We investigate the cooperation dynamics attributed to the interplay between the evolution of individual strategies and evolution of individual partnerships. We focus on the effect of reputation on an ...individual's partner-switching process. We assume that individuals can either change their strategies by imitating their partners or adjust their partnerships based on local information about reputations. We manipulate the partner switching in two ways; that is, individuals can switch from the lowest reputation partners, either to their partners' partners who have the highest reputation (i.e., ordering in partnership) or to others randomly chosen from the entire population (i.e., randomness in partnership). We show that when individuals are able to alter their behavioral strategies and their social interaction partnerships on the basis of reputation, cooperation can prevail. We find that the larger temptation to defect and the denser the partner network, the more frequently individuals need to shift their partnerships in order for cooperation to thrive. Furthermore, an increasing tendency of switching to partners' partners is more likely to lead to a higher level of cooperation. We show that when reputation is absent in such partner-switching processes, cooperation is much less favored than that of the reputation involved. Moreover, we investigate the effect of discounting an individual's reputation on the evolution of cooperation. Our results highlight the importance of the consideration of reputation (indirect reciprocity) on the promotion of cooperation when individuals can adjust their partnerships.
Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, ...we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decision-making is operationalized by either a subject’s choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Furthermore, we confirm that people who engage in uncalculating cooperation are perceived as, and actually are, more trustworthy than people who cooperate in a calculating way. Taken together, these data provide the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness, and is not merely an efficient decision-making strategy that reduces cognitive costs. Our results thus help to explain a range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic love.
Evolving cooperation in multichannel games Donahue, Kate; Hauser, Oliver P.; Nowak, Martin A. ...
Nature communications,
08/2020, Letnik:
11, Številka:
1
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Abstract
Humans routinely engage in many distinct interactions in parallel. Team members collaborate on several concurrent projects, and even whole nations interact with each other across a variety ...of issues, including trade, climate change and security. Yet the existing theory of direct reciprocity studies isolated repeated games. Such models cannot account for strategic attempts to use the vested interests in one game as a leverage to enforce cooperation in another. Here we introduce a general framework of multichannel games. Individuals interact with each other over multiple channels; each channel is a repeated game. Strategic choices in one channel can affect decisions in another. With analytical equilibrium calculations for the donation game and evolutionary simulations for several other games we show that such linkage facilitates cooperation. Our results suggest that previous studies tend to underestimate the human potential for reciprocity. When several interactions occur in parallel, people often learn to coordinate their behavior across games to maximize cooperation in each of them.
The timetable of evolution Knoll, Andrew H; Nowak, Martin A
Science advances,
05/2017, Letnik:
3, Številka:
5
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The integration of fossils, phylogeny, and geochronology has resulted in an increasingly well-resolved timetable of evolution. Life appears to have taken root before the earliest known minimally ...metamorphosed sedimentary rocks were deposited, but for a billion years or more, evolution played out beneath an essentially anoxic atmosphere. Oxygen concentrations in the atmosphere and surface oceans first rose in the Great Oxygenation Event (GOE) 2.4 billion years ago, and a second increase beginning in the later Neoproterozoic Era Neoproterozoic Oxygenation Event (NOE) established the redox profile of modern oceans. The GOE facilitated the emergence of eukaryotes, whereas the NOE is associated with large and complex multicellular organisms. Thus, the GOE and NOE are fundamental pacemakers for evolution. On the time scale of Earth's entire 4 billion-year history, the evolutionary dynamics of the planet's biosphere appears to be fast, and the pace of evolution is largely determined by physical changes of the planet. However, in Phanerozoic ecosystems, interactions between new functions enabled by the accumulation of characters in a complex regulatory environment and changing biological components of effective environments appear to have an important influence on the timing of evolutionary innovations. On the much shorter time scale of transient environmental perturbations, such as those associated with mass extinctions, rates of genetic accommodation may have been limiting for life.
A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human ...society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of ‘social viscosity’ even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IJS, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Genetic intratumoural heterogeneity is a natural consequence of imperfect DNA replication. Any two randomly selected cells, whether normal or cancerous, are therefore genetically different. Here, we ...review the different forms of genetic heterogeneity in cancer and re-analyse the extent of genetic heterogeneity within seven types of untreated epithelial cancers, with particular regard to its clinical relevance. We find that the homogeneity of predicted functional mutations in driver genes is the rule rather than the exception. In primary tumours with multiple samples, 97% of driver-gene mutations in 38 patients were homogeneous. Moreover, among metastases from the same primary tumour, 100% of the driver mutations in 17 patients were homogeneous. With a single biopsy of a primary tumour in 14 patients, the likelihood of missing a functional driver-gene mutation that was present in all metastases was 2.6%. Furthermore, all functional driver-gene mutations detected in these 14 primary tumours were present among all their metastases. Finally, we found that individual metastatic lesions responded concordantly to targeted therapies in 91% of 44 patients. These analyses indicate that the cells within the primary tumours that gave rise to metastases are genetically homogeneous with respect to functional driver-gene mutations, and we suggest that future efforts to develop combination therapies have the potential to be curative.
