Research on agriculture crowdfunding in developing countries is still limited. The crowdfunding platform offers uncollateralised loans to farmers. Therefore, they apply joint liability group lending ...to lower the default risk. However, from farmer’s point of view, joint liability causes higher risk since every group member bears his/her own risk and that of all other group members. Thus, the purpose of this article is to analyse how joint liability may lower the risk of both farmer and agriculture crowdfunding in Indonesia. A deductive qualitative research design with case study approach is used in this article. A series of in-depth interviews were conducted with one agriculture crowdfunding platform and two farmer groups. Data analysis was conducted by using pattern matching technique. The findings of this article are as follows: joint liability may lower the default risk of crowdfunding platform because the farmer groups are self-selected. The leader of the farmer group plays an important role in monitoring the members, and he may apply social sanction to the defaulting member. By implementing joint liability group lending, crowdfunding platform can provide extension services such as price certainty through contract farming, field agent monitoring and non-cash credit disbursement. These extension services help to lower the farmer’s risk.
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NUK, OILJ, SAZU, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Numerous authors point to a decline in joint liability microcredit, and rise in individual liability lending. But empirical evidence is lacking, and there have been no rigorous analyses of possible ...causes. We first show using the well-known MIX Market dataset that there is evidence for a decline. Second, we show theoretically that commercialization–an increase in competition and a shift from non-profit to for-profit lending (both of which are present in the data)–drives lenders to reduce their use of joint liability loan contracts. Third, we test the model's key predictions, and find support for them in the data.
•Joint liability lending by microfinance institutions is declining.•Theory predicts this can be linked to increased for-profit lending and competition.•Analysis of panel data on microfinance institutions supports the model.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZRSKP
•We explore the relative value of completely joint liability financing over individual financing.•We prove the existence of equilibrium point for two firms with joint liability.•We compare the two ...financing schemes from the perspective of the firms and the bank.•We show insights for the bank how to set its financing term under completely joint liability financing.
This paper makes an attempt to explore the relative value of a completely joint liability (CJL) financing scheme over traditional individual financing scheme for two financially-constrained firms. We develop a risk-sharing non-cooperative Nash-game model for the two firms in which they make unilateral ordering and financial decisions based on the CJL financing agreement as to the additional benefit (i.e., unit financing cost reduction) because of joint liability. We prove the existence of the firms’ equilibrium inventory decisions in a Nash game that is in general not quasi-concave or even supermodular. We show that in equilibrium, the completely joint liability of CJL financing induces the two firms to order more (compared to individual financing case), and meanwhile, the firms become more aggressive in ordering as the shared risk goes up. However, such over-investment in ordering under CJL financing does not always result in higher bankruptcy risks for the firms. Importantly, we show that the choice of the proposed financing schemes for both the firms is completely determined by a simple two-threshold policy in terms of the firms’ initial capitals and loan terms, and provide insights on how a financing-need firm to select proper partners to use CJL financing together, and how a profit-seeking bank to strategically set the proper financing terms to make the CJL financing scheme generate more benefits to itself and the two firms simultaneously (i.e., “win-win-win” situation).
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
This paper proposes a methodology to price bonds jointly issued by a group of countries—Eurobonds in the euro-area context. We consider two types of bonds; the first is backed by several and joint ...guarantees (SJGs), and the second features several but not joint guarantees (SNJGs). The pricing of SJG and SNJG bonds reflects different assumptions regarding the pooling of debtors’ fiscal resources. We estimate fiscal limits for the six largest euro-area economies over 2008–2021 and deduce counterfactual Eurobond prices. For the five-year maturity, SNJG bond yield spreads would have been about three times larger than SJG ones over the estimation sample. Hence, issuing SJG bonds could result in gains at the aggregate level. Notwithstanding, our model also predicts that gains may temporarily vanish in periods of acute fiscal stress. We finally envision postissuance redistribution schemes, whereby gains stemming from the issuance of SJG bonds could be shared among participating countries; we argue that these schemes may alleviate the reduction in market discipline resulting from common bonds issuance.
This paper was accepted by David Sraer, finance.
Funding:
This work has benefited from financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation Grant 182293.
Supplemental Material:
The data files and online appendix are available at
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4740
.
