Kelemen and McNamara (2022) have reinvigorated the debate on European state-building. Adopting a 'bellicist' perspective, they argue that the European Union is 'incomplete, uneven, and dysfunctional' due to the historical lack of an existential military threat. We take issue with this claim. War, in our view, is not a necessary condition for European political development, and 'transboundary crisis' acts as its modern-day functional equivalent. Whether a polity can uphold its provision of public goods in the face of such crises, and whether it does so more effectively than its competitors on the 'market for governance', decisively affects its further development. European integration, too, has progressed substantively in response to recent non-military threats. We demonstrate this on the Euro and Covid-19 crises, in which the EU has engaged in incremental and issue-specific capacity-building aimed at preserving and consolidating the regulatory state rather than approximating the Westphalian nation-state. The resulting capacity-building shores up the EU's crisis prevention and crisis management capacities, without overcoming its fundamental regulatory nature. It is misleading to dismiss the resulting political development from a bellicist perspective that takes the nation-state as its implicit point of comparison.