There are deep, yet largely unexplored, connections between computer science and biology. Both disciplines examine how information proliferates in time and space. Central results in computer science ...describe the complexity of algorithms that solve certain classes of problems. An algorithm is deemed efficient if it can solve a problem in polynomial time, which means the running time of the algorithm is a polynomial function of the length of the input. There are classes of harder problems for which the fastest possible algorithm requires exponential time. Another criterion is the space requirement of the algorithm. There is a crucial distinction between algorithms that can find a solution, verify a solution, or list several distinct solutions in given time and space. The complexity hierarchy that is generated in this way is the foundation of theoretical computer science. Precise complexity results can be notoriously difficult. The famous question whether polynomial time equals nondeterministic polynomial time (i.e., P = NP) is one of the hardest open problems in computer science and all of mathematics. Here, we consider simple processes of ecological and evolutionary spatial dynamics. The basic question is: What is the probability that a new invader (or a new mutant)will take over a resident population?We derive precise complexity results for a variety of scenarios. We therefore show that some fundamental questions in this area cannot be answered by simple equations (assuming that P is not equal to NP).
The problem of achieving widespread immunity to infectious diseases by voluntary vaccination is often presented as a public-goods dilemma, as an individual's vaccination contributes to herd immunity, ...protecting those who forgo vaccination. The temptation to free-ride brings the equilibrium vaccination level below the social optimum. Here, we present an evolutionary game-theoretic approach to this problem, exploring the roles of individual imitation behaviour and population structure in vaccination. To this end, we integrate an epidemiological process into a simple agent-based model of adaptive learning, where individuals use anecdotal evidence to estimate costs and benefits of vaccination. In our simulations, we focus on parameter values that are realistic for a flu-like infection. Paradoxically, as agents become more adept at imitating successful strategies, the equilibrium level of vaccination falls below the rational individual optimum. In structured populations, the picture is only somewhat more optimistic: vaccination is widespread over a range of low vaccination costs, but coverage plummets after cost exceeds a critical threshold. This result suggests parallels to historical scenarios in which vaccination coverage provided herd immunity for some time, but then rapidly dropped. Our work sheds light on how imitation of peers shapes individual vaccination choices in social networks.
Memory-n strategies of direct reciprocity Hilbe, Christian; Martinez-Vaquero, Luis A.; Chatterjee, Krishnendu ...
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences - PNAS,
05/2017, Letnik:
114, Številka:
18
Journal Article
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Humans routinely use conditionally cooperative strategies when interacting in repeated social dilemmas. They are more likely to cooperate if others cooperated before, and are ready to retaliate if ...others defected. To capture the emergence of reciprocity, most previous models consider subjects who can only choose from a restricted set of representative strategies, or who react to the outcome of the very last round only. As players memorize more rounds, the dimension of the strategy space increases exponentially. This increasing computational complexity renders simulations for individuals with higher cognitive abilities infeasible, especially if multiplayer interactions are taken into account. Here, we take an axiomatic approach instead. We propose several properties that a robust cooperative strategy for a repeated multiplayer dilemma should have. These properties naturally lead to a unique class of cooperative strategies, which contains the classical Win–Stay Lose–Shift rule as a special case. A comprehensive numerical analysis for the prisoner’s dilemma and for the public goods game suggests that strategies of this class readily evolve across various memory-n spaces. Our results reveal that successful strategies depend not only on how cooperative others were in the past but also on the respective context of cooperation.
A defining aspect of human cooperation is the use of sophisticated indirect reciprocity. We observe others, talk about others, and act accordingly. We help those who help others, and we cooperate ...expecting that others will cooperate in return. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation, which spreads by communication. A crucial aspect of indirect reciprocity is observability: reputation effects can support cooperation as long as peoples’ actions can be observed by others. In evolutionary models of indirect reciprocity, natural selection favors cooperation when observability is sufficiently high. Complimenting this theoretical work are experiments where observability promotes cooperation among small groups playing games in the laboratory. Until now, however, there has been little evidence of observability’s power to promote large-scale cooperation in real world settings. Here we provide such evidence using a field study involving 2413 subjects. We collaborated with a utility company to study participation in a program designed to prevent blackouts. We show that observability triples participation in this public goods game. The effect is over four times larger than offering a $25 monetary incentive, the company’s previous policy. Furthermore, as predicted by indirect reciprocity, we provide evidence that reputational concerns are driving our observability effect. In sum, we show how indirect reciprocity can be harnessed to increase cooperation in a relevant, real-world public goods game.
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