This paper analyzes recent free trade arrangements from a positive political economy perspective. In contrast to most other literature, which fails to take into account geographical factors, it is ...argued here that proximity and transportation costs play an important role in trade arrangements. Another important also largely neglected factor is the degree of social cohesion in terms of labor standards among potential trading partners. Accepting social integration might also be a condition for admitting those countries to the agreement. Changes of trade policy over time can therefore be explained by changes in the relative political influence of the sectors considered. The other important factors are, of course, a change in the degree of retaliation, leading to lower tariffs under higher retaliation, and a leveling of social standards. Redistribution across countries could also considerably change the optimal rate of tariff. The EU with its regional cohesion funds might be a good example of how those are used as a side-payment for diminishing the social divergence in the member countries. Countries with higher standards should only be willing to integrate when others raise their social standards as well. The negotiations about the social protocol in the EU indicate that this is in fact the case. More than 40 years of European integration have led to an habituation of thinking of the European Community as something ideologically neutral, which transcends normal political debate. European issues, it seems, do not fit the structure of the usual right-left ideological controversy. The only open fault-line in European politics is between advocates of "more" and those of "less" integration. The paper explores the potential cognitive and political gains of a change of perspective. It argues that the issue of more or less integration is often not interesting in itself but only to the degree that it influences the content of policies. It further shows that the policies at stake are normally such, that they can be usefully debated in the right-left framework. The decision about the site of policy control - national or European - is often only the guise in which a decision about the redrawing of the boundary between market and state, between the sphere of competitive allocation and the sphere of political coordination, materializes. This paper aimed at stressing the fundamental differences between conventional and contractarian constitutional orders. To achieve it, we have used the concept of common knowledge and have related it to its political philosophy background, especially with regard to communication and induction. The former generates a spontaneous social order - it is an evolutionist view that belongs to the Hume - Menger - Hayek tradition. The latter produces a contractarian vision shared by the Brennan-Buchanan-Tullock tradition. We consider here a basic distinction between institutions and conventions. An institution is considered as a formal, explicit rule, while a convention appears to be a tacit, implicit agreement. The former can be associated with contractarian constitutionalism, whereas the latter is related to evolutionism. In this context, institutions should not be understood as formalized conventions (such as law in Hayek). They are rather the expression of a voluntary and deliberate agreement, of a covenant. The application describes features relevant to the development of a European constitution and the corresponding unified legal system. It requires a clear vision of what a European "state" is meant to be or become. Then, once a constitutional setting is chosen, one must address the question of legal organization, in particular the nature of administrative law. Two different acceptation of law are thus associated with the two concepts of convention and contractarian institution. The former can be regarded as customary rule a kind of common knowledge that emerges from tradition and sympathy. By contrast, the latter is the place of explicitly created common knowledge. If it is to become more integrated, Europe will have to tackle this constitutional question, either in an evolutionary or in a contractarian way.
