Desde el primer capítulo, donde el autor establece una comparativa entre dos modelos de vitalismo independientes pero no ajenos (el de Canguilhem y el de Ortega), hasta el último donde se intenta dar ...una respuesta casi etnográfica al problema de la recepción española de este sistema, Vázquez García nos da muestras suficientes para ubicar en un nuevo mapa el alcance y la originalidad de la producción intelectual del filósofo de Castelnadaury. Estos desarrollos han supuesto la base teórica de movimientos como los Disability Studies, o el refuerzo de las ideas de la Antipsiquiatría y de las nuevas tendencias de la crítica política: "La cuestión para Canguilhem no consiste en "desmedicalizar" la discapacidad, sino en desplegar una acción terapéutica y pedagógica que sea tolerante con la "diferencia", evitando al mismo tiempo el estigma y la frustración" (p. 109). La verdadera introducción de la obra de Canguilhem en nuestro país, llevada a cabo por Felipe Cid a partir de los años setenta, fue sin embargo reducida al mismo retrato "epistemocéntrico" del filósofo que utilizó Foucault.
A esta fijación del corpus integral de los escritos publicados se sumó en 2008 la apertura a los investigadores de los Fonds Canguilhem, depositados en el Centre d'Archives en Philosophie, Histoire ...et Edition des Sciences (CAPHES), sito en París. Sfara constata la presencia de una filosofía cangulhemiana de la acción como sustrato teórico de la obra publicada por el pensador, dedicando parte de la introducción (pp. 23-33) a probarlo, remitiendo a los dos artículos fundamentales sobre el asunto editados respectivamente en 1937 ("Descartes et la Technique") y 1938 ("Ac ti vi té technique et creation") y realizando además una cata muy ponderada en los textos publicados con posterioridad, desde el Essai sur quelques problemes concernant le normal et le pathologique (1943) hasta el artículo "La Décadence de l'idée de progres" (1987). El segundo capítulo inicia así el estudio detallado de los borradores inéditos correspondientes a dos etapas: los cursos impartidos en los distintos liceos donde Canguilhem ejerció como profesor (1929.1941) y los correspondientes a las asignaturas impartidas en la Universidad de Estrasburgo incluida su singladura posterior como Inspector General de Filosofía (1941-1955). Lo que Canguilhem cuestiona de su maestro no es su supuesto intelectualismo, donde el juicio reflexivo operaría como guía de la acción, sino las contradicciones de Alain por no llevar hasta el final su anticartesianismo, por no ser totalmente consecuente en la discontinuidad establecida en su obra entre conocimiento y acción, asimilando no sólo el arte sino también la técnica a un acto creativo.
Science has always produced and processed images that are not only used for illustration purposes, regardless of whether they are historical drawings of biological or technical objects, more recent ...computer simulations, or the multiple use of photographs (cf. Rheinberger; Weigel; Galison). From this abundance of images, the following article singles out the scientific photographs of emotion psychology. For a long time, this special type of scientific photography in emotion research received little attention in comparison to other cases, such as photographs from psychiatry (cf. Didi-Huberman) and evolutionary biology (cf. Prodger; Voss). However, technical affect pictures have been decisive for the classification, the rating and the computing of the emotion in the sense of bodily phenomena. In the development of Emotion AI and Affective Computing, they still play a key role for the technical identification of individual affects, which is to be highlighted here.
Há um crescimento no uso de medicamentos em crianças e adolescentes como nunca visto antes. As escolas, como mostram estudos recentes, contribuem para que haja esse crescimento. Na verdade, mesmo o ...Estado incentiva que os professores estejam preparados para identificar qualquer indicativo de transtorno. O fato de que uma grande porcentagem de pessoas com idade escolar possui um transtorno de ordem biológica se fundamenta em uma concepção de normal e patológico em que se toma uma média como referencial ideal. Entretanto, a ideia de normal e patológico pode ser colocada em questão a partir de um estudo que vem da própria medicina – é o caso das reflexões de Georges Canguilhem. Apesar de seu trabalho não ter tido impacto nas áreas médicas, ele foi fundamental nas áreas humanas, porque oferece uma concepção de normal com potencial transformativo. Normal não seria aquele que segue uma norma ideal, mas aquele que é capaz de instaurar uma nova norma. A concepção de Canguilhem, como pretende-se mostrar, pode nos levar a repensar o que consideramos um transtorno e tem um potencial crítico na escola, pois lhe traz a responsabilidade de ouvir cada caso. Apresentar-se-á, nesse artigo, a posição inovadora de Canguilhem e como ela ainda nos dá uma possibilidade de repensarmos a ideia de transtorno em pessoas em idade escolar.
Full text
Available for:
IZUM, KILJ, NUK, ODKLJ, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, UL, UM, UPUK
One of the core issues in Michel Foucault’s and Georges Canguilhem’s works is the study of the epistemological status and political functioning of biological discourse, explored in its fully ...heterogeneous, plural, and conflictual character. Starting from the relations and tensions between their theoretical orientations, the present work attempts a critical re-reading of their researchs, with the aim of integrating and mobilizing their analysis in light of contemporary political and epistemological debates. In this respect, Canguilhem’s biological philosophy allows us to re-examine the foucauldian conceptions of history, society, subjectivity, technology, and environment; moreover, it enables a re-questioning about the spaces of intervention of biopolitical technologies from a socio-ecological and eco-historical perspective.
