Late in the afternoon of April 12, 1945, Presidential Press Secretary Steve Early summoned Harry Truman to the White House. Expecting to see President Franklin Roosevelt, he was ushered instead into ...the study of Eleanor Roosevelt. “Harry,” she informed him, “the President is dead.” Momentarily stunned, Truman eventually spoke and asked with genuine concern, “Is there anything I can do for you?” Mrs. Roosevelt replied insightfully: “Is there anything we can do for you for you are the one in trouble now.” Within two hours Truman recited the oath of office, becoming the thirty-third president of the United States. Immediately after his swearing-in ceremony the new president addressed the hastily convened cabinet. “It was my intention,” Truman recalled saying, “to continue both the foreign and domestic policies of the Roosevelt Administration.” He sincerely attempted to fulfill this pledge. Understanding how he did so, and appreciating the new president's basic convictions and his broad approach on foreign policy, are essential for apprehending the place that the atomic bomb played in his formulation of it.Truman's comprehension of the details of Roosevelt's foreign policy and his grasp of the contemporary international situation were distinctly limited, to put it mildly. But it is important to appreciate that he was not some sort of human tabula rasa on these matters. His arrival in the United States Senate in 1935 forced him to devote some sustained – if, at times, naive – attention to defense and foreign policy questions.
A proper accounting of the development of American policy to defeat Japan and bring World War II to an end must take due note of the crucial role played by James F. Byrnes. Although he is not ...well-remembered today, the experienced South Carolinian possessed tremendous gifts for politics. His insightful biographer rightly titled his study Sly and Able. Comparing FDR and Byrnes, David Robertson asserted with some justification that “Roosevelt publicly outshone Byrnes at making friends; but behind the scenes Jimmy Byrnes was the better politician, and he knew it.” By the time he took command at the state department he had held a number of positions any one of which might have served others as the culmination of a fine career – senate majority leader, Supreme Court justice, and director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (OWMR), where his tremendous work running the home front earned him the sobriquet of “assistant president.” Byrnes reacted to the disappointment of being passed over as FDR's running mate in 1944 with outward calm and true professionalism. His self-confidence and high regard for his own capacities were in no way damaged. He continued his important work at OWMR and spoke in support of the Roosevelt-Truman ticket. Perhaps he hoped that FDR would select him to succeed his good friend Cordell Hull at the state department, but the president judged Byrnes too independent for that task and picked the more malleable Edward Stettinius.
In the nineteen fifties, General George C. Marshall, army chief of staff during World War II and the great “organizer of victory,” sat for a series of interviews with his biographer, Forrest C. ...Pogue. Asked about the necessity of dropping the atomic bombs, Marshall replied that “I think it was quite necessary to drop the bombs in order to shorten the war.” He explained that “what they the Japanese needed was shock action, and they got it. I think it was very wise to use it.” Marshall took no pleasure in their use but the distinguished soldier–statesman correctly understood that the two terrible weapons had forced the Japanese surrender when it occurred. By July of 1945 the Japanese had been subjected to months of devastating attacks by B-29s, their capital and other major cities had suffered extensive damage, and the home islands were subjected to a naval blockade that made food and fuel increasingly scarce. The Japanese military and civilian losses had reached approximately three million and there seemed no end in sight. Despite all this, however, Japan's leaders and especially its military clung to notions of Ketsu-Go, to a plan that involved inflicting such punishment on the invader in defense of the homeland that the invader would sue for terms. Even after Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Soviet attack in Manchuria the military still wanted to pursue that desperate option, but Hirohito broke the impasse in the Japanese government and ordered surrender.
The Potsdam Conference holds a rather hazy place in American memory. This last of the three wartime conferences of the leaders of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States took place in ...the latter half of July 1945 in the Berlin suburb from whence it drew its name. Details of the conference agreements are shrouded in a fog of ignorance and even capable historians rarely present Potsdam as an especially memorable affair. The greatest drama associated with it rests in it having supposedly served as the venue for atomic diplomacy. Yet, a close examination of the conference deliberations reveals an American effort, spearheaded by the new Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, but bearing Truman's endorsement, to negotiate something approaching “a spheres of influence peace.” As Marc Trachtenberg astutely emphasized, Potsdam constituted an important step toward the division of Europe “as the basis of the postwar international order.” Such a division was not the painful consequence of the failure of negotiations but the very object and culmination of these negotiations. Byrnes led the way at Potsdam in tough bargaining with the Soviets designed to settle some of the major issues that the victorious powers confronted, in particular the future of Germany. Understanding the Byrnes-Truman approach at Potsdam is essential for grasping the real nature of American diplomacy at this crucial time.
