We consider a non-cooperative bargaining game where in each round, if a proposal is rejected, with a probability, the allocation implemented in the previous round is implemented as a status quo and ...the game proceeds to the next round, and with the complementary probability, no allocations are implemented and the negotiations break down. We show that there exists a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium such that in any round, a proposer offers a proposal such that the responder is indifferent between accepting and rejecting it and an agreement is achieved. If the probability of breakdown is close to zero, the sequence of equilibrium allocations evolves from the initial status quo to an allocation near the equilibrium allocation of the Rubinstein bargaining game over time. The effect of the initial status quo on the equilibrium allocations vanishes over time.
•We introduce endogenous status quos into a bilateral repeated bargaining situation.•We characterize a unique stationary equilibrium satisfying appropriate properties.•The equilibrium allocation evolves to around that of Rubinstein bargaining over time.•Effect of the initial status quo on the equilibrium allocation vanishes over time.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
•We estimate price markups and wage markdowns in Uruguay.•Minimum sectoral wages determined in wage councils produced increases in price markups and reductions in wage markdowns.•Wage councils ...decreased firms bargaining power in labor markets.•Firms passed part of the increases in labor costs to consumers.•Unionization rates have a statistically significant but quantitative small impact on wage markdowns.
In 2005, after a leftist coalition won the national election for the first time, Uruguay returned to sector-level wage bargaining councils with active government participation. We estimate product markups and wage markdowns using firm-level data for the period 2002–2016, and report decreasing wage markdowns and increasing -to a lesser extent- firm-level product markups. We find statistically significant impacts of minimum mandated wages on product markups and wage markdowns, and additional effects of unions on wage markdowns. The evidence suggests that firms operate in monopsonistic labor markets. Though their bargaining power in the labor market was reduced over time as a result of wage councils, firms were able to pass a sizable part of the increases in labor costs to consumers.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
Dual union members excluded from NZNO office The second remit regarding dual membership was about "recognising that if you belong to two unions you shouldn't be allowed to be office-holders in both ...unions", Corbett said. ". . . the implication is something we have to decide at a board level, and that is a conversation we are vet to have". Under the change, the affiliate membership part of the constitution (https://www.nzno.org.nz /Portals/0/publications /Constitution%20-%20NZNO%20Constitution%202020-2021.pdf?ver=DAOCQHbUQ7Vgo7oWuziehw %3d%3d) (Schedule 1; clause 3) would be changed to state that: "A dual member as defined at subclause 3.4 may not hold office, be a delegate, propose nominations or motions, or have voting rights under this Constitution". NZNO's remit committee has warned such a change could impact on mental health (and some other) nurses in Auckland, Nelson and the West Coast who were NZNO members but - due to an agreement with NZNO and PSA - had no choice but to be represented by PSA in bargaining.
This paper highlights the importance of natural resource concentration and ethnic group regional concentration for ethnic conflict. The existence of multiple conflict terrains (and hence multiple ...threat points) is the source of bargaining failure, similar to the one determined by the presence of offensive advantages. The theory predicts war to be more likely when resource concentration and group concentration are high, and the empirical analysis, both at the country level and at the ethnic group level, confirms the essential role of geographic concentration variables for civil war.
•Natural resource concentration and ethnic group concentration matter for ethnic conflict.•We find bargaining failure due to multiple conflict terrains.•We construct a novel measure of oil inequality: Oil Gini.•We perform a country and ethnic group level regression analysis.•War is found to be more likely when resource concentration and group concentration are high.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK
The rapid development of renewable energy generation and demand side flexible resource makes the operation of distribution network and the organisation of power market facing greater uncertainty ...challenges. This paper proposes a novel receding horizon peer-to-peer energy transaction model based on the prediction intervals of renewable energy generation to manage the volatility in the range of a distribution network. A peer-to-peer energy interval matching algorithm is proposed to fully explore the flexibility in demand side for mitigating the output fluctuation of renewable energy generation locally. Then the responsibilities of undertaking the uncertainty risk from renewable generations are assigned to the counter-part consumers who have been matched with the renewable energy generations in a peer-to-peer market. The autonomy energy management problem under distribution network of each consumer is formulated as a cooperative gaming problem using the Nash bargaining theory. The uncertainty risk is considered into the Nash bargaining problem by utilizing voltage chance constraints and conditional value at risk based return-risk utility, of which the quantile connotations are consistent with the quantile results of the probability prediction of renewable energy generations. Moreover, an alternating direction method of multipliers algorithm based distributed methodology is developed to solve the Nash bargaining problem in a distributed manner. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the presented peer-to-peer energy trading model.
