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Yu, Zhixian
Economics letters, 07/2020, Volume: 192Journal Article
We revisit the classical alternating-offer bargaining model, further assuming that players cannot reduce their proposals during the game. In equilibrium, players have history-dependent strategies and do not necessarily reach an agreement immediately in the first stage. •Endogenous commitment means that bargainers cannot reduce their proposals.•Endogenous commitment is used in classical alternating-offer bargaining.•In equilibrium, agreement is reached in the first or second stage.•Players have history dependent equilibrium strategies.
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