Cilj ovog rada je pokazati na koji se način metodama analitičke filozofije opovrgavaju i opravdavaju tvrdnje egzistencijalističkih filozofa te kako su određene ideje egzistencijalizma utjecale na ...suvremenu angloameričku filozofiju analitičke tradicije. U prvom dijelu rada opovrgava se tvrdnja misterioznosti smrti i tvrdi se da je fenomen smrti podložan razumskoj analizi kao i bilo koji drugi fenomen. U drugom dijelu opravdava se egzistencijalistička tvrdnja konstitutivnosti smrti za ljudska bića na način da se pokaže da je ideja transhumanizma, učitavanja osoba na računala, metafizički neodrživa. U trećem dijelu rada pokazuje se da su određene egzistencijalističke ideje, kao što je koncept narativnog jastva, inkorporirane u suvremenu analitičku filozofiju. Sva tri dijela imaju funkciju dokazivanja da analitička filozofija i egzistencijalizam, iako fundamentalno različiti u svojem pristupu, terminologiji i stilu pisanja, ipak jesu sumjerljive filozofijske tradicije. Drugim riječima, pokazuje se na koji način funkcionira analitički egzistencijalizam.
The aim of this article is to show how to refute and justify claims of existential philosophers using the methods of analytic philosophy, and to demonstrate the impact of existential thoughts on the contemporary Anglo-American philosophy of analytic tradition. In the first part of the article the author outlines how to refute the claim of the mystery of death and presents that the phenomenon of death can be reasonably analysed just like any other phenomenon. In the second part of the article the author explores how to justify an existential claim of the constitutiveness of death for human beings through transhumanism, uploading human to the computer, which is metaphysically unsustainable. In the third part of the article, the author presents that some existential ideas, such as the concept of the narrative self, are incorporated in the contemporary analytic philosophy. All three parts of this article are in the function of demonstrating that both the analytic philosophy and existentialism, although fundamentally different in the approach, terminology, and style, are comparable philosophical traditions. Specifically, the author shows how the analytical existentialism functions.
In this paper I analyse realist, eliminativist, and instrumentalist approach towards mental discourse on folk psychology. The basic idea is to examine folk psychology as a theory which explains and ...predicts behaviour. If folk psychology is a theory, then it must be reducible to or incorporated into a well-founded scientific physical theory, neuroscience foremost. The question is, is such a thing, even in principle, possible? Should we expect the scientific reduction of the entity of folk psychology or is it realistic to expect its elimination from scientific explanation and prediction of behaviour insofar as it is not possible to establish a connection with physical sciences? Or are we perhaps supposed to treat folk psychology as an abstract theory which is justified in its application, but has no scientific physical relations between its entities and the entities of physical sciences? I begin this paper with the everyday, common sense use of folk psychology in explaining and predicting behaviour, and I follow up with a brief presentation of realist perspective and its issues. Afterwards, I lay out eliminativist perspective and its reach in the debate, and pass on to the promising perspective of instrumentalism. Finally, I endorse a transformation of the perspective of instrumentalism into a milder form of realism by introducing the notion of scattered causality.
Cilj ovoga rada jest ukazati na opcije prilikom propitivanja racionalnosti straha od smrti, odvojiti pitanje zla smrti od pitanja treba li se bojati smrti te navesti uvjete racionalnosti straha i ...primijeniti te uvjete na strah od smrti. U prvom dijelu izlažem okvir rasprave o pitanju zla smrti, zatim izlažem standardne argumente kojima se poriče ili potvrđuje racionalnost straha od smrti. Nakon toga izlažem relevantnu razliku između prikladnosti samog straha prema objektu straha i osobe u strahu, koja predstavlja problem za standardne argumente te prelazim na izlaganje uvjeta racionalnog straha. U zadnjem dijelu primjenjujem uvjete racionalnog straha na strah od smrti i navodim razliku straha od smrti shvaćenog kao strah od nužne činjenice smrtnosti i straha od prerane smrti.
