In this paper we propose generic conversions for transforming a chosen-plaintext (CPA) secure attribute-based encryption (ABE) to a chosen-ciphertext (CCA) secure ABE. The only known generic ...conversion, to the best of our knowledge, was presented by Goyal et al. in ACM-CCS 2006, which itself subsumes the well-known IBE-to-PKE conversion by Canetti, Halevi, and Katz proposed in Eurocrypt 2004. The method by Goyal et al. has some restrictions that it assumes the delegatability of the original ABE and can deal only with the key-policy type of ABE with large attribute universe. In contrast, our methodology is applicable also to those ABE schemes without known delegatability. Furthermore, it works for both key-policy or ciphertext-policy flavors of ABE and can deal with both small and large universe scheme. More precisely, our method assumes only either delegatability or a newly introduced property called verifiability of ABE. We then exhaustively check the verifiability of existing ABE schemes and found that most of them satisfy such a property, hence CCA-secure versions of these schemes can be obtained automatically.
Attribute-Based Encryption for Range Attributes ATTRAPADUNG, Nuttapong; HANAOKA, Goichiro; OGAWA, Kazuto ...
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences,
09/2018, Letnik:
E101.A, Številka:
9
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is an advanced form of public-key encryption where access control mechanisms based on attributes and policies are possible. In conventional ABE, attributes are ...specified as strings. However, there are certain applications where it is useful to specify attributes as numerical values and consider a predicate that determines if a certain numerical range would include a certain value. Examples of these types of attributes include time, position coordinate, person's age, rank, identity, and so on. In this paper, we introduce ABE for boolean formulae over Range Membership (ABE-RM). We show generic methods to convert conventional ABE to ABE-RM. Our generic conversions are efficient as they introduce only logarithmic overheads (in key and ciphertext sizes), as opposed to trivial methods, which would pose linear overheads. By applying our conversion to previous ABE schemes, we obtain new efficient and expressive ABE-RM schemes. Previous works that considered ABE with range attributes are specific and can only deal with either a single relation of range membership (Paterson and Quaglia at SCN'10, and Kasamatsu et al. at SCN'12), or limited classes of policies, namely, only AND-gates of range attributes (Shi et al. at IEEE S&P'07, and some subsequent work). Our schemes are generic and can deal with expressive boolean formulae.
A lot of encryption and watermarking schemes have been developed as countermeasures to protect copyrights of broadcast or multicast content from malicious subscribers (traitors) that make pirate ...receivers (PRs) to use the content illegally. However, solo use of these schemes does not necessarily work well. Traitor tracing encryption schemes are a type of broadcasting encryption and have been developed for broadcasting and multicast services. There are multiple distinct decryption keys for each encryption key, and each service subscriber is given a unique decryption key. Any subscriber that redistributes his or her decryption key to a third party or who uses it and maybe other keys to make a PR can be identified with using the tracing algorithm of the scheme that is used by the services. However, almost all previous schemes have the same weakness; that is, they are vulnerable to an attack (content comparison attack). This is a concrete example such that solo use of the scheme does not work well. The attack involves multiple distinct decryption keys and a content-data comparison mechanism. We have developed a method, called complementary traitor tracing method (CTT), that makes traitor tracing schemes secure against content comparison attacks. It makes it impossible for PRs to distinguish ordinary content data from test data and makes traitor tracing schemes effective against all PRs, even those with multiple distinct decryption keys. CTT is made with a simple combination of schemes that are absolutely necessary. It makes broadcasting or multicast services secure.
