This article examines homicide cases in which women have been accused of killing alongside another person or persons – an area which until now has not been examined in a Scottish context. The ...findings presented demonstrate that being accused of killing with another person or persons can have particularly adverse effects for women: claims of domestic abuse are more likely to be rejected and ultimately, existing tendencies to construct women as deviant within the criminal justice system will be exacerbated, resulting in more severe punishment when they are convicted under the doctrine of art and part liability. It is concluded that closer attention must be paid to the criminalisation of women who are accused of offending alongside another person or persons, particularly in Scotland where less attention has been paid to how doctrines of derivative liability operate in practice.
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BFBNIB, FZAB, GIS, IJS, KILJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK
•We investigate whether microfinance borrowers signal their creditworthiness to the lender.•We analyze the purchase of costly voluntary insurance alongside the loan as the signal.•Borrowers who ...bought insurance were significantly more likely to fully repay their loan.•Insurance buyers also received larger loans on average.•Buying insurance indicates higher borrower quality and provides a direct benefit.
We examine how microfinance borrowers might signal their repayment responsibility (i.e., borrower quality) by opting into (costly) life insurance purchase along with their micro-loans. We show empirically that borrowers who bought additional life insurance coverage were significantly more likely to fully repay their loan, and were allowed to receive higher loan amounts, even after controlling for borrower health and other determinants of loan repayment and insurance purchase. The relationship is stronger in magnitude for new borrowers’ first loan than for their second loan, and in several situations in which borrowers would have a higher incentive to signal their creditworthiness. We interpret this evidence as borrowers signaling their creditworthiness (or quality) by purchasing costly insurance in an environment subject to a high level of information asymmetries and devoid of credible tools to demonstrate creditworthiness.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZRSKP
Microcredit is proved to be an effective tool for socio-economic development of its borrowers. In the past various models took shape in developing nations and made credit/loan available at the ...doorstep of the borrowers. The framework for delivering credit is called credit delivery model. Joint Liability Groups (JLGs) were widely adopted by various microfinance institutions in providing credit to the borrower groups. Many studies talked about the success of JLGs but very little literature was available on the problems faced by borrowers in JLGs. Data collected from Haridwar district is used to study the problems faced by borrowers in JLGs. Relation between Group association and problems faced by borrowers was also studied. The findings show that the major problems which borrowers faced include-strict repayment schedule, Non repayment/late repayment of loan, lack of loan information, peer pressure among group members etc. There also exist a relationship between group association and problems faced by borrowers.
This study empirically tests the predictions of four primary theories applicable to joint‐liability microcredit programs’ repayment performance using an administrative data in a metropolitan setting. ...We introduce a new variable, group names, as a proxy for social capital to capture cooperation, solidarity, and drive for success, which shows a significant positive impact of 9.9% on repayment performance. Precise calculations of residential distance between group members show a deterioration of repayment performance by 1.1% with a 15‐min increase in minimum walking distance. The results also show that joint liability, sectoral diversification, type of sector that the borrowers facilitate, the ratio of new members in a group, characteristics of loan officers, loan amount, interest rate, income‐loan amount coverage ratio, the existence of senior members, average education, and diversity in income streams significantly affect repayment performance.
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FZAB, GIS, IJS, IZUM, KILJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PILJ, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK
A large body of literature has shown that small firms experience difficulties in accessing the credit market due to informational asymmetries. Banks can overcome these asymmetries through ...relationship lending, or at least mitigate their effects by asking for collateral. Small firms, especially if they are young, have little collateral and short credit histories, and thus may find it difficult to raise funds from banks. In this paper, we show that even in this case, small firms may improve their borrowing capacity by joining Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGI). Our empirical analysis shows that small firms affiliated to MGIs pay less for credit compared with similar firms. We obtain this result for interest rates charged on loan contracts which are not backed by mutual guarantees. We then argue that our findings are consistent with the view that MGIs are better at screening and monitoring opaque borrowers than banks are. Thus, banks benefit from the willingness of MGIs to post collateral since this implies that firms are better screened and monitored.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK
•We study the relationship between repayment incentives and social sanctions in a microfinance game.•The results provide a mechanism through which default and attrition are connected to group ...activities.•Those with the largest gains from group activities repay more often.•Social sanctions via exclusion from group are used as an effective disciplinary device.
Microfinance groups often engage in a variety of collective activities not directly related to credit. We design a three-stage repayment game to examine how the existence of these ancillary activities affect repayment behavior and group attrition. In the first stage, the group borrows under joint liability, each member undertakes a risky project and decides whether or not to contribute to loan repayment. In the second stage, contributing members can vote to expel others from the group. Those remaining engage in a public goods game in the last stage. The public good game represents the non-credit collective activity that members can be involved in. We identify repayment equilibria with and without exclusion and show that exclusionary equilibria are most likely when loans are large and there is significant within-group heterogeneity in the gains from the public good. Results from a laboratory experiment that embodies the main features of the repayment game are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Individual decisions to contribute to loan repayment depend on gains from the public good and groups with the largest debt burdens have the highest rates of default and attrition.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZRSKP
•We provide an allocation rule to apportion damages multiple defendants caused.•The Shapley value is not a fair allocation rule with even a small random error.•We alternatively propose the stochastic ...Shapley value.•It satisfies ex post efficiency, symmetry, feasibility and fairness.
If multiple defendants are jointly liable for a plaintiff's harm, the court must determine the apportionments of the damages among them. Recently, in a series of papers, Dehez and Ferey (2013) and Ferey and Dehez (2016a,b) took a cooperative game theory approach, and used the Shapley value and the weighted Shapley value to determine the shares especially in the case of sequential acts. In this paper, we argue that their allocation rule is not strictly fair if we take even a small random error into account. We alternatively propose the stochastic Shapley value which extends the definition of the Shapley value to stochastic cooperative games and show that it satisfies ex post efficiency, symmetry, dummy, feasibility and fairness.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
The mechanisms of joint liability and dynamic incentive in microfinance institutions are often cited as the key factors that lead to the low default rate in loan repayment in developing countries. ...The study tested the effects of joint-liability lending and dynamic incentive mechanisms on risk preferences and loan repayment. Through the conduct of microfinance lab-in-the-field experiments with 256 microfinance clients in Thailand, this study found that joint liability without dynamic incentive performs better than individual lending in terms of loan repayment. The dynamic incentive mechanism reduces risk-taking behavior and promotes loan repayment, however, combination of joint-liability and dynamic incentives enhances moral hazard through risk-taking. Further, participants tended to be more risk-taking when they perceived that their partners were risk-lovers.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
We construct a dynamic model of self-enforcing insurance provision and lending to a community of borrowers who are connected by risk-sharing arrangements that are themselves subject to enforcement ...problems, as in Kocherlakota (1996). We show that an outside lender offering constant-consumption contracts can earn a higher profit if he conditions his repeated interactions with each borrower on the history of his interactions with
all the group members (a joint liability contract), rather than on his history with that borrower only (individual liability contracts). This result holds even in the absence of informational asymmetries. The observation driving it is that with individual liability contracts, a joint welfare-maximizing group may prefer to have one or more group members default on their contracts, so that the group can consume a mix of outside funds and the defaulters' stochastic income. One contribution of our work is to give precise economic content to the concept of “social collateral” as the per-agent surplus from group risk-sharing over autarky. The group can deter its members from defaulting on their contracts with the principal by threatening to reduce that surplus.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK
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