Ethical decision-making (EDM) descriptive theoretical models often conflict with each other and typically lack comprehensiveness. To address this deficiency, a revised EDM model is proposed that ...consolidates and attempts to bridge together the varying and sometimes directly conflicting propositions and perspectives that have been advanced. To do so, the paper is organized as follows. First, a review of the various theoretical models of EDM is provided. These models can generally be divided into (a) rationalist-based (i.e., reason); and (b) non-rationalistbased (i.e., intuition and emotion). Second, the proposed model, called 'Integrated Ethical Decision Making,' is introduced in order to fill the gaps and bridge the current divide in EDM theory. The individual and situational factors as well as the process of the proposed model are then described. Third, the academic and managerial implications of the proposed model are discussed. Finally, the limitations of the proposed model are presented.
This study utilizes a controlled experimental design to investigate the influence of a virtual reality experience on empathy, compassion, moral reasoning, and moral foundations. With continued debate ...and mixed results from previous studies attempting to show relationships between virtual reality and empathy, this study takes advantage of the technology for its ability to provide a consistent, repeatable experience, broadening the scope of analysis beyond empathy. A systematic literature review identified the most widely used and validated moral psychology assessments for the constructs, and these assessments were administered before and after the virtual reality experience. The study is comprised of two pre-post experiments with student participants from a university in the United States. The first experiment investigated change in empathy and moral foundations among 44 participants, and the second investigated change in compassion and moral reasoning among 69 participants. The results showed no significant change in empathy nor compassion, but significant change in moral reasoning from personal interest to post-conventional stages, and significant increase in the Care/harm factor of moral foundations. By testing four of the primary constructs of moral psychology with the most widely used and validated assessments in controlled experiments, this study attempts to advance our understanding of virtual reality and its potential to influence human morality. It also raises questions about our self-reported assessment tools and provides possible new insights for the constructs examined.
The current research presents five experiments (N = 1298) that examine what decision-making strategies lead to satisfying decisions in moral dilemmas. Past research in other contexts suggests that ...when people believe that they are using the true self as a guide (TSAG) to make decisions, they experience more decision satisfaction. However, it was unclear whether this past work would generalize to moral dilemmas given that people believe their true selves are morally good and moral dilemmas require a violation of at least one moral code to be resolved. However, results of five studies suggested that TSAG effects extend to moral dilemmas. Studies 1–3 indicated that when participants were given instructions for how to solve moral dilemmas, TSAG instructions led to more satisfying decisions relative to rational thinking, intuition, or no instruction conditions. In Study 4, all participants received non-true self instructions (rational thinking or intuition) during the decision-making process, but half were asked to reframe their decision as being guided by the true self after the decision was made. We found that this reframing facilitated decision satisfaction even though the decision was actually made using alternative instructions, suggesting that perceptions of TSAG may directly drive the observed effects on decision satisfaction as opposed to actual use of the true self per se. Finally, in Study 5, we found evidence that the effect of TSAG instructions was more robust in moral (vs. nonmoral) dilemmas and not contingent on the dilemmas being easy or difficult.
•Instructions to use true selves promoted decision satisfaction in moral dilemmas.•Post-decision true self reframing promoted decision satisfaction in moral dilemmas.•Perceptions of using true selves mediated the effect of reframing.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
Do university ethics classes influence students' real-world moral choices? We aimed to conduct the first controlled study of the effects of ordinary philosophical ethics classes on real-world moral ...choices, using non-self-report, non-laboratory behavior as the dependent measure. We assigned 1332 students in four large philosophy classes to either an experimental group on the ethics of eating meat or a control group on the ethics of charitable giving. Students in each group read a philosophy article on their assigned topic and optionally viewed a related video, then met with teaching assistants for 50-minute group discussion sections. They expressed their opinions about meat ethics and charitable giving in a follow-up questionnaire (1032 respondents after exclusions). We obtained 13,642 food purchase receipts from campus restaurants for 495 of the students, before and after the intervention. Purchase of meat products declined in the experimental group (52% of purchases of at least $4.99 contained meat before the intervention, compared to 45% after) but remained the same in the control group (52% both before and after). Ethical opinion also differed, with 43% of students in the experimental group agreeing that eating the meat of factory farmed animals is unethical compared to 29% in the control group. We also attempted to measure food choice using vouchers, but voucher redemption rates were low and no effect was statistically detectable. It remains unclear what aspect of instruction influenced behavior.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
•Meta-analysis performed on relationship between conscience and delinquency.•Components of conscience included empathy, guilt, and moral reasoning.•Conscience predicted future delinquency at a modest ...to moderate level.•It predicted a change in delinquency at a weak to modest, but significant, level.•Results support conscience and its components as predictors of delinquency.
