•Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) slowed total and C&I U.S. bank loan growth.•High EPU cut annualized loan growth by 2.5% on average from 2007 to 2013.•Tighter credit standards due to high EPU cut ...GDP by 0.5 p.p. from 2007 to 2013.•EPU effects more pronounced at larger, lower capitalized, and less liquid banks.•Results are robust to using macroeconomic uncertainty and several EPU indexes.
Economic policy uncertainty affects decisions of households, businesses, policy makers and financial intermediaries. We first examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on aggregate bank credit growth. Then we analyze commercial bank entity level data to gauge the effects of policy uncertainty on financial intermediaries’ lending. We exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity to back out indirect evidence of its effects on businesses and households. We ask (i) whether, conditional on standard macroeconomic controls, economic policy uncertainty affected bank level credit growth, and (ii) whether there is variation in the impact related to banks’ balance sheet conditions; that is, whether the effects are attributable to loan demand or, if impact varies with bank level financial constraints, loan supply. We find that policy uncertainty has a significant negative effect on bank credit growth. Since this impact varies meaningfully with some bank characteristics – particularly the overall capital-to-assets ratio and bank asset liquidity-loan supply factors at least partially (and significantly) help determine the influence of policy uncertainty. Because other studies have found important macroeconomic effects of bank lending growth on the macroeconomy, our findings are consistent with the possibility that high economic policy uncertainty may have slowed the U.S. economic recovery from the Great Recession by restraining overall credit growth through the bank lending channel.
•The Fed's corporate bond programs helped stabilize private bond yields.•The programs’ backstop effects prevented corporate spreads from soaring.•The Fed's corporate bond programs cushioned the COVID ...Recession.
In the financial crisis and recession induced by the Covid-19 pandemic, many investment-grade firms became unable to borrow from securities markets. In response, the Fed not only reopened its commercial paper funding facility but also announced it would purchase newly issued and seasoned corporate bonds rated as investment grade before the Covid pandemic. We assess the effectiveness of this program using long sample periods, spanning the Great Depression through the Great and Covid Recessions. Findings indicate that the announcement of corporate bond backstop facilities helped stop risk premia from rising further than they had by late-March 2020. In doing so, these backstop facilities limited the role of external finance premia in amplifying the macroeconomic impact of the Covid pandemic. Nevertheless, the corporate bond programs blend the roles of the Federal Reserve in conducting monetary policy via its balance sheet, acting as a lender of last resort, and pursuing credit policies.
The $1 billion open‐market operation conducted by the Federal Reserve, at the height of the Great Depression, was a successful precedent to the recent Quantitative Easing (QE) programs. The 1932 ...program entailed large purchases of medium‐ and long‐term securities over a 4‐month period. An event study analysis indicates that the program dramatically lowered medium‐ and long‐term Treasury yields. A segmented markets model is used to analyze the effects of the open‐market purchases on the economy. A significant degree of financial market segmentation is estimated, and partly explains the observed upturn in output growth. Had the Federal Reserve continued its operations and used the announcement strategy used in QE1, the Great Contraction could have been attenuated earlier. Our historical analysis suggests that the Federal Reserve in 2008 had a good predecessor to its actions.
Do steep recoveries follow deep recessions? Does it matter if a credit crunch or banking panic accompanies the recession? We look at the American historical experience in an attempt to answer these ...questions. The answers depend on the definition of a financial crisis and on how much of the recovery is considered. But in general recessions associated with financial crises are followed by rapid recoveries. We find three exceptions to this pattern: the recovery from the Great Contraction in the 1930s, the recovery after the recession of the early 1990s, and the present recovery. The present recovery is strikingly more tepid than the 1990s. Possible factors to explain the slowness of this recovery include residential investment and policy uncertainty. (JEL E32, N10, G01)
The financial crisis of 2008 engulfed the banking system of the US and many large European countries. Canada was a notable exception. In this article we argue that the structure of financial systems ...is path-dependent. The relative stability of the Canadian banks in the recent crisis compared to the US in our view reflected the original institutional foundations laid in place in the early nineteenth century in the two countries. The Canadian concentrated banking system that had evolved by the end of the twentieth century had absorbed the key sources of systemic risk—the mortgage market and investment banking—and was tightly regulated by one overarching regulator. In contrast, the relatively weak, fragmented, and crisis-prone US banking system that had evolved since the early nineteenth century led to the rise of securities markets, investment banks, and money market mutual funds (the shadow banking system) combined with multiple competing regulatory authorities. The consequence was that the systemic risk that led to the crisis of 2007-8 was not contained.
