In this paper, I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative ...reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to Φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to Φ I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond correctly to her reasons. In conclusion, I discuss some implications of this argument (given that some other standard assumptions about reasons hold). One such implication is that we are always in a position to be justified in believing all truths about what we have decisive reason (or ought) to do.
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The question of how we come to accept new theories is a central area of inquiry in scientonomic discourse. However, there has yet to be a formal discussion of the subjective reasons an agent may have ...for accepting theories. This paper explores these epistemic reasons and constructs a historically sensitive definition of reason. This formulation takes an abstractionist stance towards the ontology of reasons and makes use of a composite basing relation. The descriptive and normative components of reasons are fully formulated in scientonomic terms through the application of the newly introduced notion of implication, and its separation from the notion of inference. In addition, the paper provides scientonomic definitions for sufficient reason, support, and normative inference. The fruitfulness of this formulation of reasons is illustrated by a few examples.
Suggested Modifications
Sciento-2019-0009: Accept the following definition of implication:
Implication ≡ a logical transition from one theory to another.
Sciento-2019-0010: Accept the following definitions of sufficient reason, reason, support, and normative inference:
Sufficient Reason ≡ an agent takes theory A to be a sufficient reason for (accepting) theory B iff the following four conditions are met:
(1) The agent accepts A.
(2) The agent accepts that A→B.
(3) The agent employs ε.
(4) The agent accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B).
Support ≡ an agent takes theory A to be supporting theory B iff the agent accepts A and accepts that A→B.
Reason ≡ an agent takes theory A to be a reason for theory B iff the agent accepts that A→B, employs ε, and accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B).
Normative Inference ≡ An agent takes theory A to normatively infer theory B iff the agent accepts A, accepts that A→B, and accepts (ε, A, A→B) →ε (Should accept B).
Sciento-2019-0011: Provided that modification Sciento-2019-0010 is accepted, accept the sufficient reason theorem and its deduction from the definition of sufficient reason and the second law:
Sufficient Reason theorem: a theory becomes accepted by an agent, when an agent has a sufficient reason for accepting it.
Accept the following question as a legitimate topic of scientonomic inquiry:
Theory Acceptance without Sufficient Reason: how do theories become accepted without a sufficient reason, i.e. in the cases of circularity or theories without a reason?
Abstract Emotions play vital roles in our psychology and our lives. They also often form the basis of our evaluative beliefs. On some views, emotions, like perceptions, justify the beliefs to which ...they give rise. It has, however, been claimed that, unlike perceptions, emotions are merely proxies for the genuine reasons that are constituted by their cognitive bases. In this paper, I argue that this objection arises from the failure to notice the difference between the notions of ‘reasons there are’ and ‘possessed reasons’. After developing an account of what it is to possess a reason, it will be argued that emotions do constitute genuine reasons for the evaluative beliefs that result from them. To support this claim, a distinction is made between thinner and thicker descriptions of the same event, where a thinner description may be in terms of the emotional response, whereas a thicker description may be in terms of possessing a normative reason to hold a belief or to act.
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FZAB, GIS, IJS, KILJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK
Purpose
The purposes of this study were to identify the reasons for delayed surgery following hip fractures and analyze the impact of these reasons on 1-year mortality.
Methods
A prospective cohort ...study of 1234 patients with mean age of 83.1 (range 65–92, SD 8.0) who underwent hip fracture surgery compared three subgroups: (1) surgery within two days from admission (609 patients); (2) delayed surgery for medical reasons (286); and (3) delayed surgery for organizational causes (339). Medical reason was defined as the need of medical optimization of the patient prior to surgery. Pre-operative assessment was performed by the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) score, Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI), Hodkinson mental status, Katz index for activities of daily living, and Short-Form (SF-12) questionnaire. Univariate analyses were used (chi-square and Fisher exact or Mantel-Haenszel tests for categorical data, and variance analysis, Student
t
test, or Mann-Whitney
U
test for continuous data). Logistic regression models were used for influence of variables on complications and one year mortality.