The purpose of this study was to investigate the three central components of conscience as outlined in integrative theory (i.e., empathy, guilt, and moral reasoning) on their ability to predict future delinquency. A meta-analysis was performed on studies in which participants were assessed on one or more of these components during late childhood, early adolescence, or middle adolescence and then evaluated several months to several years later for delinquency. The analyses showed that conscience, as measured by one or more of the three components, predicted lower levels of delinquency over time. Zero-order correlations were modest-to-moderate in size, whereas partial correlations, in which prior delinquency was controlled, were weak-to-modest but statistically significant. The results of this study support conscience and its components as instrumental in reducing and preventing delinquency in mid- to late adolescence.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
Policing in many parts of the world-the United States in particular-has embraced an archetypal model: a conception of the police based on the tenets of individuated archetypes, such as the heroic ...police "warrior" or "guardian." Such policing has in part motivated moves to (1) a reallocative model: reallocating societal resources such that the police are no longer needed in society (defunding and abolishing) because reform strategies cannot fix the way societal problems become manifest in (archetypal) policing; and (2) an algorithmic model: subsuming policing into technocratic judgements encoded in algorithms through strategies such as predictive policing (mitigating archetypal bias). This paper begins by considering the normative basis of the relationship between political community and policing. It then examines the justification of reallocative and algorithmic models in light of the relationship between political community and police. Given commitments to the depth and distribution of security-and proscriptions against dehumanizing strategies-the paper concludes that a nonideal-theory priority rule promoting respect for personhood (manifest in community and dignity-promoting policing strategies) is a necessary condition for the justification of the above models.
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BFBNIB, DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Muitos dos problemas ambientais vivenciados atualmente encontram ressonância na questão ética que move o comportamento das pessoas. Esse estudo investigou as variações de aplicação da ética ambiental ...e o respectivo o ethos atribuído na responsabilidade diante de problemas socioambientais em estudantes do ensino fundamental em Manaus-AM, com idade entre 10 e 18 anos. Foi aplicada uma entrevista centrada num dilema sobre a construção de uma hidrelétrica e seus impactos socioambientais na Amazônia. Diante do dilema narrado, a maioria dos participantes se posicionou contrária à execução do projeto, evidenciando um imperativo categórico fortemente ancorado numa desejabilidade social pró-ambiental e associado a motivações altruístas e biosféricas. No entanto, o raciocínio moral presente na grande maioria dos participantes, manifestou uma perspectiva ética antropocêntrica para a resolução do problema apresentado. Os que se posicionaram a favor da instalação da hidrelétrica, apesar dos impactos, demonstraram ter mais motivações atitudinais egoístas e apáticas, com um raciocínio moral ecológico eminentemente antropocêntrico nas soluções dadas ao dilema.
People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative ...evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor‐analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral uncertainty and to rate different aspects of their uncertainty about this case. Across this wide range of moral scenarios, our items loaded onto three reliable factors: lack of information, unclear consequences, and normative uncertainty. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure using predefined stimulus material. N = 402 participants each rated eight scenarios that systematically varied in their degree of uncertainty regarding the consequences of the described actions and in the value conflict that was inherent to them. The empirical uncertainty factors were mainly affected by the introduction of uncertainty regarding consequences, and the normative uncertainty factor was mainly affected by the introduction of value conflict. Our studies provide evidence that the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty accurately describes a psychological reality. We discuss the relevance of our findings for research on moral judgments and decision‐making, and folk metaethics.
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BFBNIB, FZAB, GIS, IJS, KILJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK
Stanley et al. (2018) found that the consideration of reasons rarely induced people to change their moral decisions. We challenged this article by assuming what caused such a null or weak effect was ...that the persuasiveness of reasons provided to oppose the initial decisions was not strong enough. To verify our assumption, this study used Stanley et al.’s (2018) experimental paradigm and manipulated the levels of persuasiveness of reasons. The results revealed (1) that not only strong opposing reasons but also weak affirming reasons could induce changes in moral decision‐making and increase decision confidence after altering the decisions; (2) that people with a weak decision confidence tended to change their initial decisions after evaluation of reasons; and (3) that people who maintained their decisions after considering weak opposing reasons enhanced rather than reduced their decision confidence. Overall, these findings demonstrated that moral decision change was a composite outcome of the interaction among reason type, reason persuasiveness and initial decision confidence and that low‐quality argumentation had a boomerang effect on moral persuasion. This study re‐lifted the role of rational reasoning in moral decision‐making and revising, thus posing important amendments to Stanley et al.’s (2018) findings.
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FZAB, GIS, IJS, KILJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK
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