Ludwik Fleck Uzunić, Mislav
Revija za sociologiju,
08/2023, Volume:
53, Issue:
2
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
U radu se problemski razmatra teorija Ludwika Flecka s posebnim naglaskom na njegovu primjenu sociološke analize na problematiku spoznaje i znanosti. Fleckove se prosudbe zatim uspoređuju s teorijom ...Thomasa Kuhna i teorijom edinburške sociološke škole (SSK) s ciljem da se ocrtaju njihove konceptualne i metodološke razlike glede definiranja društvenog u znanosti. Postoji kontinuirana osovina sociološkog analiziranja znanosti i spoznaje u dvadesetom stoljeću na relaciji Fleck, Kuhn, SSK. Međutim, u radu se argumentira da su Fleckova i Kuhnova teorija fundamentalno podudarne zbog analize racionalnih čimbenika koji utječu na proces znanstvenog odlučivanja, no da se SSK izuzima svojom radikalnom interpretacijom Kuhna zbog pretpostavke o snažnom utjecaju iracionalnih i neznanstvenih čimbenika na znanstvene procese. Postoji značajna razlika u njihovoj primjeni sociološkog pristupa, a posljedično i stavu o uspjehu znanstvenih istraživanja. Zato je potrebno razlikovati što Fleck i Kuhn podrazumijevaju pod 'društveno', a što pripadnici SSK. Prvi pod društvenim podrazumijevaju međuodnose unutar znanstvenih kolektiva i samih znanstvenika koji se temelje u epistemičkim čimbenicima – prvenstveno u spoznajama koje pripadnici međusobno dijele temeljem racionalnosti i dokaza. Pripadnici SSK, pak, proširuju analizu na odnos znanosti i šireg društvenog konteksta s ciljem da se prepoznaju iracionalni i neznanstveni čimbenici u takvim odnosima. U istraživanju navedene relacije leži radikalnost, ali i originalnost SSK u primjeni vlastitog sociološkog polazišta, a što je dovelo do kritike da pristup predstavlja jedan znanstveni antirealizam koji relativizira racionalnost i uspjeh znanosti.
The paper examines Ludwig Fleck's theory with a particular emphasis on its application to the sociological analysis of knowledge and science. Fleck's position is then compared to Thomas Kuhn's theory and the theory of the Edinburgh School of Sociology (SSK) to delineate their conceptual and methodological differences in defining the social aspects of science. Throughout the 20th century, there exists a continuous axis of sociological analysis of science and knowledge, carried out by Fleck, Kuhn, and SSK. However, the paper argues that Fleck's and Kuhn's theories are fundamentally aligned due to their analysis of rational factors underlying the scientific decision-making process, while SSK deviates with its radical interpretation of Kuhn, assuming a strong influence of irrational and non-scientific factors on scientific processes. Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate between what Fleck and Kuhn mean by 'social' and what SSK practitioners mean by it. Fleck and Kuhn refer to the relations within scientific collectives and among scientists themselves, which are presumably based on epistemic factors, primarily in knowledge shared through rationality and evidence. On the other hand, SSK members extend the analysis to the relationship between science and the broader social context in order to identify irrational and non-scientific factors within these relations. The emphasis on irrational factors in science constitutes radicalism, as well as the originality of SSK's application of its own sociological framework, which has led to criticism that this approach represents a form of scientific anti-realism that relativises the rationality and success of science.
