By conducting a laboratory experiment, we investigate how consumers' purchasing behavior for certified forest coffee is affected by consumers' interest in environmental issues, the provision of ...information, and product labels. We contribute to the literature in the following three ways. First, we conduct a randomized controlled trial (RCT) to control biases due to endogeneity. Second, we utilize eye-trackers to examine how different product labels result in different visual attention. The combination of an RCT and eye-tracking techniques is new in the literature on purchasing behavior for environmentally friendly products. Third, our experiment measures participants' purchasing behavior that incurs actual costs rather than examining their willingness-to-pay (WTP) based on hypothetical questions. We find that concerns regarding environmental issues do not promote purchases of certified forest coffee. Information about certification programs does not have any effect on purchasing certified forest coffee unless information is provided to prior purchasers of certified forest coffee. By contrast, illustrations of forests on certified forest coffee labels attract participants' visual attention and further stimulate actual purchases of certified forest coffee, suggesting that a 1-second increase in visual attention increases the likelihood of purchasing certified forest coffee by 22 percentage points.
•Environmental concerns do not promote purchases of certified coffee.•Awareness of certification does not stimulate purchases of certified coffee.•Providing certification information had no impact on purchases of certified coffee.•Visual attention to the coffee label stimulates actual purchases of certified coffee.
•We generalize balanced cost reduction (BCR) for queueing games to TU-games.•BCR and efficiency are compatible only on classes of 2-games.•A weaker version of BCR and efficiency characterize the ...PANSC value.•The PANSC value is characterized by complement consistency and dual proportional standardness.•We compare the PANSC value with known solutions in the cost allocation literature.
This paper provides axiomatic characterizations of the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions (PANSC) value for TU games, being the solution which allocates the total worth proportional to the separable contributions of the players. First, we show that the PANSC value is the only one satisfying efficiency and weak balanced externalities, the last axiom requiring that every player’s payoff is the same fraction of the total externality inflicted on the other players with her presence. This is a weakening of balanced externalities studied in the context of queueing problems to characterize the Shapley value. Our second characterization is obtained by investigating the dual relation between the PANSC value and the proportional division value, showing that the PANSC value is the only one satisfying complement consistency and dual proportional standardness. In addition, we discuss the relation between the PANSC value and two methods widely used in cost allocation problems: the separable costs remaining benefits method and the alternative cost avoided method.
In cooperative game theory with transferable utilities (TU games), there are two well-established ways of redistributing Shapley value payoffs: using egalitarian Shapley values, and using consensus ...values. We present parallel characterizations of these classes of solutions. Together with the (weaker) axioms that characterize the original Shapley value, those that specify the redistribution methods characterize the two classes of values. For the class of egalitarian Shapley values, we focus on redistributions in one-person unanimity games from two perspectives: allowing the worth of coalitions to vary, while keeping the player set fixed; and allowing the player set to change, while keeping the worth of coalitions fixed. This class of values is characterized by efficiency, the balanced contributions property for equal contributors, weak covariance, a proportionately decreasing redistribution in one-person unanimity games, desirability, and null players in unanimity games. For the class of consensus values, we concentrate on redistributions in
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-person unanimity games from the same two perspectives. This class of values is characterized by efficiency, the balanced contributions property for equal contributors to social surplus, complement weak covariance, a proportionately decreasing redistribution in
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-person unanimity games, desirability, and null players in unanimity games.
The purpose of this paper is to study which coalition structures have stable distributions. We employ the projective core as a stability concept. Although the projective core is often defined only ...for the grand coalition, we define it for every coalition structure. We apply the core notion to a variety of economic models including the public goods game, the Cournot and Bertrand competition, and the common pool resource game. We use a partition function to formulate these models. We argue that symmetry is a common property of these models in terms of a partition function. We offer some general results that hold for all symmetric partition function form games and discuss their implications in the economic models. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the projective core of the models to be nonempty. In addition, we show that our results hold even in the presence of small perturbations of symmetry.
We develop a novel model of price-fee competition in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures and costly transportation. The model captures a variety of real market situations ...and it is the continuous quantity version of the assignment game with indivisible goods on a fixed network. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they achieve maximal bilateral joint welfare at prices equal to marginal costs. Maximal fees and the suppliers’ market power are restricted by the buyers’ credible threats to switch suppliers. Maximal fees also arise from a negotiation model that extends price competition to price-fee competition. Competition in both prices and fees necessarily emerges. It improves welfare compared to price competition, but buyers will not be better off. The minimal infrastructure achieving maximal aggregate welfare differs from the minimal network that protects buyers most.
► a value suited to coalition formation for games with externalities. ► The value is an average of marginal contribution of players in scenarios. ► The classical Shapley value and the de ...Clippel–Serrano value can be recovered.
The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give also two axiomatizations of our coalition formation value.
We introduce a new axiom, which we term the balanced contributions property for equal contributors. This axiom is defined by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property ...(Myerson, 1980) to two players whose contributions to the grand coalition are the same. We prove that this axiom, together with efficiency and weak covariance, characterizes a new class of solutions, termed the r-egalitarian Shapley values. This class subsumes many variants of the Shapley value, e.g., the egalitarian Shapley values and the discounted Shapley values. Our characterization provides a new axiomatic foundation for analyzing variants of the Shapley value in a unified manner.
We present axiomatic characterizations of the
proportional division value
for TU-games, which distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to the stand-alone worths of the players. ...First, a new proportionality principle, called
proportional-balanced treatment
, is introduced by strengthening Shapley’s symmetry axiom, which states that if two players make the same contribution to any nonempty coalition, then they receive the amounts in proportion to their stand-alone worths. We characterize the family of values satisfying efficiency, weak linearity, and proportional-balanced treatment. We also show that this family is incompatible with the dummy player property. However, we show that the proportional division value is the unique value in this family that satisfies the
dummifying player property
. Second, we propose appropriate
monotonicity
axioms, and obtain axiomatizations of the proportional division value without both weak linearity and the dummifying player property. Third, from the perspective of a variable player set, we show that the proportional division value is the only one that satisfies
proportional standardness
and
projection consistency
. Finally, we provide a characterization of proportional standardness.
The purpose of this study is to provide a comprehensive characterization of linear solutions to cooperative games by using monotonicity. A monotonicity axiom states an increase in certain parameters ...of a game as a hypothesis and states an increase in a player's payoff as a conclusion. We focus on various parameters of a game and introduce new axioms. Combined with previous results, we prove that efficiency, symmetry and a monotonicity axiom characterize (i) four linear solutions in the literature, namely, the Shapley value, the equal division value, the CIS value and the ENSC value, and (ii) a class of solutions obtained by taking a convex combination of the above solutions. Our methodological contribution is to provide a new linear algebraic approach for characterizing solutions by monotonicity. Using a new basis of the linear space of TU games, we identify a class of games in which a solution that satisfies monotonicity is linear. Our approach provides some intuition for why monotonicity implies linearity.
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