This letter responds to the article “What Do Prospective Parents Owe to Their Children?,” by Abigail Levin, in the March‐April 2024 issue of the Hastings Center Report.
Abstract
The Significant Interest view entails that even if there were no medical reasons to have access to genetic knowledge, there would still be reason(s) for prospective parents to use an ...identity-release donor as opposed to an anonymous donor. This view does not depend on either the idea that genetic knowledge is profoundly prudentially important or that donor-conceived people have a right to genetic knowledge. Rather, it turns on general claims about (1) parents’ obligations to help promote their children’s well-being and (2) the connection between a person’s well-being and the satisfaction of what I call their “worthwhile significant subjective interests.” To put this view (too) simply, the fact that a donor-conceived person—who knows she is donor-conceived—is likely to be very interested in acquiring genetic knowledge gives prospective parents a weighty reason to use an identity-release donor. This is because parents should promote their children’s well-being through the satisfaction of their children’s worthwhile significant interests.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
In this article, I distinguish between 4 models for thinking about how to balance the interests of parents, families, and a sick child: (1) the oxygen mask model; (2) the wide interests model; (3) ...the family interests model; and (4) the direct model. The oxygen mask model - which takes its name from flight attendants' directives to parents to put on their own oxygen mask before putting on their child's - says that parents should consider their own interests only insofar as doing so is, ultimately, good for the sick child. The wide interests model suggests that in doing well by my child I am at the very same time doing well by myself. My interests can, and plausibly do, encompass the interests of others; they are, to that extent, wide. There is, then, no sharp separation between the interests of the sick child and the interests of other family members. In the family interests model, families themselves are seen as having interests that are neither identical to the sum, nor a simple function, of the interests of individual family members. The family has goals, values, and aspirations that are essentially corporate rather than individual. According to this model, these family interests can explain why sacrifices can sometimes be demanded of some family members for the sake of others in a medical setting. Finally, the direct model takes a simpler view of family members' interests; it claims that these interests matter simply on their own and should be taken into account in making treatment decisions for a sick child. This model openly considers the competing interests that parents and other family members often have when caring for a sick child, and advocates for weighing those interests when making decisions for and about the sick child. While there is room for all four models at the bedside, I argue that the direct model should be highlighted in clinical decision-making.
In general, we think that when it comes to the good of another, we respect that person’s will by acting in accordance with what he wills because he wills it. I argue that this is not necessarily ...true. When it comes to the good of another person, it is possible to disrespect that person’s will while acting in accordance with what he wills because he wills it. Seeing how this is so, I argue, enables us to clarify the distinct roles that the wills of competent and incompetent people should play in third-party deliberations about their welfare.
What is the relationship between the position that anonymous gamete donation is wrong (i.e. the anti-anonymity position) and the position that all gamete donation is wrong (i.e. the anti-donation ...position)? Some argue that people who accept the anti-anonymity position should also accept the anti-donation position on the grounds that the two positions share the same main arguments. But that's not true. One argument in favor of anti-anonymity does not generate genuine dialectical pressure to accept the anti-donation position. The other anti-anonymity arguments do generate dialectical pressure, but not in a way that pushes toward the anti-donation position. Instead, they push toward what we might call the 'pro-known-donation' position. So, either there is no dialectical pressure or, where there is, it doesn't flow toward the anti-donation position.
Cases of paternalism usually involve disagreement between the paternalist and the paternalized subject. But not all the disagreements that give rise to paternalism are of the same kind and, as a ...result, not all instances of paternalism are morally on a par. There is, in other words, a moral difference between different kinds of paternalism, which can be explained in terms of the nature of the disagreements that give rise to the paternalism in the first place. This paper offers a novel account of how to characterize the nature of these disagreements such that we can explain this moral difference.
Some assume that respecting patient autonomy means clinicians should refrain from expressing opinions about what's in a patient's best interests. But depending on the kind of medical decision the ...patient is making, a clinician may have expertise vital to the patient's best interests-and even if she doesn't, she may still know what is best.
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