Slučaj Richtmann-Podhorsky Uzunić, Mislav; Pešić, Boško
Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine,
12/2024, Volume:
50, Issue:
1 (99)
Journal Article, Paper
Open access
Rad se bavi intelektualnim te ideološkim sukobom jugoslavenskih komunista sa Zvonimirom Richtmannom i Rikardom Podhorskim 1930-ih godina. Sukob je proizašao iz pokušaja Richtmanna i Podhorskog da ...saznanjima tadašnje znanosti i logičkog pozitivizma kritički promisle marksističku teoriju i da dodatno dokažu njezinu ispravnost. Međutim, njihov je projekt ostao neostvaren zato što su pripadnici Komunističke partije takovrsna promišljanja marksizma uzimali kao političku prijetnju te je racionalno i argumentirano rješavanje pitanja ostalo otvoreno. Rad stoga istražuje kompatibilnost teorije Richtmanna i Podhorskog s teorijom logičkog pozitivizma. Cilj je pokazati da su njihovi pokušaji bili argumentirani i opravdani jer logički pozitivizam i marksizam dijele kritiku metafizike i filozofije te zagovaraju kauzalna objašnjenja pojava. Međutim, u radu se argumentira da bi iz suvremene perspektive polazište Richtmanna i Podhorskog bilo neuvjerljivo iz dva razloga. Prvi se razlog odnosi na suvremena saznanja u općoj filozofiji znanosti koja pokazuju da je princip verifikacije logičkog pozitivizma, kojeg su Richtmann i Podhorsky inkorporirali u svoju teoriju, neuvjerljiv kao kriterij znanstvenosti. Drugi se razlog odnosi na fundamentalnu metodološku razliku između marksizma, koji polazi od makro objašnjenja povijesti i društva, i logičkog pozitivizma koji zagovara metodološki atomizam i redukcionizam.
The article delves into the intellectual and ideological clash between Yugoslav communists and Zvonimir Richtmann and Rikard Podhorsky during the 1930s. This conflict emerged from Richtmann and Podhorsky’s endeavour to critically reassess Marxist theory, leveraging contemporary scientific knowledge and logical positivism to further substantiate its validity. Nevertheless, their initiative remained unrealized due to Communist Party members perceiving such scrutiny of Marxism as a political menace, thereby leaving the rational and reasoned resolution of the matter unresolved. Consequently, the paper delves into the compatibility of Richtmann and Podhorsky’s theory with logical positivism. Its objective is to illustrate that their endeavors were both justified and reasoned, as logical positivism and Marxism converge in critiquing metaphysics and philosophy while advocating for causal explanations of phenomena. Nonetheless, the paper contends that, viewed from a contemporary standpoint, Richtmann and Podhorsky’s premise would lack persuasiveness for two reasons. Firstly, contemporary insights in the general philosophy of science undermine the verifiability principle of logical positivism, which they incorporated into their theory, as an inadequate criterion of scientific rigor. Secondly, the fundamental methodological disparity between Marxism, grounded in macro-level explanations of history and society, and logical positivism, which promotes methodological atomism and reductionism, underscores the divergence.
Zgodovinske razprave o nastanku znanosti so iz več razlogov spregledane. Prav takšni so tudi njihovi prevodi, še zlasti v manj velike kulture in jezike. Slovenija ni nobena izjema, kvečjemu je dober ...zgled.
Thomas Kuhn je 1962. godine u svojoj knjizi „Struktura znanstvenih revolucija“ predstavio pojam nesumjerljivosti. Iste je godine Paul Feyerabend predstavio formulaciju ovog pojma. Kako bih objasnio ...temelj rasprave, prvo ću predstaviti formulacije Kuhna i Feyerabenda koje označavaju početak rasprave. Drugo, objasnit ću kako je Kuhn mijenjao formulaciju nesumjerljivosti kroz tri razvojne f aze. Nakon toga ću definirati tri vrste pojma nesumjerljivosti, razloživši ga na lingvističku, nesumjerljivost standarda i teorijsku opterećenost podacima. Svaku od ovih vrsta nesumjerljivosti ću pobliže objasniti i prikazati kako bi se različite vrste nes umjerljivosti mogle koristiti u povijesnoj raspravi između biometričara i Mendelovog tabora. Na kraju ću prikazati kritiku relativizma nesumjerljivosti te ponuditi vlastitu kritiku usmjerenu prema teorijskoj opterećenosti podacima.
The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy is the definitive guide to what is happening in the lively and fascinating subject of contemporary philosophy. More than thirty distinguished scholars ...contribute incisive and up-to-date critical surveys of the principal areas of research into this subject. The coverage is broad, with sections devoted to moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of mind and action, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of the sciences.