This article surveys the co-evolution of monetary policy and financial stability for a number of countries from 1880 to the present. Historical evidence on the incidence, costs, and determinants of ...financial crises (the most extreme form of financial instability), combined with narratives on some famous financial crises, suggests that financial crises have many causes, including credit-driven asset price booms, which have become more prevalent in recent decades, but in general financial crises are very heterogeneous and hard to categorize. Moreover, evidence shows that the association across the country sample between credit booms, asset price booms, and serious financial crises is quite weak.
Original sin and the great depression Bordo, Michael D.; Meissner, Christopher M.
Journal of international economics,
11/2023, Letnik:
145
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Do exchange rate movements matter for how markets price foreign currency denominated sovereign bonds? High-frequency bond price data from 1931 show that depreciation against the dollar/gold was ...associated with elevated risk premia on US dollar/gold public debt. We use a theoretical model to illustrate how foreign currency debt influences exchange rate policy and foreign currency bond prices. We use these theoretical results, the timing of sterling's devaluation in September 1931, and historically determined fundamentals to identify the impact of exchange rate policy on hard-currency bond yields in the Great Depression.
For over two centuries, the municipal (muni) bond market has been a source of systemic risk, which returned early in the Covid-19 downturn when borrowing from securities markets became costly for ...many private and public entities, and some found it difficult to borrow at all. Indeed, just before the Fed announced its unprecedented intervention into the muni market, spreads of muni over Treasury yields rose in line with the unemployment rate and appeared headed to levels not seen since the Great Depression, when real municipal gross investment plunged 35 percent below 1929 levels. To prevent such a calamity, the Fed created the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF) to purchase newly issued, (near) investment-grade state and local government bonds at ratings-based interest rate spreads over the safe OIS benchmark yield. In general, these spreads were initially about 100 basis points above average spreads under more normal market conditions and were later lowered by 50 basis points in August 2020. Despite a modest take-up, our study documents the MLF prevented muni spreads from rising much above those margins (plus a modest 10 basis point fee) and limited the extent to which interest rate spreads could have amplified the impact of the Covid pandemic. To establish the MLF the Fed needed Treasury indemnification against default losses. There were concerns about whether the creation of the MLF could induce moral hazard among borrowers and could undermine the efficiency of the bond market if the facility had lasted too long. Partly for this reason and because the muni market had settled down by yearend 2020, the Treasury terminated the MLF at that time. Future assessments of these downside aspects will help answer the question whether the program's benefits addressed here exceeded its costs.
Does inequality lead to a financial crisis? Bordo, Michael D.; Meissner, Christopher M.
Journal of international money and finance,
12/2012, Letnik:
31, Številka:
8
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
The recent global crisis has sparked interest in the relationship between income inequality, credit booms, and financial crises. Rajan (2010) and Kumhof and Rancière (2011) propose that rising ...inequality led to a credit boom and eventually to a financial crisis in the US in the first decade of the 21st century as it did in the 1920s. Data from 14 advanced countries between 1920 and 2000 suggest these are not general relationships. Credit booms heighten the probability of a banking crisis, but we find no evidence that a rise in top income shares leads to credit booms. Instead, low interest rates and economic expansions are the only two robust determinants of credit booms in our data set. Anecdotal evidence from US experience in the 1920s and in the years up to 2007 and from other countries does not support the inequality, credit, crisis nexus. Rather, it points back to a familiar boom-bust pattern of declines in interest rates, strong growth, rising credit, asset price booms and crises.
PDF
