Dis-enclosure Nancy, Jean-Luc; Bergo, Bettina; Malenfant, Gabriel ...
2008, 2008-04-01, 20080401, 2009, 2008., 2008-03-15
eBook, Book
This book is a profound and eagerly anticipated investigation into what is left of a monotheistic religious spirit?notably, a minimalist faith that is neither confessional nor credulous. Articulating ...this faith as works and as an objectless hope, Nancy deconstructs Christianity in search of the historical and reflective conditions that provided its initial energy. Working through Blanchot and Nietzsche, re-reading Heidegger and Derrida, Nancy turns to the Epistle of Saint James rather than those of Saint Paul, discerning in it the primitive essence of Christianity as hope. The ?religion that provided the exit from religion,? as he terms Christianity, consists in the announcement of an end. It is the announcement that counts, however, rather than any finality. In this announcement there is a proximity to others and to what was once called parousia. But parousia is no longer presence; it is no longer the return of the Messiah. Rather, it is what is near us and does not cease to open and to close, a presence deferred yet imminent.In a demystified age where we are left with a vision of a self-enclosed world?in which humans are no longer mortals facing an immortal being, but entities whose lives are accompanied by the time of their own decline?parousia stands as a question. Can we venture the risk of a decentered perspective, such that the meaning of the world can be found both inside and outside, within and without our so-immanent world?The deconstruction of Christianity that Nancy proposes is neither a game nor a strategy. It is an invitation to imagine a strange faith that enacts the inadequation of life to itself. Our lives overflow the self-contained boundaries of their biological and sociological interpretations. Out of this excess, wells up a fragile, overlooked meaning that is beyond both confessionalism and humanism.
Inspired by three monographs of Gladys Swain and Marcel Gauchet, my presentation traces the rise of the new science of psychiatry in Revolutionary France, with Philippe Pinel and his student J.-E. ...Esquirol. As the directors of the division of the aliénés in the Hôpital Bicêtre (Paris), Pinel and Esquirol pioneered a therapeutic programme that spread out between their “traitement moral” (reasoning with the passions) and an “energetic repression,” wherever necessary. The discipline they created sought to gain autonomy from medicine treating diseases of the body, much as pathology would do in regard to physiology, some fifty years later. Using Canguilhem, Foucault’s teacher and significant influence, I show how the unfolding of a science of disorders (for Canguilhem, this was pathology) poses questions of taxonomy and runs the inevitable ‘risk’ of extensive fragmentation. This is what happens in France after Pinel. However, Pinel, above all, will have made one contribution that—by Swain and Gauchet’s argument—stands in stark contrast to the theses of the young Foucault. Rather than sequestering and excluding the fou by forcing him or her into exaggerated, discursive revelations or silence, Pinel and Esquirol “discover” the sense, or sens, at the heart of madness, notably in what Pinel called “manie intermittente.” Esquirol takes this discovery one step further, to discern in various attacks, a certain rationality. This rather modern conception of madness exerts a considerable influence on literature, criticism, philosophy, and medicine in their time. Hegel’s understanding of madness will come directly from Pinel, and it will see in folie the internal division of subjective Reason. From this characterization comes a therapeutics based on the conviction that one could often reintegrate the mad into society, and avoid prolonged sequestration and exclusion. Thus the presentation focuses on Swain and Gauchet’s question to Foucault (Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique, notably), using the work of Pinel and Hegel to illustrate their claim.
This article summarizes the Afro-centric 'Copernican Revolution' of Cheikh Anta Diop between 1960 and 1974, the dates on which he defended his thesis on the African identity of Egypt (Kemet and ...Nubia) and argued his thesis, with Théophile Obenga, before the UNESCO Cairo Conference on the "General History of Africa." I discuss both the unhappy reception, by European Egyptologists and others, of Diop's ground-breaking, multidisciplinary research, as well as its gradual spread, among others, to Diasporic thinkers. One such thinker, Marimba Ani (who expressly acknowledges her debt to Diop's revolutionary demonstrations) took a further step by rethinking, in Africanist terms, the philosophical bases underlying the unfolding of what she probatively shows is the European (or western) Asili (Kiswahili for an overarching way of living or cultural source), as exemplified in its patterns of thought and affective-ideological patterns. I attempt to show, here, how Ani inherits and prolongs Diop's "Copernican" displacement.