Provider: - Institution: - Data provided by Europeana Collections- U radu se bavim analizom vrijednosti prenatalnog i postmortalnog nepostojanja. Temeljna pretpostavka rasprave jest da kada biće ...umre, ono prestaje postojati. Ukoliko je to uistinu točno; a čak i ako nije; pitanje je zašto je smrt loša za osobu koja je umrla, ako smrt rezultira nepostojanjem? Nakon temeljnih terminoloških odrednica i pretpostavki, u radu iznosim četiri modela koji objašnjavaju vrijednost smrti. Prvi od njih je Epikurov model, prema kojemu je smrt neutralna za osobu koja je umrla. Drugi model jest Nagelov model; tzv. deprivacijsko objašnjenje; koji eksplicira Aristotelovu ideju da je smrt krajnje zlo. Prema Nagelovom modelu, zlo smrti je neiskustveno zlo koje se sastoji od lišavanja dobara života. Treći jest Feldmanov model; sofisticiraniji model deprivacijskog objašnjenja; koji za posljedicu ima tvrdnju da je smrt u većini slučajeva loša za osobu
koja je umrla, ali ponekad može biti dobra ili neutralna za osobu koja je umrla. Četvrti model, jest model koji zlo smrti objašnjava teorijom neostvarenja kategoričkih želja. Analizom navedenih modela, zaključujem, da ako smrt jest zlo za osobu koja je umrla, onda je najbolje objašnjena uz određene preinake Feldmanovog modela. Meutim, svi navedeni modeli; osim onog Epikurovog; moraju odgovoriti na pitanje je li prenatalno lišavanje jednako tako loše kao i postmortalno lišavanje, ili nije ni postmortalno lišavanje loše budući da nije ni prenatalno, kako je to mislio Lukrecije. Smatram da deprivacijska
teorija može riješiti Lukrecijev problem, ali se u konačnici susreće s problemom vrijednosti, tj. s nemogucnošću dokazivanja neiskustvenog zla „nepokolebljivim“ epikurejcima. Budući da se „nepokolebljivim“ epikurejcima ne može dokazati da je smrt
loša za osobu koja je umrla, moj zaključak o vrijednosti smrti za osobu koja je umrla završava u blagoj „epikureizaciji“ deprivacijske teorije. Drugim riječima, zaključujem da je smrt vrsta zla koja nas ne bi trebala u značajnoj mjeri zabrinjavati.- In my dissertation I am dealing with the value analysis of the prenatal and the postmortal nonexistence. The basic hypothesis of the discussion is that when the person dies she ceases to exist. As far as this is true; and even if it is not; the question is why is death bad for the person who died if death results with nonexistence? After basic determination of
terminology and assumptions, in my work I present four models which explain the value of death. The first one is the Epicurus’ model, according to whom the death is value Nagel's model, the so called deprivation explanation, which explicates Aristotle’s idea of death as the ultimate evil. According to Nagel´s model, the evil of death is unexperienced evil which consist of the deprivation of goods of life. The third model is Feldman's model; more sophisticated
model of the deprivation explanation; which as a result has the statement that death is in most cases bad for the person who died but sometimes it can be good or neutral for the person who died. The fourth model is the model which explains the evil of death with a theory of unrealized categorical desires. By analyzing mentioned models, I conclude, that
if death is a bad for the person who died, than it is best explained with slight modification of Feldman’s model. However, all mentioned models; except the one of Epicurus; have to answer the question is the prenatal deprivation as bad as the postmortal deprivation, or postmortal deprivation is not bad since it is not prenatal, as Lucretius thought. I believe
that deprivation explanation can resolve Lucretius' problem, but in the end it meets the problem of value, that is, it meets the impossibility of proving unexperienced evil to “unshakeable” Epicureans. Since it is impossible to prove to “unshakeable” Epicureans that death is bad for the person who died, my conclusion about the value of death for the
person who died, ends with the mild „epicurusaisation“ of the deprivation theory. In other words, I conclude that death is a kind of evil which should not worry us too much.- All metadata published by Europeana are available free of restriction under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. However, Europeana requests that you actively acknowledge and give attribution to all metadata sources including Europeana
