Twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) represents a novel QKD approach whose principal merit is to beat the point-to-point private capacity of a lossy quantum channel, thanks to performing ...single-photon interference in an untrusted node. Indeed, recent security proofs of various TF-QKD type protocols have confirmed that the secret key rate of these schemes scales essentially as the square root of the transmittance of the channel. Here, we focus on the TF-QKD protocol introduced by Curty et al, whose secret key rate is nearly an order of magnitude higher than previous solutions. Its security relies on the estimation of the detection probabilities associated to various photon-number states through the decoy-state method. We derive analytical bounds on these quantities assuming that each party uses either two, three or four decoy intensity settings, and we investigate the protocol's performance in this scenario. Our simulations show that two decoy intensity settings are enough to beat the point-to-point private capacity of the channel, and that the use of four decoys is already basically optimal, in the sense that it almost reproduces the ideal scenario of infinite decoys. We also observe that the protocol seems to be quite robust against intensity fluctuations of the optical pulses prepared by the parties.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) can remove all detection side-channels from quantum communication systems. The security proofs require, however, that certain ...assumptions on the sources are satisfied. This includes, for instance, the requirement that there is no information leakage from the transmitters of the senders, which unfortunately is very difficult to guarantee in practice. In this paper we relax this unrealistic assumption by presenting a general formalism to prove the security of MDI-QKD with leaky sources. With this formalism, we analyze the finite-key security of two prominent MDI-QKD schemes-a symmetric three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol and a four-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol-and determine their robustness against information leakage from both the intensity modulator and the phase modulator of the transmitters. Our work shows that MDI-QKD is feasible within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission given that the sources are sufficiently isolated. Thus, it provides an essential reference for experimentalists to ensure the security of implementations of MDI-QKD in the presence of information leakage.
The twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol and its variants are highly attractive because they can beat the well-known fundamental limit of the secret key rate for point-to-point QKD ...without quantum repeaters (repeaterless bound). In this Letter, we perform a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of TFQKD based on the protocol proposed by Curty, Azuma, and Lo, which removes the need for postselection on the matching of a global phase from the original TFQKD scheme and can deliver a high secret key rate. Furthermore, we employ a Sagnac loop structure to help overcome the major difficulty in the practical implementation of TFQKD, namely, the need to stabilize the phase of the quantum state over kilometers of fiber. As a proof-of-principle demonstration, the estimated secure key rate from our experimental TFQKD data at the high loss region surpasses the repeaterless bound of QKD with current technology.
In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a minimum number of assumptions. Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would ...allow for larger tolerance against device imperfections in the actual implementations. However, even in this device-independent scenario, one assumption seems unavoidable, that is, the presence of a protected space devoid of any unwanted information leakage in which the legitimate parties can privately generate, process and store their classical data. In this paper we relax this unrealistic and hardly feasible assumption and introduce a general formalism to tackle the information leakage problem in most of existing QKD systems. More specifically, we prove the security of optical QKD systems using phase and intensity modulators in their transmitters, which leak the setting information in an arbitrary manner. We apply our security proof to cases of practical interest and show key rates similar to those obtained in a perfectly shielded environment. Our work constitutes a fundamental step forward in guaranteeing implementation security of quantum communication systems.
Abstract
Coherent-one-way (COW) quantum key distribution (QKD) held the promise of distributing secret keys over long distances with a simple experimental setup. Indeed, this scheme is currently used ...in commercial applications. Surprisingly, however, it has been recently shown that its secret key rate scales at most quadratically with the system’s transmittance and, thus, it is not appropriate for long distance QKD transmission. Such pessimistic result was derived by employing a so-called zero-error attack, in which the eavesdropper does not introduce any error, but still the legitimate users of the system cannot distill a secure key. Here, we present an improved zero-error attack against COW-QKD that significantly outperforms previous approaches, and provides stronger restrictions on its maximum achievable distance in the absence of errors. This translates into an upper bound on its secret key rate that is more than an order of magnitude lower than previously known upper bounds.
Abstract
Twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) was conjectured to beat the private capacity of a point-to-point QKD link by using single-photon interference in a central measuring station. ...This remarkable conjecture has recently triggered an intense research activity to prove its security. Here, we introduce a TF-type QKD protocol which is conceptually simpler than the original proposal. It relies on the pre-selection of a global phase, instead of the post-selection of a global phase, which significantly simplifies its security analysis and is arguably less demanding experimentally. We demonstrate that the secure key rate of our protocol has a square-root improvement over the point-to-point private capacity, as conjectured by the original TF QKD.
Device-independent quantum key distribution does not need a precise quantum mechanical model of employed devices to guarantee security. Despite its beauty, it is still a very challenging experimental ...task. We compare a recent proposal by Gisin et al.Phys. Rev. Lett. 105, 070501 (2010) to close the detection loophole problem with that of a simpler quantum relay based on entanglement swapping with linear optics. Our full-mode analysis for both schemes confirms that, in contrast to recent beliefs, the second scheme can indeed provide a positive key rate which is even considerably higher than that of the first alternative. The resulting key rates and required detection efficiencies of approximately 95% for both schemes, however, strongly depend on the underlying security proof.
Besides being a beautiful idea, device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) is probably the ultimate solution to defeat quantum hacking. Its security is based on a loophole-free violation of ...a Bell inequality, which results in a very limited maximum achievable distance. To overcome this limitation, DIQKD must be furnished with heralding devices like, for instance, qubit amplifiers, which can signal the arrival of a photon before the measurement settings are actually selected. In this way, one can decouple channel loss from the selection of the measurement settings and, consequently, it is possible to safely post-select the heralded events and discard the rest, which results in a significant enhancement of the achievable distance. In this work, we investigate photonic-based DIQKD assisted by two main types of qubit amplifiers in the finite data block size scenario, and study the resources-particularly, the detection efficiency of the photodetectors and the quality of the entanglement sources-that would be necessary to achieve long-distance DIQKD within a reasonable time frame of signal transmission.
Security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically assume that the devices of the legitimate users are perfectly shielded from the eavesdropper. This assumption is, however, very hard to ...meet in practice, and thus the security of current QKD implementations is not guaranteed. Here, we fill this gap by providing a finite-key security analysis for QKD which is valid against arbitrary information leakage from the state preparation process of the legitimate users. For this, we extend the techniques introduced by Tamaki et al (2016 New J. Phys. 18 065008) to the finite-key regime, and we evaluate the security of a leaky decoy-state BB84 protocol with biased basis choice, which is one of the most implemented QKD schemes today. Our simulation results demonstrate the practicability of QKD over long distances and within a reasonable time frame given that the legitimate users' devices are sufficiently isolated.
Twin-Field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) is a major candidate to be the new benchmark for far-distance QKD implementations, since its secret key rate can overcome the repeaterless bound by ...means of a simple interferometric measurement. Many variants of the original protocol have been recently proven to be secure. Here, we focus on the TF-QKD type protocol proposed by Curty et al (2019 NPJ Quantum Inf. 5 64), which can provide a high secret key rate and whose practical feasibility has been demonstrated in various recent experiments. The security of this protocol relies on the estimation of certain detection probabilities (yields) through the decoy-state technique. Analytical bounds on the relevant yields have been recently derived assuming that both parties use the same set of decoy intensities, thus providing sub-optimal key rates in asymmetric-loss scenarios. Here we derive new analytical bounds when the parties use either two, three or four independent decoy intensity settings each. With the new bounds we optimize the protocol's performance in asymmetric-loss scenarios and show that the protocol is robust against uncorrelated intensity fluctuations affecting the parties' lasers.