U tekstu izlažemo rješenje razlike između Wittgensteinove uporabe modela u TLP i modeliranja u PI, RFM i OC temeljem analize razlike u izboru samih riječi i opisa pojmova fenomena u njegovim ...napomenama. Metoda je pojmovna analiza Wittgensteinova tretiranja znanstvenih modela i modeliranja. Dodatno, tekstualna raščlamba i poredba korištena je pri istraživanju njegovih glavnih napomena na tu temu. Ako je otkrivena razlika između modela i modeliranja i kontinuitet ovisnosti oba pojma o pojmu slike, pri čemu je razlika slike i oslikavanja uzeta kao zadana, zaključujemo kako je Wittgenstein svoj stari pojam modela nastojao inkorporirati u novi pojam modeliranja. Eksplicirana razlika i inkorporiranje pridonosi pojašnjenju teme Wittgensteinovog posrednog i neposrednog utjecaja na filozofiju znanosti (napose Toulmina, Hansona, Kuhna i Feyerabenda).
U više svojih tekstova Tomo Vereš je naglašavao potrebu detaljnijeg istraživanja pojedinih Akvinčevih tekstova te je tako inspirirao i ovo istraživanje koje poseban naglasak stavlja na Tomine ...komentare Aristotelovih djela, posebice O nebu, raspravu O vječnosti svijeta te niz pitanja iz prvoga dijela u Summa theologiae i drugoga dijela u Summa contra gentiles. Istaknuti tekstovi sama su srž stare rasprave o početcima koja uključuje pitanje o vječnosti svijeta i propitivanje pojma stvaranja, više istaknutih filozofijskih tema, poput pitanja vremena, ali i epistemološko pitanje granica spoznaje, te odnosa filozofije, znanosti i teologije. Ta su pitanja danas iznimno aktualna, osobito u kontekstu suvremene kozmologije, iz koje je proizišla teorija velikog praska, razni modeli univerzuma, prijedlozi multiverzuma i sl. Cilj je ovoga istraživanja utvrditi koliko su istaknuti Akvinčevi tekstovi, uključujući razlikovanja pojmova teološkog stvaranja, metafizičkog i prirodnog početka, važni u kontekstu suvremenih tematiziranja pitanja početaka, imajući u vidu očuvanje znanstvenosti i relevantne teme filozofije znanosti i dijaloga znanosti, filozofije i teologije.
This research was inspired by Tomo Vereš through an article of his titled Thomas Aquinas - Forerunner of Nicolaus Copernicus? Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle's works, especially regarding On Heaven, On the Eternity of the World, and also a series of questions from the first part of the Summa Theologiae (I. q. 32, q. 45 – q. 49) containing the passages addressed by Vereš. These are at the very core of the old discussion on origins which includes the question of the eternity of the world, the examination of the concept of creation and significant philosophical themes, such as the question of time, the limits of knowledge, and the relationship between philosophy, science and theology. Questions on origins are today extremely topical, especially in the context of modern cosmology from which the Big Bang theory comes as well as various models of the universe, multiverse proposals, etc. A correct understanding of these topics is extremely important for science, philosophy and theology and for the dialogue between them. In this regard, we have highlighted multiple fragments of Aquinas’ which are crucial for contemporary science in terms of a scientific preservation of so-called epistemological caution. Aquinas' epistemological caution is manifested especially in his differentiation of the change that takes place in time and creation which is a temporal act, that is to say, in the differentiation of the concepts of theological creation, metaphysical origin and natural origin. Specifically, Aquinas' distinctions in the context of contemporary cosmological ideas (models), particularly of the Big Bang, indicate that unsophisticated thought leads us into traps, especially that of the so-called „God of Gaps“ and of Scientism. These traps can be avoided through epistemological caution. Thus, Aquinas proved himself to be a great philosopher of science and at the same time anticipated many important topics in the contemporary philosophy of science, e.g. the question of models. He warned of the necessity for an autonomy of science, philosophy, and theology, and thus, by apprehending the identity of his own discipline and by accepting and recognizing its limits, he opened the space for dialogue, this being the only way to avoid traps on the path to the realization of scientificality. Thus, Aquinas has left us a valid way of apprehending truth and a multitude of topics to be more thoroughly explored in the light of his thought. Finally, since this research was inspired by an article by T. Vereš, perhaps some of these thoughts will inspire new research as well as a discovery of the light of truth to which Aquinas himself has pointed our attention.
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