Provider: - Institution: - Data provided by Europeana Collections- U radu se bavim analizom vrijednosti prenatalnog i postmortalnog nepostojanja. Temeljna pretpostavka rasprave jest da kada bice ...umre, ono prestaje postojati. Ukoliko je to uistinu tocno; a cak i ako nije; pitanje je zašto je smrt loša za osobu koja je umrla, ako smrt rezultira nepostojanjem? Nakon temeljnih terminoloških odrednica i pretpostavki, u radu iznosim cetiri modela koji objašnjavaju vrijednost smrti. Prvi od njih je Epikurov model, prema kojemu je smrt neutralna za osobu koja je umrla. Drugi model jest Nagelov model; tzv. deprivacijsko objašnjenje; koji eksplicira Aristotelovu ideju da je smrt krajnje zlo. Prema Nagelovom modelu, zlo smrti je neiskustveno zlo koje se sastoji od lišavanja dobara života. Treci jest Feldmanov model; sofisticiraniji model deprivacijskog objašnjenja; koji za posljedicu ima tvrdnju da je smrt u vecini slucajeva loša za osobu
koja je umrla, ali ponekad može biti dobra ili neutralna za osobu koja je umrla. Cetvrti model, jest model koji zlo smrti objašnjava teorijom neostvarenja kategorickih želja. Analizom navedenih modela, zakljucujem, da ako smrt jest zlo za osobu koja je umrla, onda je najbolje objašnjena uz odreene preinake Feldmanovog modela. Meutim, svi navedeni modeli; osim onog Epikurovog; moraju odgovoriti na pitanje je li prenatalno lišavanje jednako tako loše kao i postmortalno lišavanje, ili nije ni postmortalno lišavanje loše buduci da nije ni prenatalno, kako je to mislio Lukrecije. Smatram da deprivacijska
teorija može riješiti Lukrecijev problem, ali se u konacnici susrece s problemom vrijednosti, tj. s nemogucnošcu dokazivanja neiskustvenog zla „nepokolebljivim“ epikurejcima. Buduci da se „nepokolebljivim“ epikurejcima ne može dokazati da je smrt
loša za osobu koja je umrla, moj zakljucak o vrijednosti smrti za osobu koja je umrla završava u blagoj „epikureizaciji“ deprivacijske teorije. Drugim rijecima, zakljucujem da je smrt vrsta zla koja nas ne bi trebala u znacajnoj mjeri zabrinjavati.- In my dissertation I am dealing with the value analysis of the prenatal and the postmortal
nonexistence. The basic hypothesis of the discussion is that when the person dies she
ceases to exist. As far as this is true; and even if it is not; the question is why is death bad
for the person who died if death results with nonexistence? After basic determination of
terminology and assumptions, in my work I present four models which explain the value
of death. The first one is the Epicurus’ model, according to whom the death is value
neutral for the person who died. The second model is Nagel's model, the so called
deprivation explanation, which explicates Aristotle’s idea of death as the ultimate evil.
According to Nagel´s model, the evil of death is unexperienced evil which consist of the
deprivation of goods of life. The third model is Feldman's model; more sophisticated
model of the deprivation explanation; which as a result has the statement that death is in
most cases bad for the person who died but sometimes it can be good or neutral for the
person who died. The fourth model is the model which explains the evil of death with a
theory of unrealized categorical desires. By analyzing mentioned models, I conclude, that
if death is a bad for the person who died, than it is best explained with slight modification
of Feldman’s model. However, all mentioned models; except the one of Epicurus; have to
answer the question is the prenatal deprivation as bad as the postmortal deprivation, or
postmortal deprivation is not bad since it is not prenatal, as Lucretius thought. I believe
that deprivation explanation can resolve Lucretius' problem, but in the end it meets the
problem of value, that is, it meets the impossibility of proving unexperienced evil to
“unshakeable” Epicureans. Since it is impossible to prove to “unshakeable” Epicureans
that death is bad for the person who died, my conclusion about the value of death for the
person who died, ends with the mild „epicurusaisation“ of the deprivation theory. In other
words, I conclude that death is a kind of evil which should not worry us too much.- All metadata published by Europeana are available free of restriction under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication. However, Europeana requests that you actively acknowledge and give attribution to all metadata sources including Europeana
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