This paper studies the operations and financial decisions of two capital‐constrained firms via a limited joint liability (LJL) financing scheme offered by a bank with a menu of loan terms including ...interest rate and leverage ratio/credit line. To explicitly assess the value of LJL financing, we assume that the firms either use LJL financing scheme or traditional individual financing scheme to finance their operations. Under LJL financing scheme, we construct a non‐cooperative game model in which the two firms separately determine their own inventory decision to serve random demand, according to the prior joint liability agreement between the two firms and the bank. We prove that the non‐cooperative game between the two firms under the LJL financing scheme is a supermodular, and thus establish the existence of equilibrium inventory decisions of the firms. We then characterize the optimal loan terms of the profit‐seeking bank under the proposed two financing schemes. Our results show that the joint‐liability mechanism of the LJL financing scheme always induces the firms to overinvest in their ordering decisions (relative to the case of the individual financing scheme), which reveals that the endogenous financial terms of the LJL financing scheme have a positive effect on the firms' operational decisions. Importantly, we provide conditions under which the loan terms of the proposed two financing schemes can be properly set by the bank to make the LJL financing scheme more beneficial to the bank and the two firms, and the bank offering this financing scheme can obtain two additional benefits—that is, a higher probability of recouping all the loans and a lower profit risk (i.e., the standard derivation of the bank's random total profit), compared to individual financing scheme. The research findings provide managerial insights for a profit‐seeking bank on how to offer financial loans to capital‐constrained firms and for those capital‐constrained firms on how to cooperate with one another.
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BFBNIB, FZAB, GIS, IJS, IZUM, KILJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PILJ, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK
(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 69-86 | European Forum Insight of 02 May 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. Frontex under scrutiny: ...allegations, investigations, and the rule of law dilemma. - III. From Aleppo to the CJEU: WS et al. challenge Frontex in Court. - IV. The findings of the Court: no direct causal link. - V. Legal remedies and litigation avenues before the CJEU. - VI. In light of precedent: evolving perspectives on causation and joint liability. - VII. Consequences of WS for Frontex Accountability. - vii.1. Rapid reactions and resounding criticism. - vii.2. Unaddressed aspects: what the Court didn't say. - vii.3. Frontex Liability under the Competence Model. - VIII. Broader Consequences of WS for EU Law. - viii.1. The ecosystem of integrated administration. - viii.2. Is there space in EU law for joint liability?. - IX. Conclusion: shaping the EU joint liability landscape? | (Abstract) The Insight delves into the CJEU judgment of WS et al. v Frontex, the first action for damages against the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Frontex, for human rights violations at the EU's external borders. Despite the prevalence of systemic violations and heightened attention to the agency's accountability, the Court, applying a stringent causality threshold, dismissed the claim, sidestepping crucial questions of positive obligations and responsibility attribution. The analysis critiques the judgment's shortcomings in causality assessment, emphasising its broader repercussions for EU law, particularly concerning liability frameworks and accountability dynamics within the new multi-actor reality of EU integrated administration. The Insight underscores the pressing need to reevaluate the existing competence model of determining liability in EU law to address its limitations and introduces the classification of these limitations as the binary of causality and the binary of jurisdiction. The CJEU’s reluctance to establish an effective framework for joint liability not only perpetuates contested accountability gaps but also risks establishing precarious areas devoid of accountability, thereby compromising the foundational principles of the Rule of Law in the European Union. The Insight concludes with a call to address these shortcomings, emphasising that rectification is not merely a matter of procedural refinement but a crucial step towards ensuring robust accountability mechanisms in EU law.
This paper studies group lending with joint-liability contracts offered by Microfinance Institutions (MFIs). We develop a model of group lending where heterogeneous agents form groups, obtain capital ...from the MFI, and share risks among themselves. We show that the composition of the groups is not always homogeneous once risk-sharing is introduced, rationalizing the empirical evidence of risk heterogeneity within groups. Moreover, we find that joint liability introduces inefficiency for risk-averse borrowers, which explains why MFIs are moving away from joint-liability contracts. Surprisingly, the first-best outcome can be achieved even in the presence of information asymmetry.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
This study aims to delineate and analyze the configuration of social networks of farmers with respect to the acquisition of information on vital livestock technology. Three stage sampling was carried ...out by interviewing 320 technology-adopter farmers from four districts of Kerala State in India. For mapping the network, social network analysis (SNA) was used, which revealed the important sources as well as patterns of information access by farmers. Results established the predominance of a formal communication source (veterinary doctor) in the study locales followed by small-sized peer groups of livestock farmers for crucial information support on technology use. The trend is observed irrespective of their gender in various study areas. Significantly the study thus, underscored the role of homogenous peer groups of farmers in facilitating meaningful interactions as well as information sharing on the technology. Given the low level of adoption of most livestock technologies along with the weak livestock extension machinery in the country, these findings could be used by extension agencies to strategize future technological interventions.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
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