Results
There were no significant differences in complications or one year mortality rates between patients with surgery within two days and those with delayed surgery for medical reasons. However, the patients with delayed surgery for organizational causes had significant higher rates of both complications and one year mortality compared to the other two groups (
p
= 0.001).
Conclusions
This study suggests that waiting time for hip fracture surgery more than two days was not associated with higher complication or mortality rate if waiting was to stabilize patients with active comorbidities at admission, compared to stable patients at admission with early surgery. Although early surgery within two days from admission is desirable for stable patients at admission, in patients with complex comorbidities, the surgery should be performed once they are optimized. However, the patients with delayed surgery for organizational reasons had a significant higher rate of post-operative complications and one year mortality compared to the other two groups.
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EMUNI, FIS, FZAB, GEOZS, GIS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, MFDPS, NLZOH, NUK, OBVAL, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, SBMB, SBNM, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK, VKSCE, ZAGLJ
35.
Introducing a new elusive reason Cohen Rossi, Benjamin
Ratio (Oxford),
September 2021, 2021-09-00, 20210901, Volume:
34, Issue:
3
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
In this paper, I introduce a new species of elusive reason–reasons that it is impossible for an agent to act, or be motivated to act, for–and I show how this kind of elusive reason undermines a ...plausible claim about normative reasons, the Motivational Constraint. To defend the existence of this new kind of elusive reason, I respond to the objection that our intuitions are tracking another normative or evaluative phenomenon, such as reasons to have certain affective responses or reasons for others to act. In addition, because accepting the new kind of elusive reason requires affirming the claim that S acts for a reason p only if S regards p as a reason to A, I develop an account of what it is for S to regard p as a reason to A. Finally, as part of arguing for the former claim, I argue that the idea of being moved to A for a reason p entails the idea of being moved to A in light of p, which itself entails the idea of regarding p as a reason.
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In this paper, I argue against the view that epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief. I begin by responding to some of the most widespread arguments in favor of the normativity of ...epistemic reasons before advancing two arguments against this thesis. The first is supported by an analysis of what it means to “have” some evidence for p. The second is supported by the claim that beliefs, if they are to be considered as states, cannot have epistemic reasons as normative reasons.
Objectives
To systematically review reasons for the willingness to participate in biomedical human subjects research in low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs).
Methods
Five databases were ...systematically searched for articles published between 2000 and 2017 containing the domain of ‘human subjects research’ in ‘LMICs’ and determinant ‘reasons for (non)participation’. Reasons mentioned were extracted, ranked and results narratively described.
Results
Ninety‐four articles were included, 44 qualitative and 50 mixed‐methods studies. Altruism, personal health benefits, access to health care, monetary benefit, knowledge, social support and trust were the most important reasons for participation. Primary reasons for non‐participation were safety concerns, inconvenience, stigmatisation, lack of social support, confidentiality concerns, physical pain, efficacy concerns and distrust. Stigmatisation was a major concern in relation to HIV research. Reasons were similar across different regions, gender, non‐patient or patient participants and real or hypothetical study designs.
Conclusions
Addressing factors that affect (non‐)participation in the planning process and during the conduct of research may enhance voluntary consent to participation and reduce barriers for potential participants.
Objectifs
Analyser systématiquement les raisons de la volonté de participer à la recherche biomédicale sur les sujets humains dans les PRFI.
Méthodes
Cinq bases de données ont été systématiquement recherchées pour des articles publiés entre 2000 et 2017 contenant le domaine de la «recherche sur des sujets humains» dans les «PRFI» et les déterminantes «raisons de la (non) participation». Les raisons mentionnées ont été extraites, classées et les résultats décrits de manière narrative.
