Split it up to create incentives: Investment, public goods and crossing the river

E-resources

Peer reviewed

Split it up to create incentives: Investment, public goods and crossing the river

Martin, Simon; Schlag, Karl H.

Journal of economic theory, September 2020, 2020-09-00, Volume: 189

Journal Article

When should one pay the ferryman? When to pay for the delivery of a good, and how should one invest in a public good if there is a single transaction and institutions are costly? We show how to solve the hold-up problem. The idea is to appropriately split up the desired total contribution into several separate contributions that are made in sequence, with each party threatening to discontinue if others deviate. Our solution concept is based on subgame perfection, where players are either selfish and do not care about very small gains or are socially minded as long as there is no deviation.

Keep searching

Author

Access to the JCR database is permitted only to users from Slovenia. Your current IP address is not on the list of IP addresses with access permission, and authentication with the relevant AAI accout is required.

Year	Impact factor		Edition		Category		Classification
Year	JCR	SNIP	JCR	SNIP	JCR	SNIP	JCR	SNIP

Links to authors' personal bibliographies	Links to information on researchers in the SICRIS system

Source: Personal bibliographies and: SICRIS

Upload image

Shelf entry

Adding material to shelf was successful.

Adding material to shelf failed.

It was not necessary to add the material to the shelf.

Permalink

E-mail

Impact factor

Select the library membership card:

DRS, in which the journal is indexed

Citations

Theme