Individuals’ perceptions of biracials can vary based on the motives of the perceiver. Here, we examine how two factors—perceivers’ group-level identification motives and their system-level beliefs ...about the desirability of hierarchy (i.e., social dominance orientation)—predict the degree to which they attribute a biracial target’s successes or failures to that target’s White versus minority background. Across three studies examining different contexts, more anti-egalitarian White participants and more highly identified White participants rated a half-White, half-minority target as being shaped more by his minority (vs. White) background when he was disreputable (vs. reputable)—patterns broadly consistent with prior theorizing on the motivations to maintain social stratification and protect ingroup standing, respectively. In direct contrast, however, egalitarian White participants and White participants low on ethnic identification credited a target’s outgroup minority background when he was reputable (vs. disreputable), consistent with a desire to promote social equality and forgoing the opportunity to “bask in reflected glory” on behalf of the ingroup. Our results extend extant theorizing by underlining the benefits of jointly considering both group- and system-level motives when analyzing perceptions and attributions of individuals and groups, and by shedding new light on the understudied psychology of social egalitarians.
Many societies today are organised as race-based social hierarchies, with clear boundaries between racial groups at the top versus bottom. The growth of multiracial populations has been heralded as ...holding the potential to blur existing group boundaries. But whether multiracial people do blur boundaries depends critically on how monoracial perceivers categorise them. We review our research programme on how monoracial perceivers' categorisation of multiracials depends on sociopolitical motives. We present the Sociopolitical Motive × Intergroup Threat Model of Racial Categorisation, which describes how sociopolitical motives interact with specific threats to drive multiracial categorisation, and how this depends on perceivers' group position in the racial status hierarchy. Our empirical work is based on the U.S. context, but we discuss how our research, grounded in theories of intergroup relations that have been tested cross-culturally - social dominance, system justification, authoritarianism, and social identity theories - may apply more broadly.
As multiracial children of foreign-born parents, Kamala Harris and Barack Obama embody diversity in politics for many perceivers. Yet some have also questioned their loyalty to their respective ...groups. We explored perceptions of dual group members’ (DGM; dual nationals, multiracial people, and dual state residents) loyalty among first-party (those who share a group membership with a DGM target) and third-party perceivers (those who do not). Studies 1a–2b showed that first- and third-party perceivers rated DGMs as less loyal than their single group member (SGM) counterparts. However, only first- (Studies 2a–2b) but not third-party (Studies 1a–1b) perceivers preferred SGMs to DGMs for loyalty-dependent roles. Study 3 revealed that perceivers who were higher in patriotism supported DGMs for loyalty-dependent roles less when they were first- (vs. third) party observers. These studies suggest that perceivers readily intuit that DGMs are less loyal than SGMs and, under some conditions, this may lead to discrimination.
Although the act of dehumanizing an outgroup is a pervasive and potent intergroup process that drives discrimination and conflict, no formal research has examined the consequences of being ...dehumanized by an outgroup-that is, "metadehumanization." Across 10 studies (N = 3,440) involving several real-world conflicts spanning 3 continents, we provide the first empirical evidence that metadehumanization (a) plays a central role in outgroup aggression that is (b) mediated by outgroup dehumanization, and (c) distinct from metaprejudice. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate experimentally that Americans who learn that Arabs (Study 1a) or Muslims (Study 1b) blatantly dehumanize Americans are more likely to dehumanize that outgroup in return; by contrast, experimentally increasing outgroup dehumanization did not increase metadehumanization (Study 1c). Using correlational data, Study 2 documents indirect effects of metadehumanization on Americans' support for aggressive policies toward Arabs (e.g., torture) via Arab dehumanization. In the context of Hungarians and ethnic minority Roma, Study 3 shows that the pathway for Hungarians from metadehumanization to aggression through outgroup dehumanization holds controlling for outgroup prejudice. Study 4 examines Israelis' metaperceptions with respect to Palestinians, showing that: (a) feeling dehumanized (i.e., metadehumanization) is distinct from feeling disliked (i.e., metaprejudice), and (b) metadehumanization uniquely influences aggression through outgroup dehumanization, controlling for metaprejudice. Studies 5a and 5b explore Americans' metaperceptions regarding ISIS and Iran. We document a dehumanization-specific pathway from metadehumanization to aggressive attitudes and behavior that is distinct from the path from metaprejudice through prejudice to aggression. In Study 6, American participants learning that Muslims humanize Americans (i.e., metahumanization) humanize Muslims in turn. Finally, Study 7 experimentally contrasts metadehumanization and metahumanization primes, and shows that resulting differences in outgroup dehumanization are mediated by (a) perceived identity threat, and (b) a general desire to reciprocate the outgroup's perceptions of the ingroup. In summary, our research outlines how and why metadehumanization contributes to cycles of ongoing violence and animosity, providing direction for future research and policy.