Isticanjem vertikalne suprotnosti izmedju Unije i njenih clanica nudi se izbor izmedju dvije opcije "za naciju" ili "za Europu". Ali takva alternativa nema smisla jer jedna opcija ne iskljucuje drugu, a i vecina stanovnistva zemalja clanica podupire obje. Bilo bi gotovo patoloski prisiljavati ih da se odluce za jednu od opcija. Nama se cini da razumne alternative i slobode niti ne moze biti dok se god o Europi bude raspravljalo i percipiralo je iz vertikalne perspektive. Ovime se dopusta uskoj ekonomskoj i politickoj eliti aktera koja se smatra "europskom"da definira Europu kao upravni problem i odbaci svaku opoziciju kao izraz neznanja, zlobe ili nedostatne otvorenosti svijetu. Politicki sustavi koji ne uspijevaju razviti programatske alternative, bilo zato sto ih nasilno potiskuju, ili zato sto ih ne percipiraju u cjelokupnom procesu pogadjanja vrlo se tesko prilagodjavaju promjenama uvjeta i potrebama u svojoj okolini. Promatrajuci Europsku uniju u njenoj zelji da se institucijski i politicki produbi, odnosno geografski prosiri, a sa svom svojom kulturnom i etnickom raznolikoscu pitamo se da li je ab origin iluzorna predodzba da vise od 300 milijuna ljudi moze stvoriti zajednicki identitet. Sjedinjene su Americke Drzave, klasicno useljenicko drustvo, prije nacija nacionalnosti nego jedinstvena drzava, kulturno, etnicki i, takodjer, politicki krajnje heterogene? Ustav iz 1787. godine dao je poseban doprinos tom procesu. On je simbolizirao novi poredak, ali bilo bi, zacijelo, pretjerano reci da je ustav ujedinio gradjane u SAD-u i da ih nadalje ujedinjuje. On je pripremio institucije i pravna jamstva koja su vise od dva stoljeca, barem, olaksavali stvaranje jedinstva. Od nekog bi ustava iluzorno bilo ocekivati vise. Ali ne bi trebalo ni manje povezivati s ustavnom idejom. A to vrijedi i za ideju o europskom ustavu." Unija nije i nece postati nacionalna drzava. Njezin se razvoj ne moze modelirati prema centraliziranoj federalnoj drzavi velicine kontinenta nalik SAD-u. Unija je nova vrsta politickog entiteta na kojeg se konvencionalne konstitucijske kategorije ne mogu primjeniti... Unija nece nikada postati politicki entitet koji podsjeca na stare nacionalne unitarne drzave. Europska je integracija u stalnoj evoluciji i dinamicnim promjenama za koje je tesko uvijek pouzdano reci kuda vode. Analiza europskih integracija kroz prizmu odnosa drzave i trzista konstituira politicku slobodu oznacavajuci cijeli spektar alternativnih nacrta za Europu izmedju kojih je onda i moguc smisleni izbor. Otvorenost svakoj mogucoj opciji jedini je nacin da se ne ugrozi stabilnost Europske unije.
This paper is structured into four different parts. In the first part the authors analyze the origins of banking and debt crisis in the EU. The state and the evolution of the EU banking sector before ...the crisis and in its immediate aftermath is analyzed in detail in order to dispel the myth of the existence of an exclusively debt-induced crisis. This part also introduces the notion of financialization into the analysis. The second part analyzes the crisis-related dynamics by using endogenous monetary theory and makes particular use of balance-sheet recession as a concept. The third part introduces political consequences of the banking and debt crisis in the EU by focusing on the political crisis of legitimacy and its impact upon the EU integration process. In order to deal with this topic the authors borrow several concepts from critical international political economy such as transnational elite, knowledge production, and hegemony. We posit a close link between actions of the European transnational elite, crisis origins, and their ramifications. The fourth part focuses on the two most-discussed policy solutions in tackling the crisis: the banking and the fiscal union as well as their feasibility. Additionally, it lays out some fundamental trillemas for creating a viable way out of the crisis which are unfortunately often neglected in public debate. The main argument refers to the growing impact of financialization in the EU and its detrimental effect on the potential for integrated, stable, and prosperous EU economies. The authors explain the changing social, political, and economic landscape and evaluate the main challenges and obstacles to economic and political governance in the EU. The paper is concluded with some heterodox policy recommendations for overcoming them.
