This paper considers a multiple-supplier, single manufacturer assembly supply chain where the suppliers produce components of a short life-cycle product which is assembled by the manufacturer. In ...this single-period problem the suppliers determine their production quantities and the manufacturer chooses the retail price. We assume that the manufacturer faces a random price-dependent demand in either additive or multiplicative form. For each case, we analyze both simultaneous-move and leader–follower games to respectively determine the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, and find the globally-optimal solution that maximizes the system-wide expected profit. Then, we introduce appropriate buy-back and lost-sales cost-sharing contracts to coordinate this assembly supply chain, so that when all the suppliers and the manufacturer adopt their equilibrium solutions, the system-wide expected profit is maximized.
•We analyze a negotiation sequence problem in supply chains.•We develop a coopetitive game for supply chain analysis.•We consider the sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions.•We analyze supply ...chain coordination.•Buyback contract may be the best choice.
We investigate a three-echelon supply chain in which a distributor at the middle echelon negotiates two wholesale price contracts with his upstream manufacturer and downstream retailer. In the first stage, the distributor decides on whether to first negotiate with the manufacturer or with the retailer; in the second (combined, noncooperative-cooperative, game) stage, the two negotiations are conducted sequentially. We find that the supply chain can be coordinated if the distributor first negotiates with the retailer. The distributor should choose the negotiation sequence for supply chain coordination, if he has a sufficiently large (small) relative bargaining power in the negotiation with the manufacturer (the retailer). We also extend our analysis to the cases in which the distributor and the manufacturer negotiate a buyback or two-part tariff contract, and draw similar outcomes when the distributor first negotiates with the retailer. In addition, under the two-part tariff contract, the distributor prefers to first negotiate with the retailer if the manufacturer has a sufficiently high disagreement payoff whereas, under the buyback contract, the distributor always prefers to first negotiate with the firm with a stronger bargaining power. Moreover, the two-part tariff (buyback) contract cannot (can) always coordinate the supply chain.
► Erickson (1995), Feichtinger et al. (1994), and Sethi (1977) reviewed relevant models appearing before 1995. ► The interest in such problems has continued to grow since 1995. ► Such models include ...Nerlove–Arrow, Vidale–Wolfe, Lanchester, diffusion, and other differential models. ► We suggest potential research areas which have been overlooked by researchers.
A variety of continuous-time differential functions have been developed to investigate dynamic advertising problems in business and economics fields. Since major dynamic models appearing before 1995 have been reviewed by a few survey papers, we provide a comprehensive review of the dynamic advertising models published after 1995, which are classified into six categories: (i) Nerlove–Arrow model and its extensions, (ii) Vidale–Wolfe model and its extensions, (iii) Lanchester model and its extensions, (iv) the diffusion models, (v) dynamic advertising-competition models with other attributes, and (vi) empirical studies for dynamic advertising problems. For each category, we first briefly summarize major relevant before-1995 models, and then discuss major after-1995 models in details. We find that the dynamic models reviewed in this paper have been extensively used to analyze various advertising problems in the monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, and supply chain systems. Our review reveals that the diffusion models have not been used to analyze advertising problems in supply chain operations, which may be a research direction in the future. Moreover, we learn from our review that very few publications regarding dynamic advertising problems have considered the supply chain competition. We also find that very few researchers have used the diffusion model to investigate the dynamic advertising problems with product quality as a decision variable; and, the pricing decision has not been incorporated into any extant Lanchester model. The paper ends with a summary of our review and suggestions on possible research directions in the future.
We use cooperative game theory to investigate multiplayer allocation problems under the almost diminishing marginal contributions (ADMC) property. This property indicates that a player’s marginal ...contribution to a non-empty coalition decreases as the size of the coalition increases. We develop ADMC games for such problems and derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core. When the core is non-empty, at least one extreme point exists, and the maximum number of extreme points is the total number of players. The Shapley value may not be in the core, which depends on the gap of each coalition. A player can receive a higher allocation based on the Shapley value in the core than based on the nucleolus, if the gap of the player is no greater than the gap of the complementary coalition. We also investigate the least core value for ADMC games with an empty core. To illustrate the applications of our results, we analyze a code-sharing game, a group buying game, and a scheduling profit game.
This paper was accepted by Chung Piaw Teo, optimization.
