One of Eugen Fink's most important texts is "Oasis of Happiness. Thoughts on an Ontology of Play". Against the background of the interest in the phenomenon of play in philosophy and the social and ...cul-tural sciences, the Freiburg philosopher develops in this book an independent and innovative approach to play and playing, which is likely to prove a classic of 20th century philosophy. This volume on Fink's "Oasis of Happiness" contains not only this fundamental text, but also numerous interpretations from leading Fink scholars. It introduces not only Fink's reflections on play, but also methodologically his genuine phenomenological approach, and shows the broad international reception
This paper considers the incentive feedback Stackelberg game with multi‐hierarchy players under a H∞$H_\infty$ constraint, with the proposed solution involving nested hierarchies A and B. In ...hierarchy A, P0 represents the leader (the leader's control input corresponding to i‐th follower, i=1,2,…,n$i=1,2,\ldots ,n$), and P1,…,Pn$P_1,\ldots ,P_n$ are the followers, with non‐cooperative followers induced to virtually cooperate in achieving team‐optimal solution and the Nash equilibrium. In hierarchy B, the external disturbance represents the follower, and hierarchy A represents the leader. The main contributions of this work are three‐fold. First, an incentive Stackelberg strategy set under the H∞$H_\infty$ constraint through observation information is obtained for the first time. Second, a novel iterative algorithm to solve the coupled backward and forward Riccati equations is introduced and thus obtaining an explicit expression of a team‐optimal feedback Stackelberg strategy set with an H∞$H_\infty$ constraint. Finally, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the hierarchical game's optimal solutions using the Lyapunov equation and the induction algorithm are presented.
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This paper conducts a detailed overview on game-theoretic approaches for power demand response (DR) in the open and ever-growing electricity market (EM) in terms of three major categories of games, ...including non-cooperative game, cooperative game, and evolutionary game. In addition, we also separately review the Stackelberg game and Bayesian game in power DR. First, we briefly describe the main contents of game theory and the game behaviors of the electricity sellers, electricity suppliers, and electricity users in EM. Second, we comprehensively introduce the principle of the above-mentioned five categories of games and thoroughly review their applications in power DR in the context of open EMs, considering the transactions such as electricity pricing and electricity capacity trading among the electricity supplier side, electricity seller side, and electricity user side in the perfect open EMs, such as retail market, spot market, wholesale market, and ancillary service market. In this survey, aiming at each type of game mentioned above, we try to summarize the advantages and shortcomings of their application in EM in terms of power DR, as well as the issues that need to be solved currently or in the future. Finally, we offer some prospects on the scenario application and future development of game-theoretic approaches for power DR in an open EM. The biggest innovation of this paper lies in conducting a comprehensive survey on game-theoretic approaches applied to transactions in the open and ever-growing EMs from the perspective of power DR in terms of five major categories of games. We conduct this survey intended to arouse the interest and excitement of experts and scholars in the energy and electric power system industry and to look ahead to efforts that jointly promote the rapid development of game theory in the perfect open EM field.
What explains variability in norms of cooperation across organizations and cultures? One answer comes from the tendency of individuals to internalize typically successful behaviors as norms. ...Different institutional structures can cause different behavioral norms to be internalized. These norms are then carried over into atypical situations beyond the reach of the institution. Here, we experimentally demonstrate such spillovers. First, we immerse subjects in environments that do or do not support cooperation using repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. Afterwards, we measure their intrinsic prosociality in one-shot games. Subjects from environments that support cooperation are more prosocial, more likely to punish selfishness, and more trusting in general. Furthermore, these effects are most pronounced among subjects who use heuristics, suggesting that intuitive processes play a key role in the spillovers we observe. Our findings help to explain variation in one-shot anonymous cooperation, linking this intrinsically motivated prosociality to the externally imposed institutional rules experienced in other settings.
Data, as supplemental material, are available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2168
.
This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
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In this paper, we introduce a new type of contractions on a metric space (X,d) in which the distance d(x,y) is replaced with a function, depending on a parameter λ, that is not symmetric in general. ...This function generalizes the usual case when λ=1/2 and can take bigger values than msub.1/2. We call these new types of contractions λ-weak contractions and we provide some of their properties. Moreover, we investigate cases when these contractions are Picard operators.
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In a previous paper, we considered several models of the parlor game baccara chemin de fer, including Model B2 (a 2×2sup.484 matrix game) and Model B3 (a 2sup.5×2sup.484 matrix game), both of which ...depend on a positive-integer parameter d, the number of decks. The key to solving the game under Model B2 was what we called Foster’s algorithm, which applies to additive 2×2sup.n matrix games. Here “additive” means that the payoffs are additive in the n binary choices that comprise a player II pure strategy. In the present paper, we consider analogous models of the casino game baccara chemin de fer that take into account the 100 α percent commission on Banker (player II) wins, where 0≤α≤1/10. Thus, the game now depends not just on the discrete parameter d but also on a continuous parameter α. Moreover, the game is no longer zero sum. To find all Nash equilibria under Model B2, we generalize Foster’s algorithm to additive 2×2sup.n bimatrix games. We find that, with rare exceptions, the Nash equilibrium is unique. We also obtain a Nash equilibrium under Model B3, based on Model B2 results, but here we are unable to prove uniqueness.
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