In this paper, we argue that energy should be seen as a critical aspect of changing historical regimes in the social production of space. We suggest the common definition of energy as the 'capacity ...to do work' ignores key aspects of the space required for energy in the first place (particularly the concept of power density). Articulating the basic spatial concept of power density with a historical–geographical materialist understanding of energy regimes, we argue that industrial capitalism is defined by an intensive vertical reliance upon subterranean stocks of energy that require relatively little surface land to harness. Previous modes of production were characterised by a more 'horizontal' reliance upon extensive territory (e.g. forests) to meet fuel needs. While attentive to the spatialities of overall energy complexes, we focus in particular on how the spatialities of energy sources affect the production of space in major and distinctive ways. Drawing from environmental and economic history, we argue the use of fossil fuels ushered in a 'subterranean energy regime' that not only relied on underground stocks of energy, but substantially relieved the societal demand for land-based and spatially extensive sources of fuel (i.e. wood and other organic sources). The use of subterranean fuel (first coal) not only powered machines, but revolutionised 'heat-process' industries like iron smelting that dramatically expanded the steel and other metal industries; thus, transforming the built environment. We then consider the spatial and land-use implications of a transition away from this subterranean regime to renewable energy sources (solar and wind). A return to the surface for energy would not be biological as in pre-industrial times, but industrial in the sense that these systems require industrial production. Moreover, the spatially extensive nature of such energy technologies should raise important political questions about existing land-use patterns and livelihoods, particularly in rural areas.
If our oil addiction is so bad for us, why don't we kick the habit? Looking beyond the usual culprits-Big Oil, petro-states, and the strategists of empire-Lifeblood finds a deeper and more complex ...explanation in everyday practices of oil consumption in American culture. Those practices, Matthew T. Huber suggests, have in fact been instrumental in shaping the broader cultural politics of American capitalism. How did gasoline and countless other petroleum products become so central to our notions of the American way of life? Huber traces the answer from the 1930s through the oil shocks of the 1970s to our present predicament, revealing that oil's role in defining popular culture extends far beyond material connections between oil, suburbia, and automobility. He shows how oil powered a cultural politics of entrepreneurial life-the very American idea that life itself is a product of individual entrepreneurial capacities. In so doing he uses oil to retell American political history from the triumph of New Deal liberalism to the rise of the New Right, from oil's celebration as the lifeblood of postwar capitalism to increasing anxieties over oil addiction. Lifeblood rethinks debates surrounding energy and capitalism, neoliberalism and nature, and the importance of suburbanization in the rightward shift in American politics. Today, Huber tells us, as crises attributable to oil intensify, a populist clamoring for cheap energy has less to do with American excess than with the eroding conditions of life under neoliberalism.
There is renewed attention to the importance of rent to understanding capitalist resource geographies. In this report, I ground these discussions in Marx’s theory of “ground rent” and specifically ...the role of the landlord class as owners of natural forces demanding a “share” of the social surplus (as distinct from the capitalist and working classes). I review emergent literature about three key kinds of rentiers—private landowners, landlord states, and capitalist resource rentiers. I suggest the category of capitalist resource rentier confounds a Marxist class analysis centered on capitalists as the owners of the means of production.
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Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, OILJ, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Projections of future climate depend critically on refined estimates of climate sensitivity. Recent progress in temperature proxies dramatically increases the magnitude of warming reconstructed from ...early Paleogene greenhouse climates and demands a close examination of the forcing and feedback mechanisms that maintained this warmth and the broad dynamic range that these paleoclimate records attest to. Here, we show that several complementary resolutions to these questions are possible in the context of model simulations using modern and early Paleogene configurations. We find that (i) changes in boundary conditions representative of slow “Earth system” feedbacks play an important role in maintaining elevated early Paleogene temperatures, (ii) radiative forcing by carbon dioxide deviates significantly from pure logarithmic behavior at concentrations relevant for simulation of the early Paleogene, and (iii) fast or “Charney” climate sensitivity in this model increases sharply as the climate warms. Thus, increased forcing and increased slow and fast sensitivity can all play a substantial role in maintaining early Paleogene warmth. This poses an equifinality problem: The same climate can be maintained by a different mix of these ingredients; however, at present, the mix cannot be constrained directly from climate proxy data. The implications of strongly state-dependent fast sensitivity reach far beyond the early Paleogene. The study of past warm climates may not narrow uncertainty in future climate projections in coming centuries because fast climate sensitivity may itself be state-dependent, but proxies and models are both consistent with significant increases in fast sensitivity with increasing temperature.
The exchange between Robbins and Gomez-Baggethun is a debate between a middle-ground and strong degrowth perspectives. Here, I offer an argument for what Paul Robbins calls “socialist modernism”—a ...somewhat redundant phrase since socialism has always been “modernist.” It’s a shame that Breakthrough Institute-style “ecomodernism” – which Robbins (2020: 4) rightly deems “apolitical” – has taken up all the oxygen and has obscured left articulations, which, I believe offer a more robust and realistic alternative to degrowth positions.
Despite the uncertainty in future climate-change impacts, it is often assumed that humans would be able to adapt to any possible warming. Here we argue that heat stress imposes a robust upper limit ...to such adaptation. Peak heat stress, quantified by the wet-bulb temperature TW, is surprisingly similar across diverse climates today. TW never exceeds 31 °C. Any exceedence of 35 °C for extended periods should induce hyperthermia in humans and other mammals, as dissipation of metabolic heat becomes impossible. While this never happens now, it would begin to occur with global-mean warming of about 7 °C, calling the habitability of some regions into question. With 11-12 °C warming, such regions would spread to encompass the majority of the human population as currently distributed. Eventual warmings of 12 °C are possible from fossil fuel burning. One implication is that recent estimates of the costs of unmitigated climate change are too low unless the range of possible warming can somehow be narrowed. Heat stress also may help explain trends in the mammalian fossil record.
It was a pleasure reviewing this special issue on “Earth Politics: Territory and the Subterranean” convened by Andrea Marston and Matthew Himley. It is exciting to see geographers devoting more ...attention to what Bruce Braun (2000) called “vertical territory.” The social relation to the subterranean is quite historically specific. I argued recently, with James McCarthy Huber and McCarthy, 2017, that we could see modern industrialism as a “subterranean energy regime” utterly dependent upon the...
In this article, I argue that political ecology has neglected examining the "hidden abodes" of industrial factory production. I suggest a visit to such sites can expand and deepen what counts as both ...ecology and politics in the field. Ecologically speaking, the industrial secondary sector is not only at the center of the overall "metabolism" between society and nature but also is central in producing many large-scale ecological problems like climate change. Politically, although much of political ecology focuses on marginalization, dispossession, and what I call "following the politics" (i.e., protest and resistance movements), industrial environments often entail uncontested power over massive flows of raw materials, energy, and waste. I suggest that political ecology analysis can use chains of explanation to make these industrial ecologies political. To illustrate the argument, I focus on a large industrial nitrogen fertilizer facility in southern Louisiana. In the empirical sections of this article, I examine its control over the highly politicized chemical compounds of natural gas (CH
4
), ammonia (NH
3
), and carbon dioxide (CO
2
). Although the industrial facility largely benefits from its access to and control over these substances, the politics of them is directed elsewhere along the commodity chain to naturalized areas more familiar to political ecologists (e.g., sites of natural gas extraction or agricultural application). I conclude by suggesting that making this kind of analysis political requires that we disseminate our analysis and critiques to broader publics.
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