We consider the relationship between disgust and ethical behavior. Winterich, Mittal, and Morales report several experiments finding that disgust increases unethical behavior. We replicated three of ...their studies, using high-powered designs with a total of 1,239 participants, three different procedures to induce disgust, and three different measures of unethical behavior. We observe no effect of disgust on unethical behavior in any of the studies, supporting the contention that disgust has no effect on ethical decision making.
Many decisions are interactive; the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. Standard game theory assumes that individuals are ...rational, self‐interested decision makers—that is, decision makers are selfish, perfect calculators, and flawless executors of their strategies. A myriad of studies shows that these assumptions are problematic, at least when examining decisions made by individuals. In this article, we review the literature of the last 25 years on decision making by groups. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and individuals in many games: prisoner's dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal–agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that group decisions are closer to the game‐theoretic assumption of rationality than individual decisions. Given that many real‐world decisions are made by groups, it is possible to argue that standard game theory is a better descriptive model than previously believed by experimental researchers. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:471–482. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1184
This article is categorized under:
Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making
We report three studies exploring the relationship between disgust and trust. Study 1a measured emotions using face-reading technology while participants played a repeated trust game. We observed a ...negative correlation between trust and disgust. Study 1b employed self-reports along with the face reader. The self-report procedure adversely affected participants’ emotional state and eliminated the correlation between trust and other emotions. Study 2 induced incidental disgust or sadness using virtual reality and manipulated participants’ awareness of the source of their emotions. Disgusted participants judged others as less trustworthy and sent less in a trust game than sad or control participants. An interaction indicated that awareness of the source of emotions eliminated the effect. Our data are consistent with the association between disgust and harsher moral judgments and suggest that disgust is antithetical to the building of trust. However, the association disappears if individuals are aware that their disgust is unrelated to the setting.
Two experiments compared the Centipede game played either by 2 individuals or by 2 (3-person) groups. The 2 competitors alternate in deciding whether to take the larger portion of an increasing (or ...constant) pile of money, and as soon as one “takes” the game ends. Assuming that both sides are concerned only with maximizing their own payoffs (and that this is common knowledge), the game theoretic solution, derived by backward induction, is for the first mover to exit the game at the first decision node. Both experiments found that although neither individuals nor groups fully complied with this solution, groups did exit the game significantly earlier than individuals. The study of experimental games has uncovered many instances in which individuals deviate systematically from the game theoretic solution. This study is in accord with other recent experiments in suggesting that game theory may provide a better description of group behavior.
We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount ...sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2×2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy.
The power of defaults in intergroup conflict Böhm, Robert; Halevy, Nir; Kugler, Tamar
Organizational behavior and human decision processes,
January 2022, 2022-01-00, Letnik:
168
Journal Article
Recenzirano
•Default contributions may affect individuals’ participation in intergroup conflict.•The default effect in intergroup conflict is shown in an incentivized behavioral game.•The default effect in ...intergroup conflict is shown for both minimal and natural groups.
Intergroup conflict is a persistent companion of the human existence. Why do individuals engage in intergroup conflict as often as they do? We propose that groups’ tendencies to present intergroup conflict as the default option and individuals’ tendencies to disproportionately choose default options fuel individual participation in intergroup conflict. Three experiments (total N = 893) that used incentivized economic games found support for this hypothesis. Designating intergroup conflict as the default option significantly increased individual participation in conflict relative to a no-default condition and to designating other behavioral options as defaults. The effects of defaults on intergroup conflict generalized across different social identities and levels of group identification. Our findings explain the stickiness of conflict and identify choice architecture as a potential solution: changing existing defaults can redirect intergroup behavior. We discuss promising directions for future research on the psychological mechanisms underlying these effects.
We conducted an experimental study of price competition in a duopolistic market. The market was operationalized as a
repeated game between two “teams” with one, two, or three players in each team. We ...found that asking (and winning) prices were significantly higher in competition between individuals than in competition between two- or three-person teams. There were no general effects of team size, but prices increased with time when each team member was paid his or her own asking price and decreased when the team's profits were divided equally. This result is consistent with a simple model of individual learning.
