Teams play a key role in tackling complex societal challenges, such as developing vaccines or novel clean energy technologies. Yet, the effect of air pollution on team performance in non-routine ...problem-solving tasks is not well explored. Here, we document a sizable adverse effect of air pollution on team performance using data from 15,000 live escape games in London, United Kingdom. On high-pollution days, teams take on average 5% more time to solve a sequence of non-routine analytical tasks, which require collaborative skills analogous to those needed in the modern workplace. Negative effects are non-linear and only occur at high levels of air pollution, which are however commonplace in many developing countries. As team efforts predominantly drive innovation, high levels of air pollution may significantly hamper economic development.
Abstract
Are individuals of higher socio-economic status less ethical than those of lower status? Highly popularised research findings claim that this is the case. This paper provides evidence ...against this claim, based on data from two large survey experiments with more than 11,000 participants. We prime social status in two heterogeneous samples of the German population and then elicit ethical behaviour in an incentivised experimental task. Thus, our data allows us to study both correlation (using demographic data) and causality (using the priming). Our study rejects the claim that higher social status individuals are less ethical on both accounts.
We provide critical notes to the paper by Kallis et al. (2013) on monetary valuation. We evaluate the four criteria they propose for assessing valuation studies. We argue that no clear distinction is ...made between monetary valuation and pricing instruments. The selected criteria are more relevant to assessing policy than monetary valuation. The examples provided are not representative of the diversity of valuation studies encountered in the literature. Moreover, no clear examples are provided of where valuation and associated cost–benefit analysis of environmental policy go wrong. We plea for a more fair, constructive and consistent criticism of all “valuation languages” and offer relevant issues for consideration.
•We provide critical notes to the paper by Kallis et al. (2013) on monetary valuation.•We evaluate the four criteria they propose for assessing valuation studies.•No clear distinction is made between monetary valuation and pricing instruments.•No clear examples are provided of where monetary valuation goes wrong.•We plea for a fair, constructive and consistent criticism of all valuation languages.
Past experiments show systematic differences in contributions to public goods under various framing conditions. Several explanations of these differences have been presented. Some suggest that social ...frames affect subjects' preferences, while others suggest that framing changes subjects' beliefs about others, and thus in turn affects behavior. In this paper, we test the effect of framing on the level of contributions in a series of public goods games designed to separate the impact of preferences from beliefs in shaping cooperative decisions. This is achieved by implementing a social value orientation measure to elicit social preferences from decision makers, which are then analyzed in concert with reported beliefs about others' cooperation and own contribution decisions from the linear public goods games. While we find mixed results on framing effects, our study demonstrates that preferences and beliefs are significant predictors of cooperation. Furthermore, the degree to which they influence cooperation is either strengthened or weakened by framing.
Unilateral climate policies have been unable to achieve intended emissions reductions. We argue that international harmonization of climate policy beyond the Paris Agreement is the only way forward ...and that global carbon pricing, either through a tax or market, is the best available instrument to manage this. A foundation has already been laid, as current carbon pricing initiatives cover about 20% of global CO
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emissions. Since it limits free-riding by countries/jurisdictions, global carbon pricing is, in principle, behaviourally easier to negotiate than other instruments, such as emission targets or technical standards. To overcome political resistance, we propose a dynamic strategy consisting of two parallel tracks and five transition phases. The first track entails assembly of a carbon-pricing coalition that expands over time and exerts moral and economic pressure on non-members to join. The second track involves refocusing UN intergovernmental climate change negotiations on carbon pricing, potentially involving initially heterogeneous prices reflecting distinct income levels of countries, which then gradually converge. The dual tracks are designed to reinforce one another, increasing the likelihood of a successful outcome. The proposal results in a transition trajectory consisting of two interactive tracks and five phases, with specific attention to inequity within and among countries. We illustrate how such an approach could function with either a carbon tax or market.
Key policy insights
International harmonization of climate policies is required to achieve the deep cuts in emissions needed to meet the Paris Agreement's 2°C or 1.5°C target.
A focus on carbon pricing - either through taxation or emissions trading - has multiple strengths: it can be easily compared and harmonized among countries; it can be gradually strengthened over time; it moderates freeriding and fear of competitiveness losses; and it automatically generates revenues to compensate low-income households and countries.
Formation of a carbon-pricing coalition would enable such a group to speak with a single, powerful voice at UN climate change conferences. It would put economic and moral pressure on non-members, stimulating them to join and show a constructive attitude in ongoing UN climate change negotiations.
The 2015 Paris Agreement represents a historic deal in the form of a strong international response to address climate change. This outcome came as a surprise for some, as several controversial issues ...had been postponed from previous conferences, and were expected to complicate the talks in Paris. One related to the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (L&D), and potential legal remedies for L&D in the form of compensation payments. This issue had been particularly contentious with some developing countries advocating ideas for climate damage liability, which developed countries were unwilling to include in an agreement. Although the negotiations on L&D secured many positive outcomes, Decision 1/CP.21 adopting the Paris Agreement notes that there is no possibility of claiming liability and financial compensation for developing countries. This article, however, argues that, rather than triggering endless compensation claims disputes, a liability mechanism could actually serve as a commitment and reciprocity device, ultimately increasing global policy ambition. In this regard, this article reports the results of two experiments testing the effects of liability rules on the climate policy investment decisions of two players that differ in wealth and vulnerability. Results show that liability rules imposing a responsibility for precaution on both parties increase cooperation significantly, consequentially minimizing risk of L&D occurrence in the first place. Liability rules could thus not only help to address future losses, but also to drive global mitigation and adaptation ambition.
POLICY RELEVANCE
The research results presented in this paper suggest that policymakers would be well advised to further intensify negotiations on a climate-related compensation mechanism beyond that already committed to in the Paris Agreement. Our findings show that a compensation mechanism that implements a rather simple negligence rule makes climate cooperation more attractive and rewarding, potentially leading rich and poor nations to boost their investments in mitigation and adaptation for climate protection. Thus, far from opening up a Pandora's box of endless compensation claims towards industrialized countries, a liability mechanism could make global climate cooperation more effective, and in the longer run also less costly.
Comments on critiques of an article written by the authors for this journal focusing on achieving effective climate policies that limit global warming change to 1.5-2◦C.
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