The explanation of psychological phenomena is a central aim of psychological science. However, the nature of explanation and the processes by which we evaluate whether a theory explains a phenomenon are often unclear. Consequently, it is often unknown whether a given psychological theory indeed explains a phenomenon. We address this shortcoming by proposing a productive account of explanation: a theory explains a phenomenon to some degree if and only if a formal model of the theory produces the statistical pattern representing the phenomenon. Using this account, we outline a workable methodology of explanation: (a) explicating a verbal theory into a formal model, (b) representing phenomena as statistical patterns in data, and (c) assessing whether the formal model produces these statistical patterns. In addition, we provide three major criteria for evaluating the goodness of an explanation (precision, robustness, and empirical relevance), and examine some cases of explanatory breakdowns. Finally, we situate our framework within existing theories of explanation from philosophy of science and discuss how our approach contributes to constructing and developing better psychological theories. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved) (Source: journal abstract)