Among the most important problems for the world-wide nuclear explosion monitoring is the interference of naturally occurring and man-made radionuclides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) of ...the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) frequently detects these interferences using sensitive radionuclide measurement equipment. We commonly refer to the presence of radionuclides that are relevant to the CTBT but do not originate from a nuclear explosion as “background”. Backgrounds are highest near the sources but are known to have regional and global effects on the IMS. This review paper summarizes much of the relevant work in the area of background and discusses issues of interest for nuclear explosion detection.
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DOBA, EMUNI, FIS, FZAB, GEOZS, GIS, IJS, IMTLJ, IZUM, KILJ, KISLJ, MFDPS, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, SBMB, SBNM, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK, VKSCE, ZAGLJ
The understanding of subsurface events that cannot be directly observed is dependent on the ability to relate surface-based observations to subsurface processes. This is particularly important for ...nuclear explosion monitoring, as any future clandestine tests will likely be underground. We collected ground-based lidar and optical imagery using remote, very-low-altitude unmanned aerial system platforms, before and after several underground high explosive experiments. For the lidar collections, we used a terrestrial lidar scanner to obtain high-resolution point clouds and create digital elevation models (DEMs). For the imagery collections, we used structure-from-motion photogrammetry techniques and a dense grid of surveyed ground control points to create high-resolution DEMs. Comparisons between the pre- and post-experiment DEMs indicate changes in surface topography that vary between explosive experiments with varying yield and depth parameters. Our work shows that the relationship between explosive yield and the extent of observable surface change differs from the standard scaled-depth-of-burial model. This suggests that the surface morphological change from underground high explosive experiments can help constrain the experiments' yield and depth, and may impact how such activities are monitored and verified.
•Photogrammetry and lidar can record surface change from deeply buried explosions.•The observed pattern of surface change differs from conventional scaling.•The stress field controls surface damage more than number of pre-existing fractures.•Yield and depth may be obtainable from high-resolution surface change measurements.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
The characteristics of acoustic-gravity waves (waveforms, time durations, amplitudes, azimuths and horizontal phase speeds) from the eruption of the Hunga-Tonga-Hunga-Hapai volcano detected at ...different infrasound stations of the Infrasound Monitoring System and at a network of low-frequency microbarographs in the Moscow region are studied. Using the correlation analysis of the signals at different locations, six arrivals of signals from the volcano, which made up to two revolutions around the Earth, were detected. The Lamb mode of acoustic gravity waves from the volcano eruption is identified and the effect of this mode on generation of tsunami waves and variation of aerosol concentration is studied. The energy released from an underwater volcano into the atmosphere is estimated from the parameters of the Lamb wave and compared with the energy released from the most powerful nuclear bomb of 58 Mt TNT.
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DOBA, EMUNI, FIS, FZAB, GEOZS, GIS, IJS, IMTLJ, IZUM, KILJ, KISLJ, MFDPS, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, SBMB, SBNM, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK, VKSCE, ZAGLJ
4.
Noble gas adsorption to tuff Cantrell, Kirk J.; Wang, Guohui; Mitroshkov, Alexandre V. ...
Journal of environmental radioactivity,
03/2022, Volume:
243
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
A method was developed to measure trace noble gas element adsorption to the surfaces of geologic materials in the presence of a background gas that could potentially compete for surface adsorption ...sites. Adsorption of four noble gas elements (Ne, Ar, Kr, and Xe) at a concentration of 100 ppm in helium and nitrogen were measured on a sample of crushed tuff at 0, 15, 30, and 45 °C. In addition, Ne, Ar, Kr, and Xe at 250 ppm and 500 ppm in nitrogen at 15 °C were measured. Noble gas adsorption was found to increase with increasing atomic mass and decreasing temperature. It was also observed that the relative increase in noble gas element adsorption with decreasing temperature tends to increase with increasing atomic mass. As the noble gas concentrations in nitrogen increased, adsorption increased in a slightly non-linear fashion which could be modeled using a Freundlich isotherm. For noble gas concentrations that were ≤100 ppm Henry's Law constant were calculated.
•A method was developed to measure noble gas adsorption to natural materials.•Noble gas adsorption increases with increasing atomic mass.•Noble gas adsorption increases with decreasing temperature.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
Radioxenon isotopes measured at radionuclide stations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty’s (CTBT) International Monitoring System (IMS) may indicate releases from underground nuclear ...explosions (UNEs) but are often caused by emissions from nuclear facilities. Characterization of CTBT-relevant nuclear events may use the evolution of isotopic activity ratios over time, which goes from the release of an assumed UNE, through atmospheric transport, to sample collections and measurements. A mathematical approach is presented to discuss the characterization of the spatial and temporal relationships between a nuclear explosion and radioxenon measurements. On the one hand, activity concentrations at an IMS station are estimated by using the assumed release scenario regarding a UNE and atmospheric transport modelling. On the other hand, the activities collected in the samples are determined by spectral analysis first and the activity concentrations in the air passing over the IMS station are estimated under an assumption of constant concentration during sampling. The isotopic ratios of activities released from the UNE are related to the isotopic ratios of activity concentrations in the plume of air crossing the IMS station, resulting in a function of the isotopic activity ratio over the time from detonation to sample measurement. The latter is used for discrimination of a nuclear test and estimation of the time of detonation, such as a four radioxenon plot of the activity ratio relationship of
135
Xe/
133
Xe versus
133m
Xe/
131m
Xe.