This paper represents a philosophical reflection on the nature and value of philosophy itself. Georges Canguilhem somewhat scandalously argued that the fundamental value of philosophy does not lie in ...truth. He suggests that truth is a typical value of science because truth is what science says and what is said scientifically. Why would a philosopher depreciate his own discipline? And does he really do so? Or is there a different motivation: to help philosophy to become a much more self‐confident voice? And if truth is no longer a value of philosophy, what value fits it better? The article follows Canguilhem in his conception of truth, science, and philosophy. It is against the background of these considerations that the specific revised anthropology of the scientist or philosopher is formed. The main question is what this means for current philosophy and why it could be inspiring for philosophers today.
Full text
Available for:
DOBA, FZAB, GIS, IJS, IZUM, KILJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Canguilhem’s contemporary relevance lies in how he critiques the relation between knowledge and life that underlies Kantian rationality. The latter’s Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Judgment ...represent life in the form of an exception: life is simultaneously included and excluded from understanding. Canguilhem’s critique can be grouped into three main strands of argument. First, his reference to concepts as preserved problems breaks with Kant’s idea of concepts regarding the living as a ‘unification of the manifold’. Second, Canguilhem’s vital normativity represents life as the potential to resist normative orders that judge the living, relegating Kant’s ‘lawfulness of the contingent’ to a ‘mediocre regularity’. Third, Canguilhem’s introduction of the environment as a ‘category of contemporary thought’ decentres the living/knowing subject and introduces contingency. His idea of the ‘knowledge of life’ leads to the conclusion that life is the condition of possibility of rationality, rather than rationality’s ‘blind spot’.
Full text
Available for:
NUK, OILJ, SAZU, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Abstract
Phenomenology of illness and abnormality
Habitually, illness or disease is considered as something abnormal. Therefore, the distinction between health/illness is often conflated with the ...distinction normal/abnormal. Inspired by Kurt Goldstein’s work, Merleau-Ponty makes clear, however, that abnormality does not automatically coincide with pathology. It is also interesting to note that Merleau-Ponty nowhere uses the term “abnormal” to indicate the opposite of the normal person. Similar to Georges Canguilhem he uses the pair “the normal (person)” (
le normal
) – “the sick person”, “the pathological” (
le malade, le pathologique
). As Goldstein and Canguilhem make more explicit than Merleau-Ponty, the abnormal person or “deviant” is very often not sick. Instead of approaching physical symptoms from an external or statistical view (which might lead to the conclusion that something is abnormal), they claim that sickness should be defined by the patient’s own lived experience. Merleau-Ponty shares this view, but for different reasons. Goldstein and Canghuilhem, both trained clinicians, believe that patients’ own experiences should be central in clinical practice instead of objectifying measurements and tests. For Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenologist, objective physical features have no place within his phenomenology of lived bodily experience. Bracketing positivist scientific insights, phenomenology also excludes biomedical statistics from its analysis. If we assume that abnormality is a result from a comparison with what is statistically seen as normal, this means that a phenomenology of abnormal embodiment might seem a contradiction in terms. In this paper, however, I would like to show that abnormal embodiment can also be approached from a phenomenological perspective. While drawing on some ideas by Hacking on the history of statistical reasoning, I demonstrate how the statistics of abnormality directly interconnects with lived experience. Hacking explains how the descriptive “average” or “mean” has become the normative “normal”. Because our world is in many ways determined by averages, it is an illusion to think that phenomenology can just bracket statistics. The one who appears physically as abnormal can, comparable to the one who is ill, experience that his or her embodied possibilities to deal with the world dwindle. What I show in this article is that even though a clear distinction can be made between illness and abnormality, both can be accompanied by a reduction or disruption of the “I can”.
Many historical studies tend to underline two central Kantian themes frequently emerging in Georges Canguilhem’s works: (1) a conception of activity, primarily stemming from the
Critique of Pure ...Reason
, as a mental and abstract synthesis of judgment; and (2) a notion of organism, inspired by the
Critique of Judgment
, as an integral totality of parts. Canguilhem was particularly faithful to the first theme from the 1920s to the first half of the 1930s, whereas the second theme became important in the early 1940s. With this article, I will attempt to show that a third important theme of
technique
arose in the second half of the 30s also in the wake of Kant’s philosophy, especially Sect. 43 of the
Critique of Judgment
. This section, which states that technical ability is distinguished from a theoretical faculty, led Canguilhem to a more concrete and practical conception of activity. I will then suggest that it was by considering technique that the concept of normativity, which characterizes Georges Canguilhem’s philosophy of life, also took shape.
Full text
Available for:
EMUNI, FIS, FZAB, GEOZS, GIS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, MFDPS, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, SBMB, SBNM, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK, VKSCE, ZAGLJ
PDF
