Abstract
Ben Bernanke and Charles Kindleberger both studied financial crises. One interpretation in monetary macroeconomics associates them over their endorsement of the credit view as opposed to the ...money view. We suggest another interpretation and compare their contributions on financial crises more closely. This comparison makes all the more sense as the two authors were engaged in a discussion that the literature has not studied in depth, but that forms the Ariadne’s thread of our investigation. We show that the difference did not so much concern the distinction between rationality and irrationality hypothesis, or between policy and market failure, as the distinction between exogeneity and endogeneity of financial crises. Bernanke rested on the assumption of any kind of exogenous shocks and studied their effects on credit intermediation, whereas Kindleberger analysed credit intermediation throughout the financial cycle and pointed out the causes of financial crises as the culmination of the endogenous process.
Abstract
Our paper shows how Charles P. Kindleberger examined the function of the international lender of last resort and anticipated the rules governing the dollar swap line program (with unlimited ...amounts and at a fixed price) implemented by the Federal Reserve in the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. We systematically explore Kindleberger’s works on the central bank swap agreement in order to discern the theoretical foundations of the international lender of last resort rules he proposed. In this respect, two of his arguments that appear concomitantly must be distinguished. The first concerns the burden that the leadership partly or mostly should shoulder because of the problem of free riding—this is the traditional argument of benevolent leadership. The second argument concerns the efficiency with which the leadership operates as the stabilizer given the international monetary and financial context—this argument of the efficient stabilizer has been far less studied in the literature. We find that the Federal Reserve was not a benevolent monetary institution, but the global financial stabilizer instead—meaning that Kindleberger’s second argument finally prevailed. We conclude by emphasizing how central bankers rediscovered Kindleberger’s contribution to the international lender of last resort function.
Background. Although the Pneumonia Severity Index (PSI) has been extensively validated, little is known of the impact of its routine use as an aid to site-of-treatment decisions for patients with ...pneumonia who present to emergency departments (EDs). Methods. A prospective, observational, controlled cohort study of patients with pneumonia was conducted in 8 EDs that used the PSI (PSI-user EDs) and 8 EDs that did not use the PSI (PSI-nonuser EDs) in France. The outcomes examined included the proportion of “low-risk” patients (PSI risk classes I–III) treated as outpatients, all-cause 28-day mortality, admission of inpatients to the intensive care unit, and subsequent hospitalization of outpatients. Results. Of the 925 patients enrolled in the study, 472 (51.0%) were treated at PSI-user EDs, and 453 (49.0%) were treated at PSI-nonuser EDs; 449 (48.5%) of all patients were considered to be at low risk. In PSI-user EDs, 92 (42.8%) of 215 patients at low risk were treated as outpatients, compared with 56 (23.9%) of 234 patients at low risk in PSI-nonuser EDs. The adjusted odds ratios for outpatient treatment were higher for patients in PSI risk classes I and II who were treated in PSI-user EDs, compared with PSI-nonuser EDs (adjusted odds ratio, 7.0 95% confidence interval, 2.0–25.0 and 4.6 95% confidence interval, 1.3–16.2, respectively), whereas the adjusted odds ratio did not differ by PSI-user status among patients in risk class III or among patients at high risk. After adjusting for pneumonia severity, mortality was lower in patients who were treated in PSI-user EDs; other safety outcomes did not differ between patients treated in PSI-user and PSI-nonuser EDs. Conclusions. The routine use of the PSI was associated with a larger proportion of patients in PSI risk classes I and II who had pneumonia and who were treated in the outpatient environment without compromising their safety.
Abstract
Although the literature has studied the role of the Federal Reserve as the global lender of last resort in 2007–09, many aspects of the Dollar Swap Lines to the European Central Bank need ...further exploration. Accordingly, we provide original evidence about the auction operations, allotted amounts and interest rates with regard to the Federal Reserve’s dollar swaps and the European Central Bank’s dollar provision. More specifically, we examine the demand side of the Dollar Swap Lines (whereas the existing literature mentions the supply side only) and we scrutinise the interest rate (whereas the literature concentrates on volumes) set by the Federal Reserve, and also the rate set by the European Central Bank. Our findings cast light on the nature of the relationship between the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. Finally, we contribute to the literature on the global lender of last resort by coining the notion of the financial dilemma, under the dollar system within a framework of globalised financial markets.
We identify two approaches to financial crises in the history of political economy, namely, the exogenous approach whereby financial crises are sudden events, and the endogenous approach whereby they ...arise from a long process. In focusing on the endogenous approach, we study the contributions by Thomas Tooke, Ralph Hawtrey, Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger to the lender-of-last-resort theory, especially in international contexts, under the gold standard and the dollar system. The function of the lender of last resort broadens institutionally (depending on the type of securities and on the institutions issuing or holding them) and internationally (depending on jurisdiction and on the type of institutions ultimately requiring international liquidity).
