Research on agriculture crowdfunding in developing countries is still limited. The crowdfunding platform offers uncollateralised loans to farmers. Therefore, they apply joint liability group lending to lower the default risk. However, from farmer’s point of view, joint liability causes higher risk since every group member bears his/her own risk and that of all other group members. Thus, the purpose of this article is to analyse how joint liability may lower the risk of both farmer and agriculture crowdfunding in Indonesia. A deductive qualitative research design with case study approach is used in this article. A series of in-depth interviews were conducted with one agriculture crowdfunding platform and two farmer groups. Data analysis was conducted by using pattern matching technique. The findings of this article are as follows: joint liability may lower the default risk of crowdfunding platform because the farmer groups are self-selected. The leader of the farmer group plays an important role in monitoring the members, and he may apply social sanction to the defaulting member. By implementing joint liability group lending, crowdfunding platform can provide extension services such as price certainty through contract farming, field agent monitoring and non-cash credit disbursement. These extension services help to lower the farmer’s risk.