JEL classification: B52, E51, E52, F34, F50, G01, G20, P48
Managing Crisis in the Eurozone Brkić, Luka; Kotarski, Kristijan
Politička misao,
2010, Letnik:
XLVII, Številka:
5
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Euro crisis displayed its full blow in the spring of 2010. Its dynamics revealed deep-seated structural flaws at the core of the EMU. The productive Germany is tied via the euro currency union to ...countries that have lower productivity rates and inefficient economies. This union has been beneficial to the countries of Southern Europe so far since EMU inception, as it provided them with cheap credit. EMU showcased its problematic institutional design. Compared to mature federations, the institutional design of EMU is incomplete. On the one hand, there is a strong ECB that decides monetary policies for the entire euro area. At the same time, there is a lack of macroeconomic policy coordination for the same area. The budgetary and fiscal policies are set by governments of national states. This is of great concern for the vitality and robustness of the EMU in the context of soft constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. In the first part, this paper will highlight basic structural problems that led to the current crisis of confidence in the common European currency. The second part intends to discuss the lack of monetary and fiscal policy coordination, while the third part analyzes monetary and fiscal responses to the crisis by the EU institutions and national actors. The fourth part seeks to portray some possibilities for overcoming deep-seated structural imbalances, and questions the likelihood of “gouvernement économique” as a new stage in European integration.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, ODKLJ, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Giant cell tumor of bone (GCT) is mostly benign, locally aggressive tumor with a high recurrence rate. GCT is treated primarily surgically, and the approach is determined according to localization ...and local tumor behavior. The aim of this study was to analyze results and complications of surgical treatment of GCT at atertiary orthopedic clinical center in Croatia. We analyzed all patients treated at University Department of Orthopedics, Zagreb University Hospital Center, during a 15-year period. From 1995 to 2009, 39 patients were surgically treated for GCT. Four patients were lost from follow up. In patients with low-grade GCT (n = 12, 34%), we performed marginal-intralesional resection, whereas in patients with locally aggressive GCT we performed en bloc resection and reconstruction with tumor endoprosthesis or bone allograft (n = 22, 63%). In one patient, the only treatment was tumor irradiation. Complications were evident in one-third of our patients. The most common complications were tumor recurrence (n = 6, 50% of all complications) and deep infection (n = 2, 17% of all complications). We performed amputation in two patients in whom osteosarcoma was revealed under GCT radiologic and histologic appearance. We performed 84 operations in 35 patients, not counting primary biopsy. In conclusion, treatment of GCT is complex, with a high incidence of tumor recurrence. Diagnosis and treatment are best provided through a multidisciplinary approach in highly specialized centers for orthopedic oncology.
Procjena tečajnih režima postala je integralna značajka novijih rasprava o reformi međunarodne financijske arhitekture. Konačni je rezultat tog novijeg interesa za tečajne režime to što se znatan dio ...struke, čini se, preobratio na “hipotezu o iščezavajućem srednjem režimu”, jer je zemljama koje su dobro integrirane u svjetska tržišta kapitala ostalo malo prostora za kompromis između fluktuirajućih tečajeva i monetarne unifikacije, ako ga je uopće ostalo. Literatura o optimalnim valutnim područjima naglašava da je politička neovisnost presudna kad se zemlje suočavaju s karakterističnim poremećajima koji se ponavljaju.Premda države članice Europske monetarne unije pokazuju znatnu asimetriju u tempiranju faza poslovnih ciklusa i izloženost egzogenim šokovima, tim bi zemljama bilo
bolje kad bi zadržale sposobnost provođenja monetarne i tečajne politike. Kao posljedica toga važno empirijsko pitanje jest je li Europa regija u kojoj prevladavaju šokovi specifični za pojedine zemlje ili ti šokovi na sličan način pogađaju sve te zemlje. Euroizacija je razmjerno rijetka pojava. Ipak, posljednjih godina privlači mnogo pozornosti, što se može dokazati sve većim brojem studija koje obrađuju taj problem te sve većim brojem zemalja koje se kreću u tom smjeru. U ovom se radu razmatraju prednosti i nedostaci euroizacije (dolarizacije), ne samo s teorijskog stajališta nego i na osnovi iskustva drugih dolariziranih zemalja. Nedvojben je zaključak da euroizacija (dolarizacija) nije instrument monetarne politike koji bi se mogao preporučiti Hrvatskoj.
Assessment of exchange-rate arrangements has become an integral feature of recent discussions on reform of the international financial architecture. The upshot of this recent interest in ...exchange-rate regimes is that a large part of the profession appears to have become converted to ‘the hypothesis of the vanishing middle regime’, for countries well-integrated into world capital markets, there is little, if any, middle ground between floating exchange rates and monetary unification. The literature on optimal currency areas emphasizes that policy independence is crucial if countries face recurrent idiosyncratic disturbances.
