Why do ethnoculturally defined states pursue favourable policies to integrate some returnees from their historical diasporas while neglecting or excluding others? We study this question by looking at ...members of two historical diasporas that, in the 1990s, returned to their respective ethnic homelands, Greece and Serbia, but were not treated uniformly by their respective governments. Utilising a wide range of primary sources, we consider evidence for a number of plausible explanations for such policy variation, including the economic profile of an ethnic returnee group, its status in internal ethnic hierarchies, its lobbying power, and dynamics of party politics. We find, instead, that the observed variation is best explained by the role that each particular group played in the ruling elites' ex ante foreign policy objectives. Elites discouraged the repatriation of co-ethnics from parts of the world they still had claims over, by pursuing unfavourable repatriation policies. Conversely, absent a revisionist claim, states adopted favourable repatriation policies to encourage their repatriation and facilitate their integration upon return. Methodologically, the article illustrates the importance of focused comparisons across dyads of states and particular sub-diaspora groups.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
BFBNIB, DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
This article addresses the variation of anti-corruption and anti-elite salience in party positioning across Europe. It demonstrates that while anti-corruption salience is primarily related to the ...(regional) context in which a party operates, anti-elite salience is primarily a function of party ideology. Extreme left and extreme conservative (TAN) parties are significantly more likely to emphasize anti-elite views. Through its use of the new 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey wave, this article also introduces the dataset.
Talas protesta zahvatio je 2010/2011. većinu država Bliskog Istoka i Severne Afrike, ali su se intenzitet, tok i ishodi protesta značajno razlikovali. Četiri severnoafrička slučaja razmatrana u ...članku ilustruju tri glavna ishoda – smena režima u Tunisu i Egiptu, građanski rat u Libiji, postojanost režima u Alžiru. Oslanjajući se na literature o političkim režima i o politici suprotstavljanja, pokazujem da se ove varijacije mogu objasniti kombinacijom tri faktora: a) različitim strategijama učvršćivanja kohezije režimskih koalicija b) s njima delimično povezanim razlikama u organizacionoj snazi režima c) visokom neizvesnošću karakterističnom za periode masovne političke mobilizacije. Iako poslednji faktor uključuje element neodređenosti u objašnjenje, to nije mana, već nužna posledica činjenice da je politika stvar praktičnog delovanja koje se ne može i ne treba sasvim svesti na naknadne teorijske dedukcije.
The transnational protest wave that engulfed most of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa had significantly different intensity, took different trajectories, and produced different ...outcomes in different states. Four North-African cases discussed in the article illustrate three typical outcomes - fall of regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, civil war in Libya, and authoritarian durability in Algeria. Using the literatures on political regimes and on contentious politics I show that these variation can be explained through combined effect of three factors: (a) different strategies of preserving cohesion within the authoritarian coalitions; (b) partially interconnected differences in the organizational strength of the regimes; (c) high levels of uncertainty typical for the periods of mass political mobilization. Although the last factor includes a degree of indeterminacy into the explanation, this should not be seen as an analytical weakness, but rather as an inevitable consequence of the fact that politics is an area of practical action not entirely reducible to retrospective theoretical deductions.
Two prominent approaches in the research on violent dissolution of Yugoslavia – instrumentalist and constructivist – are focused on the role of the political elites in the member republics in ...ethnification of Yugoslav politics. Due to their overstated focus on elite agency these approaches are unable to systematically explain variable ways in which the ordinary Yugoslavs acted politically in the period wither following, or opposing the elites. By focusing on tempo and different forms of ethnic mobilization in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s this article offers an analytical scale for mapping different institutional, non-violent non-institutional and violent forms of political agency of the ordinary people in the period. Ethnic mobilization was only one of the ways in which ordinary people reacted to the last phase of the Yugoslav crisis, but gradually and through a complex interaction of the elites and the ordinary people it became a dominant political cleavage. Road to ethnification includes, but cannot be reduced to, top-down manipulation, nor it was always and everywhere achieved through violent methods of non-institutional contention. The article identifies some of the variations in the ethnification process that exist both between and within the Yugoslav republics, and by doing so it points out to the importance and our insufficient understanding of different local conxtexts that co-shaped mechanisms of ethnification in Yugoslav politics.
Democratic politics in Serbia has been very competitive since 2000, however this has not produced greater independence of judiciary, as one would have conditionally expected based on the theories of ...judicial independence as aн insurance policy. Instead, political parties in Serbia have reached a bad equilibrium in which parties prompted by mutual mistrust strive to increase party control over judiciary. Party patronage is used as a foremost instrument of this control. Under the conditions of bad equilibrium of democratic competition, the only remaining constituencies supporting independence of judiciary have been located in judiciary itself, in wider civil society, and in international community. Actions of these actors posed obstacles to the efforts of executive power to undermine judicial independence, but the overall strength of this resistance has been limited. Primacy of domestic political actors and analytical benefits of logic of bad equilibrium are illustrated through process tracing of three important episodes in executive-judicial relations in Serbia since 2000. Main sources used are legal documents and public statements of representatives of the two branches of government.
The intervening influence of state-dissolution, war and international sanctions on processes of state-(re)building is examined in this paper. It is argued that the influence was corrosive and that it ...was largely transmitted by undermining formal state institutions and weakening the rule of law. The paper identifies some of the mechanisms of this corrosive influence but does not seek to fully explain post-Yugoslav state-building strategies. Instead it seeks to illustrate the usefulness of the state-building paradigm in post-communist studies both theoretically, and by situating two brief case studies (of Croatia and Serbia) within the larger comparative perspective of state-building in the post-communist region.
The intervening influence of state-dissolution, war and international sanctions on processes of state-(re)building is examined in this paper. It is argued that the influence was corrosive and that it ...was largely transmitted by undermining formal state institutions and weakening the rule of law. The paper identifies some of the mechanisms of this corrosive influence but does not seek to fully explain post-Yugoslav state-building strategies. Instead it seeks to illustrate the usefulness of the state-building paradigm in post-communist studies both theoretically, and by situating two brief case studies (of Croatia and Serbia) within the larger comparative perspective of state-building in the post-communist region.
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