This study evaluates the relation between hostile takeovers and 17 takeover laws from 1965 to 2014. Using a data set of largely exogenous legal changes, we find that certain takeover laws, such as ...poison pill and business combination laws, have no discernible impact on hostile activity, while others such as fair price laws have reduced hostile takeovers. We construct a Takeover Index from the laws and find that higher takeover protection is associated with lower firm value, consistent with entrenchment and agency costs. However, conditional on a bid, firms with more protection achieve higher premiums, consistent with increased bargaining power.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZRSKP
I examine how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation and firm value. I find a significant decline in the number of patents and citations per patent ...for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not. Most of the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation occurs 2 or more years after they are passed, indicating a causal effect. The negative effect of antitakeover laws is mitigated by the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as large shareholders, pension fund ownership, leverage, and product market competition.
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BFBNIB, FZAB, GIS, IJS, INZLJ, KILJ, NLZOH, NMLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK, ZRSKP
We argue and demonstrate empirically that a firm's institutional and legal context has first-order effects in tests that use state antitakeover laws for identification. A priori, the size and ...direction of a law's effect on a firm's takeover protection depends on (i) other state antitakeover laws, (ii) preexisting firm-level takeover defenses, and (iii) the legal regime as reflected by important court decisions. In addition, (iv) state antitakeover laws are not exogenous for many easily identifiable firms. We show that the inferences from nine prior studies related to nine different outcome variables change substantially when we include controls for these considerations.
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BFBNIB, FZAB, GIS, IJS, INZLJ, KILJ, NLZOH, NMLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBMB, UL, UM, UPUK, ZRSKP
This paper reviews the vast academic literature on the market for corporate control. Our main focus is the cyclical wave pattern that this market exhibits. We address the following questions: Why do ...we observe recurring surges and downfalls in M&A activity? Why do managers herd in their takeover decisions? Is takeover activity fuelled by capital market developments? Does a transfer of control generate shareholder gains and do such gains differ across takeover waves? What caused the formation of conglomerate firms in the wave of the 1960s and their de-conglomeration in the 1980s and 1990s? And, why do we observe time- and country-clustering of hostile takeover activity? We find that the patterns of takeover activity and their profitability vary significantly across takeover waves. Despite such diversity, all waves still have some common factors: they are preceded by technological or industrial shocks, and occur in a positive economic and political environment, amidst rapid credit expansion and stock market booms. Takeovers towards the end of each wave are usually driven by non-rational, frequently self-interested managerial decision-making.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK
5.
Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic? Eckbo, B. Espen; Makaew, Tanakorn; Thorburn, Karin S.
Journal of financial economics,
06/2018, Volume:
128, Issue:
3
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
The more the target knows about the bidder, the more difficult is paying the target with overpriced bidder shares. Thus, when bidders are opportunistic, the fraction of stock in the deal payment will ...be lower for better informed targets. We test this intuitive prediction against the alternative that stock payments primarily reflect bidder concerns with target adverse selection, which implies a greater fraction of stock in the deal payment for better informed targets. Discriminating between these two mutually exclusive and nested predictions requires measures of target information about the bidder but not of market mispricing. We find that public bidders systematically use more stock in the payment when the target knows more about the bidder. Tests exploiting exogenous variation in bidder market-to-book ratios also fail to support bidder opportunism. Finally, greater potential competition from private bidders is associated with greater propensity for public bidders to pay in cash.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK
Merger negotiations and the toehold puzzle Betton, Sandra; Eckbo, B. Espen; Thorburn, Karin S.