Harry Truman bore the ultimate responsibility for the use of the atomic bombs, but the American decision to develop these weapons for use in World War II was made by Franklin Roosevelt. Truman's ...predecessor is a dominant political figure of the twentieth century. His place in American history rests secure as a great leader in peace and war, a brilliant political practitioner, and the measuring rod for all subsequent presidents. In the depths of depression he helped restore to an almost despairing nation real hope and energy with his New Deal measures. He overcame the powerful forces of American isolationism and unilateralism in the years from 1939 to 1941 and supported Great Britain and the Soviet Union in their deathly struggle against Hitler's Germany. After Pearl Harbor he convinced the American people that they faced a truly global challenge, which required the defeat of both Germany and Japan. He led a unified nation through to the brink of ultimate victory in the greatest armed conflict in history.Yet, when examining Roosevelt's portrait more closely and beyond the broad brush strokes formed by his buoyant leadership of his nation through the Depression and the Second World War, his picture becomes more blurred. Roosevelt might best be thought of as a remarkable exemplar of the “political fox” in action. He was never limited by any central conviction or purpose.
The Japanese Surrender Miscamble, Wilson D.
The Most Controversial Decision,
04/2011
Book Chapter
The first of the two nuclear weapons used in war caused a blinding explosion over the center of Hiroshima. It produced enormous damage and killed approximately eighty thousand people while wounding a ...similar number. Many of the maimed died soon thereafter from the effects of their exposure to the radioactivity let loose by the explosion. The bomb caused carnage and devastation for five square miles. One observer who entered Hiroshima on August 7 described it simply as “a city completely destroyed.” He recalled it as an “indescribable spectacle,” indeed as “a macabre vision which staggered the imagination.” Scenes of horror and suffering overwhelmed those who sought to rescue the victims of the unprecedented assault.Hiroshima contained military targets – a military headquarters, an assembly area for troops, a communications center, and a port that served as the main embarkation center for China – yet its civilian residents suffered greatly from the destructive power of the atomic blast. The Japanese government emphasized the civilian nature of the target in the protest it transmitted to the United States through the good offices of the Swiss government on August 9. The statement contested Truman's claim that Hiroshima counted as a military target noting that the city lacked “military fortifications or installations.” It zeroed in on the indiscriminate nature of the bomb, pointing out that “the zone of damage spread over a wide area and all persons within this area, without discrimination as to belligerents and non-belligerents and irrespective of sex or age, were killed or wounded by the blast and radiated heat.”
The final orders to use the atomic bombs had been issued well before Truman began his journey home from Potsdam. On July 25 General Marshall's deputy, General Thomas Handy, serving as the acting ...chief of staff, wrote at the direction of Stimson and Marshall to General Carl Spaatz, the commanding general of the Army Strategic Air Forces and told him: “The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.” Handy went further and instructed that “additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as ready by the project staff,” and he explained that “further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.” Notably, there was no suggestion here that only two bombs would be used. The American military prepared to utilize the atomic weapons as they became available.Stimson had alerted Truman on July 30 of the rapid progress on what he termed “Grove's project” and the expected use of the atomic bomb in early August. The secretary of war also obtained Truman's approval for the White House to release a prepared statement once the bomb had been delivered on its target. It must be appreciated that the American military largely controlled the specific timing of the bomb's use and Truman proved quite content to delegate that responsibility.
The devastating atomic blows against Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly helped end World War II, but did they simultaneously plant the seeds for future conflict among the victorious allies? Did the ...atomic blasts constitute in some way the opening shots in the Cold War struggle that dominated the postwar era? Could the Cold War have been avoided if Truman had refrained from using the atomic bomb against Japan? Some attention surely must be given these questions here, although the detailed story of how nuclear weapons contributed in the long contest between the United States and the Soviet Union lies beyond the scope of this study. Understanding the American approach regarding these weapons in the early Cold War casts a certain light back on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and it puts their use into a broader perspective. It clarifies that the atomic bomb did not cause the Cold War but rather it helped shape how the Cold War developed. The issues of nuclear weapons control and competition became unavoidably intertwined with the developing Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet, it must be emphasized, they reflected the conflict rather than serving to provoke it. Comprehending the essential and immediate cause of outbreak of the Cold War assures that one avoids any exaggeration of the place of nuclear weapons in precipitating the bitter struggle.
Harry S. Truman and James F. Byrnes had little time to catch their breath as World War II ended. Pressures and demands came at them relentlessly, and they developed policies concerning the atomic ...bomb in circumstances where they juggled numerous other serious issues. Over the coming months and without any formal decision, Truman gravitated more to domestic politics and policies while Byrnes saw himself as the main player in the foreign policy domain. Truman hardly seemed perturbed by the division. The president had full confidence in his chosen appointee, and certainly Byrnes played a role in shaping the initial postwar approach to the American atomic monopoly. On this matter, which possessed both domestic and international dimensions, the Americans were mapping new terrain with no set rules or norms to guide them. Understanding the efforts of Truman, Byrnes, and their associates immediately after the use of the atomic bombs is important for clarifying American intentions regarding these weapons and the place they played in postwar American diplomacy. Such an examination reveals that the forceful purpose with which the Americans developed and used the atomic bombs as weapons of war was followed by much less certainty and even confusion as the Truman administration struggled to fashion the role that nuclear weapons and energy should play in the postwar era.