Prisoner exchanges between groups in conflict are often a first step towards peace. As with bargaining more generally, groups presumably try to get the best deal possible. But when exchanging human ...lives, can getting "more" make your group seem worth less? Building on research on signals of self-regard at the interpersonal level, we consider whether certain behaviors—even strategically beneficial ones—can diminish perceptions of the esteem in which a group holds itself, with consequences for the respect and treatment it is afforded. Across seven preregistered experiments (total N = 5060), we find that groups that negotiate a "better deal" (e.g., getting multiple prisoners back in return for releasing only one outgroup prisoner; negotiating down the "price" for retrieving a single prisoner) are ironically seen as placing less value on themselves, and, as a consequence, are respected less and prescribed worse treatment. We observe these results in real-world and in artificial contexts, and whether perceivers belong to the outgroup in conflict or are neutral third-party observers. A seventh study, focused on the decision to pursue or eschew a risky rescue mission (with negative expected value of lives saved) expands beyond the prisoner swap context, highlighting that our results are one manifestation of a general tendency for perceivers to intuit a group's self-regard from its actions. Our work suggests that, when deciding between various courses of action, it would behoove groups to consider the ways in which their actions subtly communicate how highly they value themselves.
Social Dominance Orientation Ho, Arnold K.; Sidanius, Jim; Pratto, Felicia ...
Personality & social psychology bulletin,
05/2012, Letnik:
38, Številka:
5
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Social dominance orientation (SDO) is one of the most powerful predictors of intergroup attitudes and behavior. Although SDO works well as a unitary construct, some analyses suggest it might consist ...of two complementary dimensions—SDO-Dominance (SDO-D), or the preference for some groups to dominate others, and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E), a preference for nonegalitarian intergroup relations. Using seven samples from the United States and Israel, the authors confirm factor-analytic evidence and show predictive validity for both dimensions. In the United States, SDO-D was theorized and found to be more related to old-fashioned racism, zero-sum competition, and aggressive intergroup phenomena than SDO-E; SDO-E better predicted more subtle legitimizing ideologies, conservatism, and opposition to redistributive social policies. In a contentious hierarchical intergroup context (the Israeli–Palestinian context), SDO-D better predicted both conservatism and aggressive intergroup attitudes. Fundamentally, these analyses begin to establish the existence of complementary psychological orientations underlying the preference for group-based dominance and inequality.
This review places intergroup encounters in a broad framework which considers the context in which such encounters take place, and in particular, the power dynamics at play. We address different ...forms of encounters, spanning from interpersonal interactions (not focused on intergroup aspects) to political negotiations between the groups' representatives, and argue for a deeper consideration of power asymmetries in examining such encounters. We argue that because high- and low-power group members have different motivations for change in the status quo, they differ in their expectations from intergroup encounters and in the types of encounters they prefer. We describe relevant research while considering moderating factors such as the legitimacy and stability of the power dynamics. We also identify remaining gaps and topics requiring further research. This work has both conceptual and practical implications for the prospects of promoting both positive attitudinal change as well as changes to the hierarchical status quo.
Research suggests that some people, particularly those on the political right, tend to blatantly dehumanize low-status groups. However, these findings have largely relied on self-report measures, ...which are notoriously subject to social desirability concerns. To better understand just how widely blatant forms of intergroup dehumanization might extend, the present article leverages an unobtrusive, data-driven perceptual task to examine how U.S. respondents mentally represent "Americans" versus "Arabs" (a low-status group in the United States that is often explicitly targeted with blatant dehumanization). Data from 2 reverse-correlation experiments (original N = 108; preregistered replication N = 336) and 7 rating studies (N = 2,301) suggest that U.S. respondents' mental representations of Arabs are significantly more dehumanizing than their representations of Americans. Furthermore, analyses indicate that this phenomenon is not reducible to a general tendency for our sample to mentally represent Arabs more negatively than Americans. Finally, these findings reveal that blatantly dehumanizing representations of Arabs can be just as prevalent among individuals exhibiting low levels of explicit dehumanization (e.g., liberals) as among individuals exhibiting high levels of explicit dehumanization (e.g., conservatives)-a phenomenon into which exploratory analyses suggest liberals may have only limited awareness. Taken together, these results suggest that blatant dehumanization may be more widespread than previously recognized and that it can persist even in the minds of those who explicitly reject it.
Whereas politicians broker peace deals, it falls to the public to embrace peace and help sustain it. The legacy of conflicts can make it difficult for people to support reconciling and reintegrating ...with former enemies. Here we create a five-minute media intervention from interviews we conducted with Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) ex-combatants in a Colombian demobilization camp and non-FARC Colombians in neighbouring communities. We show that exposure to the media intervention humanizes FARC ex-combatants and increases support for peace and reintegration. These effects persisted at least three months post-exposure, were replicated in an independent sample of non-FARC Colombians and affected both attitudes (for example, support for reintegration policies) and behaviour (for example, donations to organizations supporting ex-combatants). As predicted, the intervention's effects were mediated by changing conflict-associated cognitions-reducing the belief that ex-combatants are unwilling and unable to change-beyond affective pathways (for example, increased empathy or reduced prejudice).
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