To understand the making of Christianity, it is necessary to understand the problem to which its making was a solution—that is, the problem of establishing a community named Christianity, of determining how (or whether) a set of individuals named as Christian can constitute, or be constituted as, a community.4 This is to observe that a key problem faced by “early Christianity” (the term is already anachronistic) was whether Jews and Gentiles—or, more broadly speaking, a variety of “ethnicities,” indexed by the central difference between Jews and non-Jews—could belong to one community. ...when Christianity was faced with humans who failed to actualize or who deviated from their definitive ontological potentiality of properly belonging to Christian community, it was able to account for this failure or deviance by way of particularity. The enactment of damnation is not the delimitation of transit; it is the making absent of that which could support the possibility of transit.8 In view of this genealogical detour, the question of diaspora’s autonomy from the logic of transitivity gains precision: to assume such transitivity is to assume the establishment of—or the terms established by—Christianity; to articulate diaspora as intransitive demands nothing less than becoming adequate to, or acceding to, excommunication. Yet the obstacles and forms of domination that are thereby associated with Christianity do not simply arise with Christendom: while the actual power gained through Christendom makes these obstacles and forms of domination apparent, they are bound to a certain logic (LUP) that emerges as the very establishment of orthodox or standard Christianity (prior to the rise of Christendom).