‘Noise’ in this study, in the sense of evolutionary game theory, refers to deviations from prevailing behavioral rules. Analyzing data from a laboratory experiment on coordination in networks, we ...tested ‘what kind of noise’ is supported by behavioral evidence. This empirical analysis complements a growing theoretical literature on ‘how noise matters’ for equilibrium selection. We find that the vast majority of decisions (96%) constitute myopic best responses, but deviations continue to occur with probabilities that are sensitive to their costs, that is, less frequent when implying larger payoff losses relative to the myopic best response. In addition, deviation rates vary with patterns of realized payoffs that are related to trial-and-error behavior. While there is little evidence that deviations are clustered in time or space, there is evidence of individual heterogeneity.
The global population at risk from mosquito-borne diseases-including dengue, yellow fever, chikungunya and Zika-is expanding in concert with changes in the distribution of two key vectors: Aedes ...aegypti and Aedes albopictus. The distribution of these species is largely driven by both human movement and the presence of suitable climate. Using statistical mapping techniques, we show that human movement patterns explain the spread of both species in Europe and the United States following their introduction. We find that the spread of Ae. aegypti is characterized by long distance importations, while Ae. albopictus has expanded more along the fringes of its distribution. We describe these processes and predict the future distributions of both species in response to accelerating urbanization, connectivity and climate change. Global surveillance and control efforts that aim to mitigate the spread of chikungunya, dengue, yellow fever and Zika viruses must consider the so far unabated spread of these mosquitos. Our maps and predictions offer an opportunity to strategically target surveillance and control programmes and thereby augment efforts to reduce arbovirus burden in human populations globally.
We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant ...information about the game and about the other players in the population. The resulting behavior of players is completely uncoupled from such information, and the individual strategy adjustment dynamics are driven only by reinforcement feedbacks from each player's own past. We show that the resulting "directional learning" is sufficient to explain cooperative deviations away from the Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of k-strong equilibria, which nest both the Nash equilibrium and the Aumann-strong equilibrium as two special cases, and we show that, together with the parameters of the learning model, the maximal k-strength of equilibrium determines the stationary distribution. The provisioning of public goods can be secured even under adverse conditions, as long as players are sufficiently responsive to the changes in their own payoffs and adjust their actions accordingly. Substantial levels of public cooperation can thus be explained without arguments involving selflessness or social preferences, solely on the basis of uncoordinated directional (mis)learning.
Common property summer pastures constitute longstanding evidence that the tragedy of the commons can be prevented through self-organization. As a byproduct of their sustainable governance, high ...nature value farming systems with well-integrated patchy landscapes have existed for centuries. These common pool resources-which have historically needed protection from overexploitation-today suffer from underutilization, and their continued use is often contingent on government subsidies. The current study sought to identify which user, institutional, and resource attributes contribute to the sustainable use of high nature value summer pastures. Taking as our point of departure a recent field study of Swiss Alpine grazing lands, we set out to experimentally identify the most promising mechanisms for successful resource management in this context. To do so, we implement a controlled experiment that closely mirrors our field observations ("field-in-the-lab"), and parametrize our experiment to replicate field data. Our focus is on the institutional linkage of provision and appropriation. Our treatments varied across a range of parameters, ceteris paribus, to isolate which governance elements are most relevant; we did so to identify which policy options and scenarios should be prioritized in practical policy evaluations. It turns out that underappropriation appears to be the main management challenge for Swiss common property pastures today. Our analytical results suggest that current governance institutions-and, more specifically, how they link appropriation to provision requirements-might need to be overhauled. The most promising avenues for doing so appear to be increased provision requirements, incentivized overprovision, and appropriation subsidies. Thus, our study highlights promising institutional adaptations at various governance levels that potentially counteract the decreasing use of high nature value common property pastures in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe.
How humans behave in repeated strategic interactions, how they learn, how their decisions adapt, and how their decision-making evolves is a topic of fundamental interest in behavioral economics and ...behavioral game theory ...
Social distancing is an effective strategy to mitigate the impact of infectious diseases. If sick or healthy, or both, predominantly socially distance, the epidemic curve flattens. Contact reductions ...may occur for different reasons during a pandemic including health-related mobility loss (severity of symptoms), duty of care for a member of a high-risk group, and forced quarantine. Other decisions to reduce contacts are of a more voluntary nature. In particular, sick people reduce contacts consciously to avoid infecting others, and healthy individuals reduce contacts in order to stay healthy. We use game theory to formalize the interaction of voluntary social distancing in a partially infected population. This improves the behavioral micro-foundations of epidemiological models, and predicts differential social distancing rates dependent on health status. The model's key predictions in terms of comparative statics are derived, which concern changes and interactions between social distancing behaviors of sick and healthy. We fit the relevant parameters for endogenous social distancing to an epidemiological model with evidence from influenza waves to provide a benchmark for an epidemic curve with endogenous social distancing. Our results suggest that spreading similar in peak and case numbers to what partial immobilization of the population produces, yet quicker to pass, could occur endogenously. Going forward, eventual social distancing orders and lockdown policies should be benchmarked against more realistic epidemic models that take endogenous social distancing into account, rather than be driven by static, and therefore unrealistic, estimates for social mixing that intrinsically overestimate spreading.
Cooperation among unrelated individuals in social-dilemma-type situations is a key topic in social and biological sciences. It has been shown that, without suitable mechanisms, high levels of ...cooperation/contributions in repeated public goods games are not stable in the long run. Reputation, as a driver of indirect reciprocity, is often proposed as a mechanism that leads to cooperation. A simple and prominent reputation dynamic function through scoring: contributing behaviour increases one's score, non-contributing reduces it. Indeed, many experiments have established that scoring can sustain cooperation in two-player prisoner's dilemmas and donation games. However, these prior studies focused on pairwise interactions, with no experiment studying reputation mechanisms in more general group interactions. In this paper, we focus on groups and scores, proposing and testing several scoring rules that could apply to multi-player prisoners' dilemmas played in groups, which we test in a laboratory experiment. Results are unambiguously negative: we observe a steady decline of cooperation for every tested scoring mechanism. All scoring systems suffer from it in much the same way. We conclude that the positive results obtained by scoring in pairwise interactions do not apply to multi-player prisoner's dilemmas, and that alternative mechanisms are needed.
Image scoring sustains cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma through indirect reciprocity, even though defection is the uniquely dominant selfish behaviour in the one-shot game. ...Many real-world dilemma situations, however, firstly, take place in groups and, secondly, lack the necessary transparency to inform subjects reliably of others' individual past actions. Instead, there is revelation of information regarding groups, which allows for 'group scoring' but not for image scoring. Here, we study how sensitive the positive results related to image scoring are to information based on group scoring. We combine analytic results and computer simulations to specify the conditions for the emergence of cooperation. We show that under pure group scoring, that is, under the complete absence of image-scoring information, cooperation is unsustainable. Away from this extreme case, however, the necessary degree of image scoring relative to group scoring depends on the population size and is generally very small. We thus conclude that the positive results based on image scoring apply to a much broader range of informational settings that are relevant in the real world than previously assumed.