If member-countries of the EMU show sizeable asymmetry in the timing of business cycle phases and their exposure to exogenous shocks, these countries may be better off retaining their ability to conduct monetary and exchange-rate policies. Consequently, the important empirical issue is whether Europe is a region in which country-specific shocks prevail or whether shocks affect most of these countries in a similar way. Euroization is a relatively rare phenomenon. Yet in recent years it has attracted a lot of attention, which can be proved by an increasing number of studies dealing with this problem, as well as an increasing number of countries taking this course of action. This paper deals with the advantages and disadvantages of euroization (dollarization), not only from the theoretical aspect but also on the basis of experience of other dollarized countries. The unequivocal conclusion is that euroization (dollarization) is not a monetary policy instrument that can be recommended to Croatia.
Assessment of exchange-rate arrangements has become an integral feature of recent discussions on reform of the international financial architecture. The upshot of this recent interest in ...exchange-rate regimes is that a large part of the profession appears to have become converted to ‘the hypothesis of the vanishing middle regime’, for countries well-integrated into world capital markets, there is little, if any, middle ground between floating exchange rates and monetary unification. The literature on optimal currency areas emphasizes that policy independence is crucial if countries face recurrent idiosyncratic disturbances. If member-countries of the EMU show sizeable asymmetry in the timing of business cycle phases and their exposure to exogenous shocks, these countries may be better off retaining their ability to conduct monetary and exchange-rate policies. Consequently,the important empirical issue is whether Europe is a region in which country-specific shocks prevail or whether shocks affect most of these countries in a similar way. Euroization is a relatively rare phenomenon. Yet in recent years it has attracted a lot of attention,which can be proved by an increasing number of studies dealing with this problem, as well as an increasing number of countries taking this course of action. This paper deals with the advantages and disadvantages of euroization (dollarization), not only from the theoretical aspect but also on the basis of experience of other dollarized countries. The unequivocal conclusion is that euroization (dollarization) is not a monetary policy instrument that can be recommended to Croatia.
Od potpisivanja Ugovora iz Maastrichta pa do summita Europske unije u belgijskom Laekenu i Konvencije o budućnosti Europe iz prosinca 2001. godine traju rasprave o odnosu integracije i suvereniteta ...država članica Europske unije. U političkom izboru aranžmana slobodne trgovine analiziramo socijalnu integraciju kao mehanizam smanjenja komparativnih prednosti zemalja izvan integracije. Raspravu o razvoju multilateralnih institucija i političkih posljedica njihove ekspanzije kontekstuiramo u okviru klasične kooperativne teorije igara. Prvo analiziramo pristup inkluzivne formacije kao jednostavnog procesa u kojem se pozivaju svi potencijalni članovi multilateralne institucije i kada nema promjene preferencija. S druge strane, sekvencijalnu konstrukciju karakterizira proces u više etapa u kojem multilateralka samo postupno raste, a odluke o primanju ovise o tome hoće li primanje novih članica dovesti do trenutnih koristi, a ne o očekivanjima budućih koristi. U kontekstu kontroverzi o tome pokreću li integraciju supranacionalni ili međudržavni čimbenici, analiziramo razvoj EU-a u smjeru horizontalnog odnosa između tržišta i države te vertikalnog odnosa između Unije i država članica. Obje te perspektive slažu se da jezgru Rimskih ugovora čini zajedničko tržište, četiri slobode i pravo na konkurenciju te da je Zajednica utemeljena radi stvaranja zajedničkog tržišta, a u provođenju tih zadataka koristi se ograničenim ovlastima. Razlik e su, pak, u tome što prva pozicija smatra da su novim politikama Zajednice stvoreni temelji kasnijeg diskrecijskog zadiranja u tržište, dok za drugu stvaranje zajedničkog tržišta predstavlja samo jedan korak koji vodi europskoj socijalnoj državi radi institucionalnog uravnoteženja europske konstrukcije. Ideja europskog ustava razumijeva se kao još jedan napor u pripremi institucija i pravnih jamstava koji trebaju olakšati stvaranje jedinstva. Analiziramo postupke odlučivanja i odnose snaga. Rad završava još jednim pokušajem terapeutske reformulacije postojećeg odnosa Hrvatske i europskih integracija, u kojem se ističe da integracija nije formula za rješavanje svih naših problema i ne može biti supstitut uspješne politike razvoja.
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