We analyze the problem of allocating cost savings from sharing demand information in a three-level supply chain with a manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer. To find a unique allocation scheme, ...we use concepts from cooperative game theory. First, we analytically compute the expected cost incurred by the manufacturer and then use simulation to obtain expected costs for the distributor and the retailer. We construct a three-person cooperative game in characteristic-function form and derive necessary conditions for the stability of each of five possible coalitions. To divide the cost savings between two members, or among three supply chain members, we use various allocation schemes. We present numerical analyses to investigate the impacts of the demand autocorrelation coefficient, ρ, and the unit holding and shortage costs on the allocation scheme.
This paper investigates supply chain coordination with side-payment contracts. We first summarize specific side-payment contracts and present our review on the literature that developed general ...side-payment schemes to coordinate supply chains. Following our review, we discuss two criteria that a proper side-payment contract must satisfy, and accordingly introduce a decision-dependent transfer payment function and a constant transfer term. We present the condition that the transfer function must satisfy, and use Nash arbitration scheme and Shapley value to compute the constant transfer term and derive its closed-form solution. Next, we provide a five-step procedure for the development of side-payment contract, and apply it to four supply chain games: Cournot and Bertrand games, a two-retailer supply chain game with substitutable products and a one-supplier, one-retailer supply chain. More specifically, for the Cournot game, we construct a linear transfer function and a constant side-payment to coordinate two producers. For the Bertrand game, we build a nonlinear transfer function which is equivalent to a revenue-sharing contract, and show that the constant term is zero and two firms in the game equally share the system-wide profit. For a supply chain with substitutable products, we present a side-payment contract to coordinate two retailers. For a two-echelon supply chain, we develop a proper side-payment scheme that can coordinate the supply chain and also help reduce the impact of forward buying on supply chain performance.
We consider the transfer pricing decision for a multidivisional firm with an upstream division and multiple downstream divisions. The downstream divisions can independently determine their retail ...prices, and decide on whether or not they will purchase from the upstream division at negotiated transfer prices. To allocate the firm-wide profit between upstream and downstream divisions, we construct a cooperative game, show the convexity of the game, and then compute the Shapley value-based transfer prices for the firm.
Natural language processing (NLP) is an effective tool for generating structured information from unstructured data, the one that is commonly found in clinical trial texts. Such interdisciplinary ...research has gradually grown into a flourishing research field with accumulated scientific outputs available. In this study, bibliographical data collected from Web of Science, PubMed, and Scopus databases from 2001 to 2018 had been investigated with the use of three prominent methods, including performance analysis, science mapping, and, particularly, an automatic text analysis approach named structural topic modeling. Topical trend visualization and test analysis were further employed to quantify the effects of the year of publication on topic proportions. Topical diverse distributions across prolific countries/regions and institutions were also visualized and compared. In addition, scientific collaborations between countries/regions, institutions, and authors were also explored using social network analysis. The findings obtained were essential for facilitating the development of the NLP-enhanced clinical trial texts processing, boosting scientific and technological NLP-enhanced clinical trial research, and facilitating inter-country/region and inter-institution collaborations.
We investigate an on-demand ridesharing system consisting of a ridesharing platform, multiple drivers, and multiple passengers. We begin by analyzing a choice problem for a passenger who chooses ...either a ridesharing or taxi service and also studying a choice problem for a driver who decides on whether or not to serve. Then, we obtain the ridesharing platform’s optimal service price charged to passengers and its optimal wage paid to drivers. We perform sensitivity analysis to draw a number of managerial implications. An increase in the number of potential passengers (drivers) usually results in an increase (a decrease) in both the price and wage. We also find that the platform is better off when both the number of passengers and the number of drivers are higher, and an increase in the passengers’ mental costs for the taxi service can help increase the platform’s profit. Moreover, the dynamic pricing strategy can not only improve the platform’s profit but also generate larger surpluses to passengers and drivers.
•We investigate two subsidy schemes.•We analyze a duopoly system.•We encourage the adoption of electric vehicles.•A higher driving range may discourage the EV adoption.•The government may increase ...its subsidy for a longer-range EV.
We analyze the competition between an electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer and an internal combustion vehicle manufacturer, under a government's subsidy scheme that provides a per-unit subsidy to the EV manufacturer or a price discount subsidy to EV consumers. The government should adopt the per-unit subsidy scheme, because, compared to the price-discount scheme, the government under the per-unit scheme can achieve the same EV sales and social welfare but pay for a smaller total subsidy.