past year, the public has become keenly aware of the threat of emerging infectious diseases with the global spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the continuing threat of ...bioterrorism, the proliferation of West Nile virus, and the discovery of human cases of monkeypox in the United States. At the same time, an old foe has again raised its head, reminding us that our worst nightmare may not be a new one. In 2003, highly pathogenic strains of avian influenza virus, including the H5N1 and H7N7 subtypes, again crossed from birds to humans and caused fatal disease. Direct avian-to-human influenza transmission was unknown before 1997. Have we responded to these threats by better preparing for emerging disease agents, or are we continuing to act only as crises arise? Here we consider progress to date in preparedness for an influenza pandemic and review what remains to be done. We conclude by prioritizing the remaining needs and exploring the reasons for our current lack of preparedness for an influenza pandemic.
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BFBNIB, NMLJ, NUK, PNG, SAZU, UL, UM, UPUK
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