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DOBA, EMUNI, FIS, FZAB, GEOZS, GIS, IJS, IMTLJ, IZUM, KILJ, KISLJ, MFDPS, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, SBMB, SBNM, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK, VKSCE, ZAGLJ
Abstract Current noble gas detection systems for nuclear explosion monitoring are based on the detection of four radioxenon isotopes—Xe-131m, -133, -133m and -135. The data provided by radioxenon ...detection could be enhanced by other radionuclide signatures such as Ar-37. Activation of Ca-40 in rock by neutrons produces Ar-37, and monitoring for this additional nuclide could help distinguish detections of nuclear explosions from background sources, such as medical isotope production. This work studies the capabilities of a hypothetical argon detection network. A 10 kt explosion was modeled using MCNP and SCALE to determine the inventory of Ar-37 created in a representative granite rock layer, assuming either 0.1, 1 or 10% of the total inventory was released. The Ar-37 inventory was combined with atmospheric transport data from HYSPLIT compiled in a previous study, along with the detection limits of standard Ar-37 detection systems, to determine how many hypothetical monitoring stations would detect Ar-37 from an explosion. This method was repeated for 365 HYSPLIT data sets to create a year’s worth of hypothetical explosions, releases, and detections. The study quantified the average number of detections per release, the number of stations detecting Ar-37, and the possibility of detecting Ar-37 in coincidence with xenon.
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EMUNI, FIS, FZAB, GEOZS, GIS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, MFDPS, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, SBMB, SBNM, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK, VKSCE, ZAGLJ
Monitoring atmospheric concentrations of radioxenons is relevant to provide evidence of atmospheric or underground nuclear weapon tests. However, when the design of the International Monitoring ...Network (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear‐Test‐Ban Treaty (CTBT) was set up, the impact of industrial releases was not perceived. It is now well known that industrial radioxenon signature can interfere with that of nuclear tests. Therefore, there is a crucial need to characterize atmospheric distributions of radioxenons from industrial sources—the so‐called atmospheric background—in the frame of the CTBT. Two years of Xe‐133 atmospheric background have been simulated using 2013 and 2014 meteorological data together with the most comprehensive emission inventory of radiopharmaceutical facilities and nuclear power plants to date. Annual average simulated activity concentrations vary from 0.01 mBq/m3 up to above 5 mBq/m3 nearby major sources. Average measured and simulated concentrations agree on most of the IMS stations, which indicates that the main sources during the time frame are properly captured. Xe‐133 atmospheric background simulated at IMS stations turn out to be a complex combination of sources. Stations most impacted are in Europe and North America and can potentially detect Xe‐133 every day. Predicted occurrences of detections of atmospheric Xe‐133 show seasonal variations, more accentuated in the Northern Hemisphere, where the maximum occurs in winter. To our knowledge, this study presents the first global maps of Xe‐133 atmospheric background from industrial sources based on two years of simulation and is a first attempt to analyze its composition in terms of origin at IMS stations.
Key Points
Simulation of two years of Xe‐133 atmospheric background from industrial releases worldwide
Characterization of Xe‐133 atmospheric background origin at monitoring stations locations
Implications for nuclear weapon test detections
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BFBNIB, FZAB, GIS, IJS, KILJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK
The article analyzes the process of formation and establishes the characteristics of the striking factors of a nuclear explosion of tactical nuclear ammunition with a power of 0.1 to 10 kt when ...damaging military facilities and the accompanying damage to the population of civilian communities and personnel of infrastructure facilities. Calculated are data on the parameters of air shock wave action zones, penetrating radiation flow, light pulse energy beam flow, and the dimensions of the zone of radioactive contamination of the area, which can create a negative impact on the population, residential buildings, personnel, and critical infrastructure facilities in the area of application of tactical nuclear weapons. It is shown that the zone affected by an air shock wave, depending on the type of explosion of tactical nuclear ammunition and its power, can reach a radius of up to 3100 m. Dangerous light pulse damage to the population and personnel located in the open area will be observed at a distance of 440 to 3700 m from the epicenter of the nuclear explosion. The negative impact of the penetrating radiation of a nuclear explosion on the population and personnel of critical infrastructure facilities will be observed at distances from 560 to 1300 m, depending on the type of explosion and the power of the tactical nuclear ammunition. The dimensions of the zone of radioactive contamination, in the case of the explosion of tactical nuclear ammunition, in which the most severe degree of radiation damage to the population and personnel of critical infrastructure objects will be observed, with their open location in the area, depending on the power and type of explosion, can reach from 1400 to 2600 m. And the zone in which it is necessary to carry out the priority immediate evacuation of the population can be from 3.4 to 44.0 km in the direction of the average wind. It was determined that the scale of radioactive contamination of the area will have the greatest values of the size of the areas of negative impact relative to other types of impressive factors of the nuclear explosion of tactical nuclear ammunition. In large areas of the regions adjacent to the area of application of the specified ammunition, a significant negative radiation effect will be created, which will require measures of radiation protection and evacuation of the population.
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DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
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