Journal of financial economics,
02/2009, Volume:
91, Issue:
2
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Open access
The substantial control premium typically observed in corporate takeovers makes a compelling case for acquiring target shares (a toehold) in the market prior to launching a bid. Moreover, auction ...theory suggests that toehold bidding may yield a competitive advantage over rival bidders. Nevertheless, with a sample exceeding 10,000 initial control bids for US public targets, we show that toehold bidding has declined steadily since the early 1980s and is now surprisingly rare. At the same time, the average toehold is large when it occurs (20%), and toeholds are the norm in hostile bids. To explain these puzzling observations, we develop and test a two-stage takeover model where attempted merger negotiations are followed by open auction. With optimal bidding, a toehold imposes a cost on target management, causing some targets to (rationally) reject merger negotiations. Optimal toeholds are therefore either zero (to avoid rejection costs) or greater than a threshold (so that toehold benefits offset rejection costs). The toehold threshold estimate averages 9% across initial bidders, reflecting in part the bidder's opportunity loss of a merger termination agreement. In the presence of market liquidity costs, a threshold of this size may well induce a broad range of bidders to select zero toehold. As predicted, the probability of toehold bidding decreases, and the toehold size increases, with the threshold estimate. The model also predicts a relatively high frequency of toehold bidding in hostile bids, as observed. Overall, our test results are consistent with rational bidder behavior with respect to the toehold decision.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK
By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition ...mitigates managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant drop in operating performance after the laws’ passage, firms in competitive industries experience no significant effect. When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we find evidence in support of a “quiet-life” hypothesis. Input costs, wages, and overhead costs all increase after the laws’ passage, and only so in non-competitive industries. Similarly, when we conduct event studies around the dates of the first newspaper reports about the BC laws, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant stock price decline, firms in competitive industries experience a small and insignificant stock price impact.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK
We explore whether firms that are vulnerable to takeovers pre-emptively manage earnings in anticipation of such events. We find a positive relationship between firms' vulnerability to takeovers and ...their propensity to manage earnings, mainly through the manipulation of real activities. We consider two motivations for firms' pre-emptive earnings management behavior; (1) to deter future takeovers and (2) to optimize M&A outcomes. Concerning the former, we document evidence consistent with entrenched managers using real earnings management to deter or delay future takeovers. Concerning the latter, we find evidence suggesting that, contingent on receiving takeover bids, vulnerable firms that pre-emptively manipulate real activities extract comparatively higher merger premiums. Overall, our findings suggest that managers of vulnerable firms pre-emptively manage earnings to purposefully delay the timing and optimize the outcomes of prospective takeovers.
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9.
Which antitakeover provisions deter takeovers? Karpoff, Jonathan M.; Schonlau, Robert; Wehrly, Eric
Journal of corporate finance (Amsterdam, Netherlands),
August 2022, 2022-08-00, Volume:
75
Journal Article
Peer reviewed
Antitakeover provisions play a central role in corporate governance research. But there is little agreement over which, if any, provisions actually affect takeover likelihoods. In tests that account ...for the endogenous use of antitakeover provisions, we find that at most 11 of the 24 G-index provisions are negatively related to takeover likelihood. Various indices used in the literature measure takeover deterrence to the extent they include this subset of provisions. In more stringent tests, only four provisions are consistently and negatively related to takeover likelihood throughout the 1995–2020 period, while one provision (golden parachutes) is positively related to takeover likelihood.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP
This paper provides an overview of the academic literature on the market for corporate control, and focuses specifically on firms' performance around and after a takeover. Despite the aggregate M&A ...market amounting to several trillions USD on an annual basis, acquiring firms often underperform relative to non-acquiring firms, especially in public takeovers. Although hundreds of academic studies have investigated the deal- and firm-level factors associated with M&A announcement returns, short-run returns are often not sustained in the long run. Moreover, the wide variety of performance measures and heterogeneity in sample sizes complicates the drawing of accurate and unambiguous conclusions. In this light, our survey compiles the recent literature and aims to identify the areas of research for which short-run returns predict (or fail to predict) long-run performance. We find that post-takeover deal performance is affected by key determinants including serial acquisitions, CEO overconfidence, acquirer-target relatedness and complementarity, and shareholder intervention in the form of voting or activism.
•Overview of academic literature on market for corporate control, and short- versus long-term performance.•Serial acquisition performance declines deal by deal, mainly driven by CEO overconfidence.•Related or focused acquisitions outperform unrelated or diversifying acquisitions.•Deal performance is positively affected by shareholder intervention in the form of voting or activism.
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GEOZS, IJS, IMTLJ, KILJ, KISLJ, NLZOH, NUK, OILJ, PNG, SAZU, SBCE, SBJE, UILJ, UL, UM, UPCLJ, UPUK, ZAGLJ, ZRSKP