Exposure of a secret key is a significant threat in practice. As a notion of security against key exposure, Dodis et al. advocated key-insulated security, and proposed concrete key-insulated ...encryption (KIE) schemes in which secret keys are periodically updated by using a physically “insulated” helper key. For significantly reducing possibility of exposure of the helper key, Hanaoka et al. further proposed the notion of parallel KIE (PKIE) in which multiple helper keys are used in alternate shifts. They also pointed out that in contrast to the case of the standard KIE, PKIE cannot be straightforwardly obtained from identity-based encryption (IBE). In this paper, we clarify that PKIE can be generically constructed by using a new primitive which we call one-time forward secure public key encryption (OTFS-PKE) and show that it is possible to construct OTFS-PKE from arbitrary IBE or hierarchical IBE (without degenerating into IBE). By using our method, we can obtain various new PKIE schemes which yield desirable properties. For example, we can construct first PKIE schemes from lattice or quadratic residuosity problems (without using bilinear maps), and PKIE with short ciphertexts and cheaper computational cost for both encryption and decryption.
Identity-based encryption (IBE) is an advanced form of public key encryption and one of the most important cryptographic primitives. Of the many constructions of IBE schemes, the one proposed by ...Boneh and Boyen (in Eurocrypt 2004) is quite important from both practical and theoretical points of view. The scheme was standardized as IEEE P1363.3 and is the basis for many subsequent constructions. In this paper, we investigate its multi-challenge security, which means that an adversary is allowed to query challenge ciphertexts multiple times rather than only once. Since single-challenge security implies multi-challenge security, and since Boneh and Boyen provided a security proof for the scheme in the single-challenge setting, the scheme is also secure in the multi-challenge setting. However, this reduction results in a large security loss. Instead, we give tight security reduction for the scheme in the multi-challenge setting. Our reduction is tight even if the number of challenge queries is not fixed in advance (that is, the queries are unbounded). Unfortunately, we are only able to prove the security in a selective setting and rely on a non-standard parameterized assumption. Nevertheless, we believe that our new security proof is of interest and provides new insight into the security of the Boneh-Boyen IBE scheme.
Secure two-party comparison plays a crucial role in many privacy-preserving applications, such as privacy-preserving data mining and machine learning. In particular, the available comparison ...protocols with the appropriate input/output configuration have a significant impact on the performance of these applications. In this paper, we firstly describe a taxonomy of secure two-party comparison protocols which allows us to describe the different configurations used for these protocols in a systematic manner. This taxonomy leads to a total of 216 types of comparison protocols. We then describe conversions among these types. While these conversions are based on known techniques and have explicitly or implicitly been considered previously, we show that a combination of these conversion techniques can be used to convert a perhaps less-known two-party comparison protocol by Nergiz et al. (IEEE SocialCom 2010) into a very efficient protocol in a configuration where the two parties hold shares of the values being compared, and obtain a share of the comparison result. This setting is often used in multi-party computation protocols, and hence in many privacy-preserving applications as well. We furthermore implement the protocol and measure its performance. Our measurement suggests that the protocol outperforms the previously proposed protocols for this input/output configuration, when off-line pre-computation is not permitted.
Signatures from Trapdoor Commitments with Strong Openings HANAOKA, Goichiro; SCHULDT, Jacob C. N.
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences,
09/2017, Letnik:
E100.A, Številka:
9
Journal Article
Recenzirano
In this paper, we propose a new generic construction of signatures from trapdoor commitments with strong openings in the random oracle model. Our construction is very efficient in the sense that ...signatures consist of just a single decommitment of the underlying commitment scheme, and verification corresponds to verifying this decommitment against a commitment derived via a hash function. Furthermore, assuming the commitment scheme provides sufficiently strong statistical hiding and trapdoor opening properties, the reduction of the security of the signature scheme to the binding property of the commitment scheme is tight. To instantiate our construction, we propose two new commitment schemes with strong openings. Both of these are statistically hiding, and have binding properties based on a Diffie-Hellman inversion problem and factoring, respectively. The signature schemes obtained from these are very efficient; the first matches the performance of BLS signatures, which currently provides the shortest signatures, and the second provides signatures of similar length to the shortest version of Rabin-Williams signatures while still being tightly related to factoring.