U radu se razmatra pitanje jesu li na umjetnoj inteligenciji utemeljeni dijagnostički sustavi (AIBDS) prijetnja autonomiji pacijenata kao jednom od središnjih načela biomedicinske etike. U prvom ...dijelu rada objašnjava se što su AIBDS i kako funkcioniraju, s naglaskom na tehnologiji strojnog učenja i na njegovu svojstvu netransparentnosti. U drugom dijelu rada prikazuje se više paradigmatskih stavova o AIBDS-u kao prijetnji autonomiji pacijenata, uz osvrt na standardnu analizu prema kojoj ta autonomija uključuje (minimalno) tri komponente: intencionalnost, slobodu od ograničenjâ i razumijevanje. U trećem se dijelu rada argumente pro et contra teze o AIBDS-u kao prijetnji autonomiji razmatra iz perspektive pacijenata, dok ih se u četvrtom dijelu rada razmatra iz perspektive liječnika. U radu se pokazuje koliko rasprava o ovom pitanju može biti složena i koja oruđa argumentacije suprotstavljenim stranama pritom mogu stajati na raspolaganju.
The paper considers the question whether artificial intelligence-based diagnostic systems (AIBDS) pose a threat to patient autonomy as one of the central principles of biomedical ethics. The first part of the paper explains what AIBDS are and how they work, with an emphasis on machine learning technology and its property of non-transparency. The second part of the paper presents several paradigmatic views on AIBDS as a threat to patient autonomy, with reference to the standard analysis according to which this autonomy includes (at least) three components: intentionality, freedom from constraints and understanding. In the third part of the paper, the arguments pro et contra of the thesis about AIBDS as a threat to autonomy are considered from the perspective of patients, while in the fourth part of the paper they are considered from the perspective of physicians. The paper shows how complex the discussion of these issues can be and what argumentative tools can be made available to opposing parties.
Sex reassignment surgery is a therapy for gender dysphoria (gender identity disorder) standardly provided only upon a psychiatric authorization. Transgender scholars criticize this practice as ...unjustified medicalization and stigmatization of transsexual people. By demanding that sex reassignment surgery is not classified as therapy, they imply it should be classified as some kind of a biomedical enhancement. It is argued in this article that this reclassification is empirically and morally implausible because sex reassignment surgery is incompatible with two major views of enhancement. It is incompatible with the nontherapeutic view because it does not improve or augment, above average, any physical or mental trait or function. It is incompatible with the welfarist view because this view, contrary to the transgender scholars's demands, is compelled to retain the standard practice of providing sex reassignment surgery in order to ensure the optimal balance between its availability, beneficence, and possible harmfulness.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
ABSTRACT
Integrative bioethics is a brand of bioethics conceived and propagated by a group of Croatian philosophers and other scholars. This article discusses and shows that the approach encounters ...several serious difficulties. In criticizing certain standard views on bioethics and in presenting their own, the advocates of integrative bioethics fall into various conceptual confusions and inconsistencies. Although presented as a project that promises to deal with moral dilemmas created by modern science and technology, integrative bioethics does not contain the slightest normativity or action‐guiding capacity. Portrayed as a scientific and interdisciplinary enterprise, integrative bioethics displays a large number of pseudoscientific features that throw into doubt its overall credibility.
Utilitarizam Ivana Supeka Bracanović, Tomislav
Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine,
12/2022, Letnik:
48, Številka:
2 (96)
Journal Article, Paper
Odprti dostop
U radu se razmatra na koji bi način trebalo klasificirati Ivana Supeka s obzirom na njegova etička shvaćanja. Ponuđeni odgovor koji se nastoji potkrijepiti glasi da bi ga trebalo klasificirati kao ...utilitarista ili barem kao vrlo bliskog utilitarizmu. U radu se analizira veći broj tvrdnji iz Supekovih različitih spisa i uspoređuje ih se s paradigmatičnim tvrdnjama istaknutih utilitarista od Johna Stuarta Milla do Petera Singera. Ispostavlja se, primjerice, da je Supek smatrao da su posljedice važne za procjenu naših postupaka, da je Kantova etika nepogodna za rješavanje konkretnih moralnih dilema, da se univerzalnost etike može postići samo ako uključuje i element racionalnosti i element osjećajnosti, te da solidarnost – u smislu dužnosti pomaganja – mora od privrženosti našoj neposrednoj zajednici biti proširena na sve ljude. Ove i mnoge druge tipično utilitarističke tvrdnje snažno upućuju prema zaključku da je Supek bio privržen nekoj vrsti utilitarizma. U radu se razmatraju i dva moguća prigovora tezi o Supekovu utilitarizmu: prigovor da je Supek sebe smatrao humanistom, a ne utilitaristom te prigovor da je on utilitarizam na više mjesta otvoreno kritizirao. Prvi prigovor nije poguban za tezu o Supekovu utilitarizmu jer humanizam i utilitarizam dijele velik broj središnjih obilježja. Drugi prigovor također nije poguban jer Supekova se kritika utilitarizma, kao što pokazuje dodatna analiza njegovih spisa, temeljila na njegovom relativno slabom poznavanju nekih složenijih pojedinosti iz tradicije utilitarističke etike.
The paper discusses how Ivan Supek should be classified when it comes to his ethical views. The answer offered and sought to corroborate is that he should be classified as a utilitarian or at least as very close to utilitarianism. The paper analyzes a number of claims from Supek’s various writings and compares them with the paradigmatic claims of prominent utilitarians from John Stuart Mill to Peter Singer. It turns out, for example, that Supek believed that consequences are significant in evaluating our actions, that Kant’s ethics is unsuitable for resolving concrete moral dilemmas, that the universality of ethics could only be achieved if it included elements of both rationality and empathy, and that solidarity – in terms of the duty to help – from commitment to our immediate community should extend to all people. These and many other typically utilitarian claims strongly point towards the conclusion that Supek was committed to some version of utilitarianism. The paper also discusses two possible objections to the thesis of Supek’s utilitarianism: the objection that Supek considered himself a humanist and not a utilitarian and the objection that he openly criticized utilitarianism in several places. The first objection is hardly fatal to the thesis of Supek’s utilitarianism because humanism and utilitarianism share a large number of central features. The second objection is also hardly fatal because Supek’s critique of utilitarianism, as it is shown by an additional analysis of his writings, was based upon his relatively poor knowledge of some more intricate details of the tradition of utilitarian ethics.
This article discusses the view that bioethics should become “culturally sensitive” and give more weight to various cultural traditions and their respective moral beliefs. It is argued that this view ...is implausible for the following three reasons: it renders the disciplinary boundaries of bioethics too flexible and inconsistent with metaphysical commitments of Western biomedical sciences, it is normatively useless because it approaches cultural phenomena in a predominantly descriptive and selective way, and it tends to justify certain types of discrimination.
PDF