The bargaining trap Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian
Games and economic behavior,
11/2022, Volume:
136
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price haggling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves one party strictly worse off than if no ...transaction took place (e.g., the equilibrium price exceeds a buyer's valuation). This arises when one party is impatient about capturing zero surplus (e.g., Rubinstein's example of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with costless unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally removes the trap.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
Collective bargaining has come under renewed scrutiny, especially in Southern European countries, which rely predominantly on sectoral bargaining supported by administrative extensions of collective ...agreements. Following the global financial crisis, some of these countries have implemented substantial reforms in the context of adjustment programmes, seen by some as a 'frontal assault' on collective bargaining. This paper compares the recent top-down reforms in Portugal with the more gradual evolution of the system in the Netherlands. While the Dutch bargaining system shares many of the key features that characterise the Portuguese system, it has shown a much greater ability to adjust to new challenges through concerted social dialogue. This paper shows that the recent reforms in Portugal have brought the system more in line with Dutch practices, including in relation to the degree of flexibility in sectoral collective agreements at the worker and firm levels, the criteria for administrative extensions, and the application of retro- and ultra-activity. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the top-down approach taken in Portugal will change bargaining practices, and importantly, the quality of industrial relations.
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CEKLJ, NUK, ODKLJ, UL, UM, UPUK
This paper endogenizes policymaking procedures in a multilateral bargaining framework. A procedure specifies players' proposal power in bargaining over one-dimensional policies. In procedural ...bargaining players internalize the procedures' effects on subsequent policy bargaining. In policy bargaining players' utilities are continuous, strictly concave, and order-restricted. The paper provides equilibrium characterization, existence, and uniqueness results for this two-tier bargaining model. Although the procedural choice set is multidimensional, sequentially rational procedures feature "limited power sharing" and admit a total order. In equilibrium, endogenous procedures and policies are strategic complements.
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BFBNIB, CEKLJ, DOBA, EMUNI, FIS, FZAB, GEOZS, GIS, IJS, IMTLJ, IZUM, KILJ, KISLJ, MFDPS, NLZOH, NMLJ, NUK, ODKLJ, OILJ, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, SBMB, SBNM, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK, VKSCE, ZAGLJ
► We model corruption in a society as a result of bargaining for bribes between private citizens and public officials. ► The extrinsic cost of engaging in corruption is subject to strategic ...complementarities, which lead to multiple corruption equilibria. ► Corruption is lowest when potential bribers and potential bribees are uncertain regarding each other′s “corruptibility” and have asymmetric bargaining powers.
We model corruption in a society as a result of bargaining for bribes between private citizens and public officials. We investigate the role that incomplete information with respect to the intrinsic moral cost of one's potential corruption partner plays out in his or her propensity to engage in bribery, and, consequently, the equilibrium level of corruption in the society. We assume that the cost of engaging in corruption is subject to strategic complementarities, which may lead to multiple corruption equilibria. We find that corruption is lowest when potential bribers and potential bribees are uncertain regarding each other's “corruptibility” and have asymmetric bargaining powers. Our uncertainty result provides theoretical support in favor of anti-corruption strategies, such as staff rotation in public offices, aimed at decreasing the social closeness of bribers and bribees. Our bargaining power result suggests that, under uncertainty, monopolistic public good provision has the same corruption-reducing effect as competitive public good provision.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK
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