The paper concerns the reception among central bankers of Bagehot's ideas on the lender of last resort (LLR). For the period 1999-2017 we construct a database of speeches by G7 central bankers that ...mention Bagehot. On the basis of this database, we show that there was a boom in mentions of Bagehot during the recent financial crisis. Using the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes, we indicate that this increase in the references to Bagehot among central bankers mainly relates to the idea of the LLR, and specifically the so-called Bagehot rules. However, a variety of interpretations of these rules can be observed among central bankers. We argue that these differences in interpretation can be explained by the fact that Bagehot's rules are used by central bankers either to justify, or, on the contrary, to impose limits on the liquidity injections envisaged under the unconventional monetary policies adopted in reaction to the crisis. We conclude that these diverging preferences on liquidity injections among central bankers allow us to distinguish two main "types" of receptions of Bagehot's rules: liberal versus conservative.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
BFBNIB, DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
This article provides a survey of the recent literature on the finance and growth relationship, the so-called nexus, since the 2007 global financial crisis. We use simple bibliometric analysis to ...survey this literature. The crisis brought the nexus into question which is why we begin by reviewing the impact of the crisis on the pre-crisis consensus in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (2008–2014). Then, we review the evolution of the finance growth nexus after 2014. We discuss the current state of the pre-crisis consensus, and highlight the main features of the new consensus. We also propose a review of the methodological aspects of this recent literature, the econometrics of finance and growth in particular. Finally, we identify the actual limitations of literature and the key issues remaining unresolved which suggests avenues for future research.
La crise financière a-t-elle causé un changement de paradigme de politique monétaire? En particulier, la stratégie des banques centrales en matière de stabilité financière a-t-elle changé? Le ...consensus d'avant-crise des banquiers centraux sur la stratégie de lutte ex post contre l'éclatement de la bulle financière (cleaning up the bust afterwards) prévaut-il encore ? Désormais les banquiers centraux préfèrent-ils au contraire agir ex ante contre la montée de la bulle (leaning against the wind) ? L'article examine si la crise a modifié ce débat clean versus lean sur la base des méthodes de littérature de la communication des banques centrales. Quatre-vingt-quatorze discours de membres de la Réserve fédérale américaine (Fed), de la Banque centrale européenne et de la Banque d'Angleterre portant sur ce débat sont étudiés sur la période 2002-2012. L'analyse et le codage de ces discours apportent deux résultats majeurs. En premier lieu, le consensus sur la stratégie de clean est moins marqué qu'avant la crise dans les trois banques centrales considérées. La devient clairement favorable à la stratégie opposée de lean. Cependant, en second lieu, le changement de paradigme de politique monétaire n'apparaît pas pour autant car la Fed et la Banque d'Angleterre continuent de préférer la stratégie de clean. Has the financial crisis led to a paradigm shift in monetary policy? In particular, has central banks' strategy to deal with financial stability changed? Does the central bankers' pre-crisis consensus on dealing ex post with the financial instability during the bust of the bubble (cleaning up the bust afterwards) still prevail? Or on the contrary do central bankers now prefer acting ex ante against the growth of the financial bubble (leaning against the wind) ? We examine whether the financial crisis has impacted this debate clean versus lean. We use the methods of the central bank communication literature. Ninety-four speeches on this debate, from members of the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Bank of England, are studied over the period 2002-2012. Two main results emerge from the analysis and coding of these speeches. First, following the crisis the consensus on the 'clean' strategy is relaxed in the three central banks inspected. The ECB particularly becomes clearly favorable to the opposite strategy of 'lean'. Secondly, yet, there is no signal of a new central banking paradigm on financial stability as the Bank of England and the Fed remain favorable to the 'clean' strategy.
Les régulateurs sont souvent recrutés par les entreprises qu’ils régulaient. Ce phénomène baptisé « revolving door » induirait, selon la littérature, un risque de conflit d’intérêt, voire de ...capture du régulateur. L’article examine si ce phénomène de revolving door existe dans les banques centrales. Les carrières des banquiers centraux à leurs entrées et sorties de la banque centrale sont étudiées afin d’établir un état des lieux. La base de données construite montre que le phénomène est significatif, notamment à la sortie de la banque centrale. Les résultats permettent d’établir un schéma type de revolving door dans lequel l’entrée dans la banque centrale fait suite à une carrière dans le secteur bancaire, et une sortie de la banque centrale est suivie d’un recrutement par un gestionnaire d’actifs sur un poste managérial après un délai médian d’environ un an. Un allongement du délai de carence à deux ans permettrait de limiter ce phénomène de revolving door . Classification JEL : E58, G01, G18, J62.
La crise financière a-t-elle causé un changement de paradigme de politique monétaire ? En particulier, la stratégie des banques centrales en matière de stabilité financière a-t-elle changé ? Le ...consensus d'avant-crise des banquiers centraux sur la stratégie de lutte ex post contre l'éclatement de la bulle financière ( cleaning up the bust afterwards ) prévaut-il encore ? Désormais les banquiers centraux préfèrent-ils au contraire agir ex ante contre la montée de la bulle ( leaning against the wind ) ?L'article examine si la crise a modifié ce débat clean versus lean sur la base des méthodes de la littérature de la communication des banques centrales. Quatre-vingt-quatorze discours de membres de la Réserve fédérale américaine (Fed), de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE) et de la Banque d'Angleterre portant sur ce débat sont étudiés sur la période 2002-2012.L'analyse et le codage de ces discours apportent deux résultats majeurs. En premier lieu, le consensus sur la stratégie de clean est moins marqué qu'avant la crise dans les trois banques centrales considérées. La BCE devient clairement favorable à la stratégie opposée de lean . Cependant, en second lieu, le changement de paradigme de politique monétaire n'apparaît pas pour autant car la Fed et la Banque d'Angleterre continuent de préférer la stratégie de clean .Classification JEL : D83, E52, G01.
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