This paper begins to explore behavioral mechanism design, replacing equilibrium by a model based on "level-k" thinking, which has strong support in experiments. In representative examples, we ...consider optimal sealed-bid auctions with two symmetric bidders who have independent private values, assuming that the designer knows the distribution of level-k bidders. We show that in a first-price auction, level-k; bidding changes the optimal reserve price and often yields expected revenue that exceeds Myerson's (1981) bound; and that an exotic auction that exploits bidders' non-equilibrium beliefs can far exceed the revenue bound. We close with some general observations about level-k auction design.
► We study asymmetric social dilemmas between individuals and groups. ► We demonstrate that outcomes depend on player type and on conflict structure. ► We show that individuals outperform groups. ► ...Individuals’ advantage results from better cooperation with other individuals. ► Groups’ disadvantage results from difficulties in solving internal social dilemmas.
Three computer-controlled experiments were conducted to study interactions between individuals and non-cooperative groups in prototypical social-dilemma games. The asymmetric competition between an individual and a group was compared with symmetric control conditions where both competitors were either individuals or groups. All games were played repeatedly with the same players interacting for 120 rounds. The results show that the outcome of the conflict depends both on the type of competing players and on the structure of the competition. Generally, individuals do better than non-cooperative groups, regardless of the type of conflict, and more often than not it is better to have a non-cooperative group rather than an individual as an opponent. The relative advantage is a result of individuals generally cooperating better with other individuals (as compared to cooperation between two groups), and that in mixed competitions the individual takes advantage of the group’s difficulties in mobilizing collective-action, and dominates it.
Crime and punishment Goldman, Barry; Cooper, Dylan; Kugler, Tamar
The International journal of conflict management,
02/2019, Letnik:
30, Številka:
1
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Purpose
A surprisingly large proportion of the working population of the USA consists of individuals with felony convictions. Moreover, the issue of employability of these individuals is compounded ...for minorities. This paper aims to present two experimental studies investigating whether minorities with felony backgrounds have a more difficult time being selected for employment than identically situated white applicants. The authors ground the paper in realistic group conflict theory. Results indicate discrimination is more acute against minorities with felony backgrounds than whites with the same background and shed light on the mechanisms leading to this discrimination. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper involves two experimental studies involving working adults engaging with realistic survey situations using mTurk.
Findings
Results of both studies indicate discrimination is more acute against minorities with felony backgrounds than whites with the same background, and shed light on the mechanisms leading to this discrimination.
Research limitations/implications
One limitation of the methodology is that the authors used fictional candidates and jobs. This may have led to understating the effects of discrimination on minorities because it allowed applicants to answer in socially desirable ways (e.g. absent of racial bias) without suffering any of the anticipated negative consequences of actually hiring individuals about whom they hold negative stereotypes.
Practical implications
This research has several important implications for practice. First, organizations should be keenly aware of the potential for subtle and unconscious bias to affect the job application process even among well-intentioned hiring managers. Second, as the bias is often triggered by threats, organizations should share with their employees the nature of the threat involved with former felons.
Social implications
Organizations should deliberately address issues associated with the use of criminal background checks. For many organizations, a felony conviction in an applicant’s background automatically eliminates that person from employment. However, a substantial amount of the workforce now has a felony in their background. Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2012) has issued guidelines that detail important factors that organizations should consider on a case-by-case basis when considering employment for former felons. Organizations may consider updating any blanket exclusions regarding the hiring of ex-felons – not only because it makes good policy but also because it may help the organization hire the best people.
Originality/value
This research studies an important – and growing – societal problem related to the hiring of convicted felons, and the related issue of racial discrimination that affects black convicted felons particularly hard. There has been very little work in the management area on this topic. Moreover, there has been very little work in all areas that includes experimental methods. The use of such methods is particularly useful to eliminate confounds found in field data.
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