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  • Is there a "third way" of concept acquisition?
    Jutronić, Dunja
    Fodor held that "most de facto lexical concepts are innate". In the last chapter of his book Concepts, Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong Fodor renounces his strong nativist alignment. I examine ... Fodor's proposal and find it wanting. My arguments are the following: 1. The stress on innate mechanism is the explanation of what we need to acquire concepts but not an answer of how we acquire them. 2. If this is all to concept asquisition the question is why additional mention of the mind since the mind is not doing any explanatory work. 3. Nonintentional disposition that provides content representation is psychophysical or neural. But if that is true then disposition is not different from the mechanism. 4. With the present Fodor's proposal concepts are neither triggered nor abstracted. Is there a third way then? The answer is that the proto-concepts are conveyed by our mind. I argue that this is cryptic and does not make better sense than the aerlier explanation in which our inborn endownment caused our concepts, that is, our concepts were simply innate. But what does coming from the mind mean? I argue that this is not different from coming from the organism - if the mind is no more than the innate mechanism. The question of acquisition boils down to the claim that our minds are structured such that this is the case. But this is not the explanation that we need an acquisition theory to account for
    Vrsta gradiva - članek, sestavni del ; neleposlovje za odrasle
    Leto - 2001
    Jezik - angleški
    COBISS.SI-ID - 11191304