"This book offers the first critical engagement with the political economy of the Middle East and North Africa. Challenging conventional wisdom on the origins and contemporary dynamics of capitalism ...in the region, these cutting-edge essays demonstrate how critical political economy can illuminate both historical and contemporary dynamics of the region and contribute to wider political economy debates from the vantage point of the Middle East. Leading scholars, representing several disciplines, contribute both thematic and country-specific analyses. Their writings critically examine major issues in political economy-notably, the mutual constitution of states, markets, and classes; the co-constitution of class, race, gender, and other forms of identity; varying modes of capital accumulation and the legal, political, and cultural forms of their regulation; relations among local, national, and global forms of capital, class, and culture; te
Following the popular uprisings that swept across the Arab world beginning in 2010, armed forces remained pivotal actors in politics throughout the region. As demonstrators started to challenge ...entrenched autocratic rulers in Tunis, Cairo, Sana'a, and Manama, the militaries stormed back into the limelight and largely determined whether any given ruler survived the protests. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, senior officers pulled away from their presidents, while in Algeria, Bahrain, and Syria, they did not. More important, military officers took command in shaping the new order and conflict trajectories throughout that region.
Armies and Insurgencies in the Arab Springexplores the central problems surrounding the role of armed forces in the contemporary Arab world. How and why do military apparatuses actively intervene in politics? What explains the fact that in some countries, military officers and rank-and-file take steps to defend an incumbent, while in others they defect and refrain from suppressing popular protest? What are the institutional legacies of the military's engagement during, and in the immediate aftermath of, mass uprisings?
Focusing on these questions, editors Holger Albrecht, Aurel Croissant, and Fred H. Lawson have organizedArmies and Insurgencies in the Arab Springinto three sections. The first employs case studies to make comparisons within and between regions; the second examines military engagements in the Arab uprisings in Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria; and the third looks at political developments following the cresting of the protest wave in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and the Gulf. The collection promotes better understanding not only of the particular history of military engagement in the Arab Spring but also of significant aspects of the transformation of political-military relations in other regions of the contemporary world.
Contributors:Holger Albrecht, Risa A. Brooks, Cherine Chams El-Dine, Virginie Collombier, Aurel Croissant, Philippe Droz-Vincent, Kevin Koehler, Fred H. Lawson, Shana Marshall, Dorothy Ohl, David Pion-Berlin, Tobias Selge, Robert Springborg.
Raise the subject of Arab military-industrial production and the country that springs to mind is Egypt. A historian might recall Iraq's early arms industry; a Gulf analyst might think of the weapons ...development projects being financed by the United Arab Emirates. Few would think of Jordan. But according to promotional literature, Jordan's armed forces have entered joint venture partnerships with at least 26 foreign defense companies,1 to produce everything from pre-packaged field rations and boots to backpack-portable drones and armored vehicles. The partnerships are concentrated in the King `Abdallah II Design and Development Bureau (KADDB, or `kad-bee,' as it is commonly known)-the military-industrial arm of the Jordanian Armed Forces established by royal decree in 1999. The bureau's website and press releases issued with foreign partners show at least 20 distinct product lines with defense firms from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States and the UAE, as well as a commercial firm from Malaysia. According to its website, KADDB `aims to be the globally preferred partner in designing and developing defense products and security solutions in the region.'
Raise the subject of Arab military-industrial production and the country that springs to mind is Egypt. A historian might recall Iraq's early arms industry; a Gulf analyst might think of the weapons ...development projects being financed by the United Arab Emirates. Few would think of Jordan. But according to promotional literature, Jordan's armed forces have entered joint venture partnerships with at least 26 foreign defense companies, to produce everything from pre-packaged field rations and boots to backpack-portable drones and armored vehicles. Adapted from the source document.
Egypt's Generals and Transnational Capital Marshall, Shana; Stacher, Joshua
Middle East report (New York, N.Y. 1988),
04/2012, Letnik:
42, Številka:
262
Journal Article
Although contemporary studies of civil-military relations in the Middle East tend to overlook the Gulf Arab states,¹ where the armed forces have been politically marginal and operationally weak, ...Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are taking steps to strengthen the capabilities and institutional prestige of their armed forces. These efforts include signifi-cant support for the domestic production of defense material, a shift toward investment in troop training and institutional infrastructure (as opposed to hardware and equipment procurement), and efforts to build prestige and foster a more coherent institutional identity for the armed forces.
When significant material and political
In December 2008, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released its thirteenth annual report on offsets in the U.S. defense trade. This chart displays numbers for the BIS category Middle ...East/Africa, taken from these reports beginning in 1993. Offsets are a variety of industrial and commercial incentives that defense firms provide to foreign governments to facilitate purchases, from coproduction of particular weapons systems to overseas investment. They have become such big business in the Middle East that a system has evolved to allow defense contractors to bank and trade offset credits like any other investment. Unlike ordinary investments, however, offsets represent transfers of substantial resources to authoritarian governments under conditions of near total unaccountability. Because offsets are usually a percentage of the overall contract value, regimes that spend more on weapons get more in offsets.
Since 2001, Syria has faced a series of major political crises such as the flow of refugees from the Iraq War, the assassination and suicide of high level officials, and strained relations with Egypt ...and Saudi Arabia. In light of these challenges, this paper argues that the recent global financial disaster is less of a crisis for Syria than it is an opportunity for Baathist politicians to reform their economic policies. However, any attempts at economic reform have been accompanied by large levels of corruption by Baath party bureaucrats seeking kickbacks; unfortunately this has proven to be very detrimental to the growth of small and medium sized businesses in Syria. Corruption, nepotism and patronage are endemic to the Syrian political and economic systems, and true economic reform will most likely not occur in Syria without an attendant democratic political reform. Adapted from the source document.