Résultats
94 articles ont été inclus, 44 études qualitatives et 51 études à méthodes mixtes. L'altruisme, les avantages pour la santé personnelle, l'accès aux soins de santé, les avantages pécuniaires, les connaissances, le soutien social et la confiance étaient les principales raisons de la participation. Les principales raisons de la non‐participation étaient les problèmes de sécurité, les inconvénients, la stigmatisation, le manque de soutien social, les soucis de confidentialité, la douleur physique, les soucis d'efficacité et la méfiance. La stigmatisation était une préoccupation majeure dans le cadre de la recherche sur le VIH. Les raisons étaient similaires dans les différentes régions, le sexe, les participants patients ou non‐patients et les modèles d’étude réels ou hypothétiques.
Conclusions
La prise en compte des facteurs qui affectent la (non) participation au processus de planification et au cours de la recherche peut renforcer le consentement volontaire à la participation et réduire les obstacles pour les participants potentiels.
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In this paper, I defend the view that only practical reasons are normative reasons for belief. This requires viewing beliefs as the predictable results of our actions. I will show how this fits with ...our intuitions about mental autonomy. The remainder of the paper consists in a defense against a series of objections that may be expected against this position. The paper concludes with a metaphilosophical explanation about our conflicting intuitions regarding the normativity of rationality.
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La présente étude a évalué la prévalence et les facteurs associés à trois comportements de sextage : la production, l'envoi et la retransmission. Les raisons d'envoyer des sextos ont été documentés. ...Cette étude observationnelle transversale a été réalisée auprès de 1,089 adolescents de secondaire 4 et 5 (M = 16 ans). Environ un adolescent sur quatre a déjà produit et a déjà envoyé des sextos, et environ 3 % des adolescents en a déjà retransmis. Les adolescents envoient principalement des sextos pour flirter ou offrir un cadeau sexy. Le genre féminin, l'attirance sexuelle autre qu'hétérosexuelle, l'impulsivité et un plus grand nombre de partenaires sexuels augmentent la probabilité de s'engager dans la production de sextos, tandis qu'une plus grande estime de soi, le fait de ne pas avoir eu de relation sexuelle et le fait de ne pas avoir eu de relation sexuelle occasionnelle en diminuent la probabilité. L'impulsivité augmente la probabilité de s'engager dans l'envoi de sextos, tandis qu'une plus grande estime de soi et le fait de ne pas avoir eu de relation sexuelle en diminuent la probabilité. Un plus grand nombre de partenaires sexuels augmente la probabilité de s'engager dans la retransmission de sextos, tandis que le genre féminin et le fait de ne pas avoir eu de relation sexuelle occasionnelle en diminuent la probabilité. Ces observations aideront à l'élaboration de nouvelles stratégies de prévention et d'intervention.
This study assessed the prevalence and factors associated with three sexting behaviors: producing, sending, and retransmitting. Reasons for sexting were documented. This cross-sectional observational study included 1,089 adolescents in secondary 4 and 5 (M = 16 years). Approximately one in four adolescents had produced and sent sexting, and approximately 3% of adolescents had retransmitted sexting. Adolescents primarily sext to flirt or to offer a sexy gift. Female gender, non-heterosexual sexual attraction, impulsivity, and a more significant number of sexual partners increase the likelihood of engaging in sexting, while higher self-esteem, not having had sex, and not having had casual sex decrease the likelihood. Impulsivity increases the likelihood of engaging in sexting, while higher self-esteem and not having had sex decrease the likelihood. A more significant number of sexual partners increases the likelihood of engaging in sexting while being of the female gender and not having had casual sex decreases the likelihood. These findings will help in the development of new prevention and intervention strategies.
Intérêt public
La présente étude démontre qu'environ un jeune sur quatre a déjà produit et a déjà envoyé des sextos et environ 3 % des jeunes en ont déjà retransmis. Les jeunes envoient principalement des sextos pour flirter. Les facteurs qui sont associés à la production, à l'envoi et à la retransmission de sextos ne sont pas tous les mêmes. Ces résultats montrent l'importance d'élaborer de nouvelles stratégies de prévention et d'intervention auprès des jeunes.
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