The article discusses the operation of the women’s correctional facility in Ig in the first ten years of its existence, the living conditions, different forms of re-education work for the convicts ...and the economic units in which the convicts worked. Female convicts came to Ig in July 1956, specifically to the castle building that had previously housed male convicts. Though the building was partly renovated upon the women’s arrival, it was soon apparent that it could not provide optimal conditions for the accommodation of convicts and re-education work. The view on convicts’ re-education and of the importance of manual labour in re-education started to gradually change in the 1960s. For selected convicts, a less restrictive regime of serving sentences had been introduced as early as the late 1950s.
Based on hitherto untapped documents from the Israeli and Turkish state archives, this article discusses Turkish-Israeli relations during the 1960s. It shows that since the relationship was more ...important for Israel, Ankara called most of the shots while Israel used its relative advantages, especially in the economic and trade fields, to keep the relations going. Hence, despite intensifying political and economic ties with the Arab world since the mid-1960s, Ankara resisted persistent pressures to downscale, if not end altogether, its relations with Israel, though these took the odd beating in line with the vicissitudes in Turkey's domestic and international affairs.
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In February 1962, the Israeli government put in place a farreaching economic liberalization reform. Had it been implemented as designed by the economists at the Bank of Israel and the Ministry of ...Finance, the plan could have dramatically changed Israel’s politicaleconomic structure. Yet the plan’s actual implementation was limited and partial, with the result that economic liberalization was postponed for two further decades. This article examines the political dynamics through which Israeli economists tried to persuade political decision-makers to adopt the New Economic Policy and assesses the political obstructions that organized workers, employers, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry utilized in order to prevent its implementation. This analysis reveals the real yet limited political power that Israeli professional economists possessed in the 1960s, as well as the limits binding the power of the state with regard to organized economic interests.
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This article discusses the causes and processes that drove Menachem Begin and his Gahal party into the Israeli cabinet during the three-week waiting period preceding the June 1967 war (or Six Day War ...as it is commonly known). A close examination of Begin's behaviour reveals a calculated political move aimed at exploiting deep processes within the Israeli political establishment in general, and its right-wing factions in particular. This sheds fresh light on a number of key events preceding the war, notably Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's surrender of the defence portfolio to Moshe Dayan, as well as on the deeper processes that led within a decade to the Likud's (Gahal's successor) rise to power, for the first time in Israel's history.
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The Tzavta club in Tel Aviv (until 1956 called the Center for Progressive Culture) was founded in 1946 by Hakibbutz Ha'artzi-Hashomer Hatza'ir kibbutz movement. Cultural activity was a traditional ...means used by political movements to increase their influence in society. However, as part of the "cultural front" of Hashomer Hatza'ir and Mapam, Tzavta had the additional goal of strengthening "ideological collectivism" among the members of the movement and the party. This article analyzes Tzavta's activity between 1956 and 1973, arguing that it was created to combine two functions - cultural and political. Although the leadership of Mapam intended to use the club as a political tool for disseminating the party's views and controlling internal conflicts, Tzavta became increasingly culturally autonomous and eventually uncontrollable.
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In 1960, Israeli decision-makers decided to investigate the possibility of an association agreement with the Common Market. That was a bold and presumptuous decision. But despite repeated failures ...and clear signs that there was no chance of achieving this goal, the Israelis stubbornly held on to it, convincing themselves that it was reachable. The article tries to explain this puzzling behavior. It proposes several explanations: 1. The Israelis put tremendous store by an association agreement with the Common Market— not just for economic reasons but for political ones as well; 2. Israel was confident that it had several useful assets for the Europeans, which could help it reach its goal. 3. The Israelis believed that the European Commission was an ally within the Common Market institutions and was working to promote the association with Israel. It took a long time before the Israelis acknowledged their misguided assumptions. And even then they found it difficult to abandon the dream of association. They finally gave up in spring 1962.
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Az alábbi dokumentumok, amelyeket a magyar Külügyminisztériumnak a Magyar Országos Levéltárban ôrzött iratai közül válogattunk ki, a Magyarország és Izrael közötti kapcsolatok egy különös, de ...egyúttal mindkét fél politikai törekvéseit jól megjelenítô epizódja során keletkeztek. Mint a CEU Jewish Studies Yearbook ötödik kötetében megjelent dokumentumválogatás bevezetôjében már említettük: az izraeli kormány a legelsôk között ismerte el az 1956-os forradalom után a nemzetközi színtéren elszigetelt Kádár-kormányt, és nagyköveti szintû kapcsolatokat létesített vele. Ennek egyszerû oka volt: az izraeli kormány ily módon próbálta meg elérni, hogy Európa egyik legnagyobb zsidó közössége elôtt megnyíljon a kivándorlás, az alija legális útja.
