Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, ...incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.
Total hip replacement is a common and highly effective operation. All hip replacements would eventually fail if in situ long enough and it is important that patients understand when this might ...happen. We aimed to answer the question: how long does a hip replacement last?
We did a systematic review and meta-analysis with a search of MEDLINE and Embase from the start of records to Sept 12, 2017. We included articles reporting 15-year survival of primary, conventional total hip replacement constructs in patients with osteoarthritis. We extracted survival and implant data and used all-cause construct survival as the primary outcome. We also reviewed reports of national joint replacement registries, and extracted data for a separate analysis. In the meta-analyses, we weighted each series and calculated a pooled survival estimate for each source of data. This study was registered with PROSPERO (CRD42018085642).
We identified 140 eligible articles reporting 150 series, and included 44 of these series (13 212 total hip placements). National joint replacement registries from Australia and Finland provided data for 92 series (215 676 total hip replacements). The 25-year pooled survival of hip replacements from case series was 77·6% (95% CI 76·0–79·2) and from joint replacement registries was 57·9% (95% CI 57·1–58·7).
Assuming that estimates from national registries are less likely to be biased, patients and surgeons can expect a hip replacement to last 25 years in around 58% of patients.
National Institute for Health Research, National Joint Registry for England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Isle of Man, and The Royal College of Surgeons of England.
Knee replacements are the mainstay of treatment for end-stage osteoarthritis and are effective. Given time, all knee replacements will fail and knowing when this failure might happen is important. We ...aimed to establish how long a knee replacement lasts.
In this systematic review and meta-analysis, we searched MEDLINE and Embase for case series and cohort studies published from database inception until July 21, 2018. Articles reporting 15 year or greater survival of primary total knee replacement (TKR), unicondylar knee replacement (UKR), and patellofemoral replacements in patients with osteoarthritis were included. Articles that reviewed specifically complex primary surgeries or revisions were excluded. Survival and implant data were extracted, with all-cause survival of the knee replacement construct being the primary outcome. We also reviewed national joint replacement registry reports and extracted the data to be analysed separately. In the meta-analysis, we weighted each series and calculated a pooled survival estimate for each data source at 15 years, 20 years, and 25 years, using a fixed-effects model. This study is registered with PROSPERO, number CRD42018105188.
From 4363 references found by our initial search, we identified 33 case series in 30 eligible articles, which reported all-cause survival for 6490 TKRs (26 case series) and 742 UKRs (seven case series). No case series reporting on patellofemoral replacements met our inclusion criteria, and no case series reported 25 year survival for TKR. The estimated 25 year survival for UKR (based on one case series) was 72·0% (95% CI 58·0–95·0). Registries contributed 299 291 TKRs (47 series) and 7714 UKRs (five series). The pooled registry 25 year survival of TKRs (14 registries) was 82·3% (95% CI 81·3–83·2) and of UKRs (four registries) was 69·8% (67·6–72·1).
Our pooled registry data, which we believe to be more accurate than the case series data, shows that approximately 82% of TKRs last 25 years and 70% of UKRs last 25 years. These findings will be of use to patients and health-care providers; further information is required to predict exactly how long specific knee replacements will last.
The National Institute for Health Research, the National Joint Registry for England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Isle of Man, and the Royal College of Surgeons of England.
This article reviews a diverse set of proposals for dual processing in higher cognition within largely disconnected literatures in cognitive and social psychology. All these theories have in common ...the distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and conscious. A number of authors have recently suggested that there may be two architecturally (and evolutionarily) distinct cognitive systems underlying these dual-process accounts. However, it emerges that (a) there are multiple kinds of implicit processes described by different theorists and (b) not all of the proposed attributes of the two kinds of processing can be sensibly mapped on to two systems as currently conceived. It is suggested that while some dual-process theories are concerned with parallel competing processes involving explicit and implicit knowledge systems, others are concerned with the influence of preconscious processes that contextualize and shape deliberative reasoning and decision-making.
High-sensitivity assays can quantify cardiac troponins I and T (hs-cTnI, hs-cTnT) in individuals with no clinically manifest myocardial injury.
The goal of this study was to assess associations of ...cardiac troponin concentration with cardiovascular disease (CVD) outcomes in primary prevention studies.
A search was conducted of PubMed, Web of Science, and EMBASE for prospective studies published up to September 2016, reporting on associations of cardiac troponin concentration with first-ever CVD outcomes (i.e., coronary heart disease CHD, stroke, or the combination of both). Study-specific estimates, adjusted for conventional risk factors, were extracted by 2 independent reviewers, supplemented with de novo data from PROSPER (Pravastatin in Elderly Individuals at Risk of Vascular Disease Study), then pooled by using random effects meta-analysis.
