The comes Africae Heraclianus’ revolt (413 C.E.) has usually been interpreted as an attempt to usurp imperial power. This article will argue that Heraclianus was not a usurper, but that he had simply ...wished to secure his influence over the emperor Honorius when he felt threatened by the generalissimo Constantius.
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This article wishes to re-examine the early career of Aëtius, with special emphasis on his elimination of the magister utriusque militiae Felix in 430. Scholars have often treated this episode ...superficially, but it is of fundamental importance to understand how Aëtius managed to break the western Roman court’s monopoly of violence. By carefully considering the historiographical record of Aëtius’ campaigns during the late 420s, the chronology of his itinerary, and the wider context of the Vandal invasion of Africa, it will both offer a new interpretation of how Aëtius managed to achieve Felix’ murder and its implications for western Roman unity.
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Thecomes AfricaeHeraclianus’ revolt (413 C.E.) has usually been interpreted as an attempt to usurp imperial power. This article will argue that Heraclianus was not a usurper, but that he had simply ...wished to secure his influence over the emperor Honorius when he felt threatened by thegeneralissimoConstantius.
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It has been frequently asserted that the western Roman supreme commander Stilicho’s neglect of the Transalpine provinces during the usurpation of Constantine III contributed to his eventual downfall ...in 408. Stilicho’s fatal flaw, in this recurring opinion, seems to have been a desire to annex eastern Illyricum for which he sought to employ Alaric. In a volte-face, he then wished to use Alaric as the leader of the western field army that was supposed to bring down Constantine. The aim of this article is to advance several notes of critique on this narrative that has had a long life in Stilichonian scholarship. Instead it will demonstrate that a) the threat of Constantine has been overestimated, b) Stilicho had no designs on annexing eastern Illyricum, c) he had a military strategy ready against Constantine that was sound and in tandem with earlier civil wars, and d) that the intended role of Alaric during this enterprise has been misunderstood. Nevertheless, Stilicho’s military strategy in 408 proved to be fundamentally corrosive towards his hitherto carefully built-up political capital. Olympius, the architect of his demise and his precise knowledge of Stilicho’s army preparations, as befitted the
, provided the former with the perfect material to fabricate stories of Stilicho coveting a throne while neglecting the west. This set in motion the plot that ultimately brought down Stilicho.
Perhaps the court was not even willing to entertain the latter option considering what had happened to Felix. Since Aětius had already shown that he had enough influence to suborn soldiers to kill ...their own supreme commander inside the imperial capital, it is possible that palatine troops may have demanded that Aětius be nominated as Felix' successor.76 Some may have been bribed, but he could easily have persuaded others that his recall to Italy was a pretext for Felix to get rid of him, the same way as the latter had tried to depose Bonifatius initially. ...whether Aětius himself shipped over with them to Africa or sent one of his officers in his place to command them, this would still mean sending his personal troops to fight in a campaign led by Aspar, a man whom he and his Huns had only fought five years previously, and against a far more formidable enemy than disgruntled provincials or second-tier barbarian groups.83 It is this consideration over all, namely the prospect of losing control over his mobile powerbase, that eventually drove Aětius to counteract any possibility to join the campaign against the Vandals. First he records Aětius victory over a Gothic war-band near Arles (Hyd. 82 92). 77 Demougeot (as in n. 8) 509 states that Ravenna could not send reinforcements to Africa because Aětius was fighting the Franks in Gaul and the Iuthungi in Noricum. ...Placidia appealed to Theodosius II for military aid.
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This article wishes to re-examine the early career of Aëtius, with special emphasis on his elimination of the magister utriusque militiae Felix in 430. Scholars have often treated this episode ...superficially, but it is of fundamental importance to understand how Aëtius managed to break the western Roman court's monopoly of violence. By carefully considering the historiographical record of Aëtius' campaigns during the late 420s, the chronology of his itinerary, and the wider context of the Vandal invasion of Africa, it will both offer a new interpretation of how Aëtius managed to achieve Felix' murder and its implications for western Roman unity.
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Ice cores, lake deposits, marine sediments, tree rings and human bones provide the reader with a catalogue of natural sources, aligned with literary accounts and archaeological data, to understand ...the complexities narrated. ...the Roman Empire's efflorescence was clipped in bloom’ (p. 118). In combination with the ‘Late Antique Little Ice Age’, whose chill in the 530s and 540s may have worked in lethal tandem with the plague, a demographic onslaught was unleashed.
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