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  • Providing knowledge and virtue to others : the third responsibility
    Borstner, Bojan ; Šetar, Niko
    As is well known among epistemologists and those interested in the field, one of the main approaches in virtue epistemology is virtue responsibilism, which in a nutshell claims that epistemic agents ... are responsible for acquiring virtuous character traits which allow them to obtain knowledge. The notion of responsibility widens once epistemic vices are introduced into the knowing game, and Cassam (2019) defines two types of responsibility that pertain to the latter, i. e., acquisition responsibility and revision responsibility. However, one may sometimes not be held responsible for acquisition, and revision may often, as we will show in this article, be next to impossible, or the opportunity for revision might arrive insanely late and take a lamentable moral toll. We argue that there is a need for preventing the need for vice revision, and that that can be only achieved if we are to somehow to improve our virtue acquisition. The latter seems like a gargantuan task to undertake but might not be so if we withdraw from the subpersonal approach to virtue and vice and instead look at the whole epistemological process, from obtaining virtue, to gathering knowledge, all the way to revising vice, as a social process. I will attempt to defend this view and introduce a new kind of responsibility, one that requires that people provide virtue to each other, and analyse several ways in which that may be achieved, as well as elaborate on how that reduces need for revision and what outstanding issues still remain.
    Vrsta gradiva - članek, sestavni del ; neleposlovje za odrasle
    Leto - 2023
    Jezik - angleški
    COBISS.SI-ID - 160078083