We revisit the classical alternating-offer bargaining model, further assuming that players cannot reduce their proposals during the game. In equilibrium, players have history-dependent strategies and ...do not necessarily reach an agreement immediately in the first stage.
•Endogenous commitment means that bargainers cannot reduce their proposals.•Endogenous commitment is used in classical alternating-offer bargaining.•In equilibrium, agreement is reached in the first or second stage.•Players have history dependent equilibrium strategies.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
Bargaining-Based Mobile Data Offloading Lin Gao; Iosifidis, George; Jianwei Huang ...
IEEE journal on selected areas in communications,
06/2014, Volume:
32, Issue:
6
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
The unprecedented growth of mobile data traffic challenges the performance and economic viability of today's cellular networks and calls for novel network architectures and communication solutions. ...Data offloading through third-party WiFi or femtocell access points (APs) can effectively alleviate the cellular network congestion in low operational and capital expenditure. This solution requires the cooperation and agreement of mobile cellular network operators (MNOs) and AP owners (APOs). In this paper, we model and analyze the interaction among one MNO and multiple APOs (for the amount of MNO's offloading data and the respective APOs' compensations) by using thew Nash bargaining theory. Specifically, we introduce a one-to-many bargaining game among the MNO and APOs and analyze the bargaining solution (game equilibrium) systematically under two different bargaining protocols: 1) sequential bargaining, where the MNO bargains with APOs sequentially, with one APO at a time, in a given order; and 2) concurrent bargaining, where the MNO bargains with all APOs concurrently. We quantify the benefits for APOs when bargaining sequentially and earlier with the MNO, and the losses for APOs when bargaining concurrently with the MNO. We further study the group bargaining scenario where multiple APOs form a group bargaining with the MNO jointly and quantify the benefits for APOs when forming such a group. Interestingly, our analysis indicates that grouping of APOs not only benefits the APOs in the group but may also benefit some APOs not in the group. Our results shed light on the economic aspects and the possible outcomes of the MNO/APOs interactions and can be used as a roadmap for designing policies for this promising data offloading solution.
We use a field experiment to evaluate the impacts of two price negotiation tactics on buyers’ bargaining payoffs in a marketplace where face-to-face haggling determines price and sellers often cheat ...on the weight. We implement three scripted interventions, all involving undercover buyers requesting a non-specific price discount. In one of the non-baseline interventions, buyers undervalue the product, while in the other, buyers reveal their inability to pay the quoted price, both at the discount-request phase. The data from a within-seller design show that compared to devaluing the opponent’s product, mentioning one’s lack of affordability leads to a higher rate of bargaining success and a higher mean price discount, culminating in a higher buyer payoff net of the monetary value of cheating. We also find that merely asking for a discount without furnishing a reason, as in our baseline intervention, leads to better bargaining outcomes for buyers than underestimating the opponent’s product.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
We report experimental results from a dynamic real-time bargaining experiment. Players earn flows of income from the assets they possess at any point in the bargaining process, while they incur costs ...which are proportional to the size of the conflict between players’ current claims. We find that most bargaining interactions are characterised by small but non-zero amounts of contention, which arises from the process of tacitly coordinating claims, including from negotiating turn-taking approaches. Interactions with large losses from contention occur in a sizeable minority of interactions. There are significant individual differences in outcomes across participants. We do not find systematic gender effects, but do find that the locus of control of participants predicts bargaining outcomes.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
This paper explores channel coordination and profit division issues of a manufacturer–distributer–duopolistic retailers supply chain for a product, where the manufacturer supplies lotsize of the ...product that contains a random portion of imperfect quality item. In manufacturer-Stackelberg vertical game setting, the duopolistic retailers׳ three behaviours – Cournot, Collusion and Stackelberg are discussed. Besides analyzing the effect of imperfect quality product on optimal decisions, the paper depicts the hybrid contract mechanism so that all units quantity discount with franchise fee resolves channel conflict though unable to provide win–win outcome. For surplus profit division, the paper proposes two sequential bargaining processes- backward and forward, where outcome of a Nash bargaining is dependent on the previous. It is found that, for channel coordinated win–win profit, the manufacturer prefers Collusion, Stackelberg and Cournot, while the retailer prefers the reverse and both prefer backward sequential bargaining. But, the distributers preference depends on the target profit that it sets during the bargaining process. The proposed mechanisms are illustrated by a numerical example.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZRSKP
Trade unions distort a profit-maximizing firm's input choice. The nature of the resulting inefficiency depends on whether there are wage negotiations or there is efficient bargaining. Moreover, trade ...unions redistribute income and thereby affect welfare. If firms also pursue Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) objectives, input choices may be distorted already in the absence of collective bargaining. Adopting a positive perspective, we show that CSR objectives, which induce a firm to expand production, have ambiguous wage and employment consequences in case of wage negotiations and raise employment if there is efficient bargaining. Importantly from a normative vantage point, such CSR objectives make a welfare-enhancing role of trade unions more likely in the presence of wage negotiations. The reverse is true in case of efficient bargaining.
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FZAB, GIS, IJS, IZUM, KILJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PILJ, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK
Pledge-and-review bargaining Harstad, Bård
Journal of economic theory,
January 2023, 2023-01-00, Volume:
207
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
This paper presents a novel dynamic bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before all pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance ...for delay, each equilibrium pledge maximizes an asymmetric Nash product. The weights on others' payoffs increase in the uncertainty, but decrease in the correlation of the shocks. The weights vary pledge to pledge, and this implies that the outcome is generically inefficient. The Nash demand game and its mapping to the Nash bargaining solution follow as a limiting case. The model sheds light on the Paris climate change agreement, but it also applies to negotiations between policymakers or business partners that have differentiated responsibilities or expertise.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
Using the right‐to‐manage model of union‐firm bargaining, we show that a higher union power increases product innovation if the bargaining is decentralised, the market expansion effect is weak, and ...the cost of innovation is relatively low. Otherwise, the relationship between union power and innovation is negative. Hence, we contribute to the literature in two ways. Unlike the extant theoretical literature, we consider the effects on product innovation, which is empirically relevant but has been ignored in the theoretical literature and explain a positive relationship between union power and innovation.
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BFBNIB, FZAB, GIS, IJS, IZUM, KILJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PILJ, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK
I conduct a bargaining experiment with discounting in continuous time. At any point in time, each of the two players can make a proposal. However, after making an offer, a player must wait for a ...specific duration of “waiting time” before she can make a new offer or accept the other's offer. In addition, the player's share is discounted by her discount rate for every unit of time. In the equilibrium, the agreement is reached immediately, and a player's share increases with her waiting time and decreases with her discount rate. Results show that a longer waiting time or a lower discount rate alone increases a player's proportion of the actual payoff, but the combination of the two factors has a weaker effect.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
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