A total of 28 relevant studies were identified involving 154,052 participants. Cardiac troponin was detectable in 80.0% (hs-cTnI: 82.6%; hs-cTnT: 69.7%). In PROSPER, positive associations of log-linear shape were observed between hs-cTnT and CVD outcomes. In the meta-analysis, the relative risks comparing the top versus the bottom troponin third were 1.43 (95% confidence interval CI: 1.31 to 1.56) for CVD (11,763 events), 1.67 (95% CI: 1.50 to 1.86) for fatal CVD (7,775 events), 1.59 (95% CI: 1.38 to 1.83) for CHD (7,061 events), and 1.35 (95% CI: 1.23 to 1.48) for stroke (2,526 events). For fatal CVD, associations were stronger in North American studies (p = 0.010) and those measuring hs-cTnT rather than hs-cTnI (p = 0.027).
In the general population, high cardiac troponin concentration within the normal range is associated with increased CVD risk. This association is independent of conventional risk factors, strongest for fatal CVD, and applies to both CHD and stroke.
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Do Smart People Have Better Intuitions? Thompson, Valerie A.; Pennycook, Gordon; Trippas, Dries ...
Journal of experimental psychology. General,
07/2018, Letnik:
147, Številka:
7
Journal Article
Recenzirano
There is much evidence that high-capacity reasoners perform better on a variety of reasoning tasks (Stanovich, 1999), a phenomenon that is normally attributed to differences in either the efficacy or ...the probability of deliberate (Type II) engagement (Evans, 2007). In contrast, we hypothesized that intuitive (Type I) processes may differentiate high- and low-capacity reasoners. To test this hypothesis, reasoners were given a reasoning task modeled on the logic of the Stroop Task, in which they had to ignore one dimension of a problem when instructed to give an answer based on the other dimension (Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2011). Specifically, in Experiment 1, 112 reasoners were asked to give judgments consistent with beliefs or validity for 2 different types of deductive reasoning problems. In Experiment 2, 224 reasoners gave judgments consistent with beliefs (i.e., stereotypes) or statistics (i.e., base-rates) on a base rate task; half responded under a strict deadline. For all 3 problem types and regardless of the deadline, high-capacity reasoners performed better for logic/statistics than did belief judgments when the 2 conflicted, whereas the reverse was true for low-capacity reasoners. In other words, for high-capacity reasoners, statistical information interfered with their ability to make belief-based judgments, suggesting that, for them, probabilities may be more intuitive than stereotypes. Thus, at least part of the accuracy-capacity relationship observed in reasoning may be because of intuitive (Type I) processes.
In this article, we respond to the four comments on our target article. Some of the commentators suggest that we have formulated our proposals in a way that renders our account of dual-process theory ...untestable and less interesting than the broad theory that has been critiqued in recent literature. Our response is that there is a confusion of levels. Falsifiable predictions occur not at the level of paradigm or metatheory—where this debate is taking place—but rather in the instantiation of such a broad framework in task level models. Our proposal that many dual-processing characteristics are only correlated features does not weaken the testability of task-level dual-processing accounts. We also respond to arguments that types of processing are not qualitatively distinct and discuss specific evidence disputed by the commentators. Finally, we welcome the constructive comments of one commentator who provides strong arguments for the reality of the dual-process distinction.
We propose a critique of normativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems ...associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial "is-ought" inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we propose that a clear distinction between normative systems and competence theories is essential, arguing that equating them invites an "is-ought" inference: to wit, supporting normative "ought" theories with empirical "is" evidence. We analyze in detail two research programmes with normativist features - Oaksford and Chater's rational analysis and Stanovich and West's individual differences approach - demonstrating how, in each case, equating norm and competence leads to an is-ought inference. Normativism triggers a host of research biases in the psychology of reasoning and decision making: focusing on untrained participants and novel problems, analyzing psychological processes in terms of their normative correlates, and neglecting philosophically significant paradigms when they do not supply clear standards for normative judgement. For example, in a dual-process framework, normativism can lead to a fallacious "ought-is" inference, in which normative responses are taken as diagnostic of analytic reasoning. We propose that little can be gained from normativism that cannot be achieved by descriptivist computational-level analysis, illustrating our position with Hypothetical Thinking Theory and the theory of the suppositional conditional. We conclude that descriptivism is a viable option, and that theories of higher mental processing would be better off freed from normative considerations.
Researchers in thinking and reasoning have proposed recently that there are two distinct cognitive systems underlying reasoning. System 1 is old in evolutionary terms and shared with other animals: ...it comprises a set of autonomous subsystems that include both innate input modules and domain-specific knowledge acquired by a domain-general learning mechanism. System 2 is evolutionarily recent and distinctively human: it permits abstract reasoning and hypothetical thinking, but is constrained by working memory capacity and correlated with measures of general intelligence. These theories essentially posit two minds in one brain with a range of experimental psychological evidence showing that the two systems compete for control of our inferences and actions.
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