And God Created Woman Bergo, Bettina
Levinas studies,
01/2018, Letnik:
12
Journal Article
Recenzirano
This article reads Levinas’s “And God Created Woman” in light of its socio-political context, Mai soixante-huit. It explores themes from his “Judaism and Revolution,” in which he reframed concepts of ...revolution, exegesis, the revolutionary, and human alienation. Following these themes, which run subtly through his Talmudic remarks on women and indirectly on feminism, I examine his arguments about a “signification beyond universality” and the fraught relationship between formal equity in gender relations and the practice of justice, as embodied by the Antigone-like Rizpah bath Aiah and analyzed in Levinas’s Talmudic reading “Toward the Other.” I summarize the Rabbinic debate about the meaning of an extra yod in the term often translated as “to create” in Genesis, turning to the significance of dissymmetry between the Hebrew names of “man” and “woman,” Ish and Isha. In light of this, Biblicist and psychoanalyst Daniel Sibony opens further insights into gender, naming, and identity.
Starting from Mal d'archive and La bête et le souverain II, I explore what Derrida argues is the cleaved nature of Freud's concepts, and which he compares to the contradictory characteristics of ...every archive (from a library, to memory, to writing, to electronic mail): to be revolutionary in its institution of the new and simultaneously to be or become conservative, even reactionary. For Derrida, Freud's later writing will tie the motivation to create an archive to the destructive logic of the death drive. An interesting example of Freud's cleaved concepts first emerges in his early study of the brain (1888). It is elaborated in his deconstructive approach to aphasia and to the acquisition of language (1891).
I argue in this essay that Derrida understood Freud's logic as present over the course of his entire life, and this, in a way that justifies my showing its presence in Freud's earliest neurological texts. I show that in its radicality, which includes an interactionist neurology based on inscription and archiving, opposition to 19th century cortico-centrism (and the homunculus model of psychic sovereignty), and a rethinking of traditional “localizationism,” Freud's model of the brain and mind would have advanced understanding of the mental “archive” decades before this upheaval took place in neuroscience.
What are the challenges that Nietzsche's philosophy poses for contemporary phenomenology? Elodie Boublil, Christine Daigle, and an international group of scholars take Nietzsche in new directions and ...shed light on the sources of phenomenological method in Nietzsche, echoes and influences of Nietzsche within modern phenomenology, and connections between Nietzsche, phenomenology, and ethics. Nietzsche and Phenomenology offers a historical and systematic reconsideration of the scope of Nietzsche's thought.
STERBEN SIE? BETTINA BERGO
Heidegger's Black Notebooks,
09/2017
Book Chapter
This chapter grows out of three themes in Heidegger’s philosophical anti-Semitism as explored by Peter Trawny: worldlessness, “machination,” and the “brutalitasof being.” I would like to expand a ...tension between Heidegger’s critical stance toward racial thinking, caught as it is in the subjectivism of modernity, and his more “practical” attitudes towardRassenkundein Freiburg. Trawny’s evenhanded arguments remind us that we should “consider how Heidegger’s being-historical interpretation of race belongs in the context of the … narrative of the history of Being more generally.”¹
While for Heidegger the science of race that emerged in the nineteenth century belongs to
From 1947 through 1974, Levinas worked out a first philosophy against fundamental ontology and in a very conscious tension with conceptions of messianism that turn on an other "time" or a "uchrony" ...of a future of promise or hope. In Existence and Existents, Levinas first began reworking the phenomenology of subjective time toward an interpretation of the "transcendental I" as embodied and caught up in cycles of its own repetitive birth to consciousness (awaking) and escape from consciousness (in sleep, in erotic life, escapism). This "I" is more than an "open" or a "Da-"; it arises from the neutrality of existence, masters and enjoys its world in a present time, anxious about tomorrow. Unfolding the uniqueness of the present brought Levinas to philosophies of the instant and to a different source of transcendence in the present, namely the other person who, like death itself, is neither objectively graspable nor escapable. Because this Other affects a me at a sensuous level, bringing to our encounter something I do not experience in solitude, our conceptions of the hopeful place or moment of redemption are shifted from some future to a present instant. For the uniqueness of the now-moment to come to light in phenomenology, a difference must be secured between the upsurge of sensibility and the flowing, essentially unified and formal time that Husserl had identified with the transcendental ego of phenomenology (thereby formalizing the "times" of bodily sensation, and momentary affects). The question thus arose for Levinas: how can we rethink hope, with responsibility, in light of the double nature of so-called phenomenological time? In answering this question, Levinas considerably reworked the Heideggerian heritage of phenomenology, even as he began to weave his "ethics" together with a profoundly corporeal understanding of Jewish messianism, secular and religious. The author of this article argues that Levinas, long before he is taken for an ethical thinker, is a unique thinker of messianic consciousness. The author compares the way he reopens messianic suffering and remembrance with Walter Benjamin's weak messianic force. We have, the author believes, in Levinas, what may be the most fragile, perhaps the ultimate form of messianic hope, located in a rethinking of the present and the intersubjective body as informal conditions of possibility of a conscience both subjective and intersubjective.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
BFBNIB, DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
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