Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation Nowak, Martin A
Science (American Association for the Advancement of Science),
12/2006, Letnik:
314, Številka:
5805
Journal Article
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Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means ...that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.
Social dilemmas occur when incentives for individuals are misaligned with group interests
. According to the 'tragedy of the commons', these misalignments can lead to overexploitation and collapse of ...public resources. The resulting behaviours can be analysed with the tools of game theory
. The theory of direct reciprocity
suggests that repeated interactions can alleviate such dilemmas, but previous work has assumed that the public resource remains constant over time. Here we introduce the idea that the public resource is instead changeable and depends on the strategic choices of individuals. An intuitive scenario is that cooperation increases the public resource, whereas defection decreases it. Thus, cooperation allows the possibility of playing a more valuable game with higher payoffs, whereas defection leads to a less valuable game. We analyse this idea using the theory of stochastic games
and evolutionary game theory. We find that the dependence of the public resource on previous interactions can greatly enhance the propensity for cooperation. For these results, the interaction between reciprocity and payoff feedback is crucial: neither repeated interactions in a constant environment nor single interactions in a changing environment yield similar cooperation rates. Our framework shows which feedbacks between exploitation and environment-either naturally occurring or designed-help to overcome social dilemmas.
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. For the iterated prisoner's dilemma, a new class of strategies has recently been described, the so-called zero-determinant ...strategies. Using such a strategy, a player can unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between his own payoff and the co-player's payoff. In particular the player may act in such a way that it becomes optimal for the co-player to cooperate unconditionally. In this way, a player can manipulate and extort his co-player, thereby ensuring that the own payoff never falls below the co-player's payoff. However, using a compliant strategy instead, a player can also ensure that his own payoff never exceeds the co-player's payoff. Here, we use adaptive dynamics to study when evolution leads to extortion and when it leads to compliance. We find a remarkable cyclic dynamics: in sufficiently large populations, extortioners play a transient role, helping the population to move from selfish strategies to compliance. Compliant strategies, however, can be subverted by altruists, which in turn give rise to selfish strategies. Whether cooperative strategies are favored in the long run critically depends on the size of the population; we show that cooperation is most abundant in large populations, in which case average payoffs approach the social optimum. Our results are not restricted to the case of the prisoners dilemma, but can be extended to other social dilemmas, such as the snowdrift game. Iterated social dilemmas in large populations do not lead to the evolution of strategies that aim to dominate their co-player. Instead, generosity succeeds.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Acquired resistance is one of the major barriers to successful cancer therapy. The development of resistance is commonly attributed to genetic heterogeneity. However, heterogeneity of drug ...penetration of the tumor microenvironment both on the microscopic level within solid tumors as well as on the macroscopic level across metastases may also contribute to acquired drug resistance. Here we use mathematical models to investigate the effect of drug heterogeneity on the probability of escape from treatment and the time to resistance. Specifically we address scenarios with sufficiently potent therapies that suppress growth of all preexisting genetic variants in the compartment with the highest possible drug concentration. To study the joint effect of drug heterogeneity, growth rate, and evolution of resistance, we analyze a multi-type stochastic branching process describing growth of cancer cells in multiple compartments with different drug concentrations and limited migration between compartments. We show that resistance is likely to arise first in the sanctuary compartment with poor drug penetrations and from there populate non-sanctuary compartments with high drug concentrations. Moreover, we show that only below a threshold rate of cell migration does spatial heterogeneity accelerate resistance evolution, otherwise deterring drug resistance with excessively high migration rates. Our results provide new insights into understanding why cancers tend to quickly become resistant, and that cell migration and the presence of sanctuary sites with little drug exposure are essential to this end.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
The vast majority of mutations in the exome of cancer cells are passengers, which do not affect the reproductive rate of the cell. Passengers can provide important information about the evolutionary ...history of an individual cancer, and serve as a molecular clock. Passengers can also become targets for immunotherapy or confer resistance to treatment. We study the stochastic expansion of a population of cancer cells describing the growth of primary tumors or metastatic lesions. We first analyze the process by looking forward in time and calculate the fixation probabilities and frequencies of successive passenger mutations ordered by their time of appearance. We compute the likelihood of specific evolutionary trees, thereby informing the phylogenetic reconstruction of cancer evolution in individual patients. Next, we derive results looking backward in time: for a given subclonal mutation we estimate the number of cancer cells that were present at the time when that mutation arose. We derive exact formulas for the expected numbers of subclonal mutations of any frequency. Fitting this formula to cancer sequencing data leads to an estimate for the ratio of birth and death rates of cancer cells during the early stages of clonal expansion.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Nucleoside analogs are a major class of antiviral drugs. Some act by increasing the viral mutation rate causing lethal mutagenesis of the virus. Their mutagenic capacity, however, may lead to an ...evolutionary safety concern. We define evolutionary safety as a probabilistic assurance that the treatment will not generate an increased number of mutants. We develop a mathematical framework to estimate the total mutant load produced with and without mutagenic treatment. We predict rates of appearance of such virus mutants as a function of the timing of treatment and the immune competence of patients, employing realistic assumptions about the vulnerability of the viral genome and its potential to generate viable mutants. We focus on the case study of Molnupiravir, which is an FDA-approved treatment against Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19). We estimate that Molnupiravir is narrowly evolutionarily safe, subject to the current estimate of parameters. Evolutionary safety can be improved by restricting treatment with this drug to individuals with a low immunological clearance rate and, in future, by designing treatments that lead to a greater increase in mutation rate. We report a simple mathematical rule to determine the fold increase in mutation rate required to obtain evolutionary safety that is also applicable to other pathogen-treatment combinations.
Celotno besedilo
Dostopno za:
DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
7.
Evolving cooperation Nowak, Martin A.
Journal of theoretical biology,
04/2012, Letnik:
299
Journal Article
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a population can affect which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations remains ...difficult. Mathematical results are known for special structures in which all individuals have the same number of neighbours. The general case, in which the number of neighbours can vary, has remained open. For arbitrary selection intensity, the problem is in a computational complexity class that suggests there is no efficient algorithm. Whether a simple solution for weak selection exists has remained unanswered. Here we provide a solution for weak selection that applies to any graph or network. Our method relies on calculating the coalescence times of random walks. We evaluate large numbers of diverse population structures for their propensity to favour cooperation. We study how small changes in population structure-graph surgery-affect evolutionary outcomes. We find that cooperation flourishes most in societies that are based on strong pairwise ties.
Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the ability to use conditional strategies ...that depend on the outcome of previous interactions, thus allowing for reciprocation. Recently, a new class of strategies has been proposed, so-called "zero-determinant" strategies. These strategies enforce a fixed linear relationship between one's own payoff and that of the other player. A subset of those strategies allows "extortioners" to ensure that any increase in one player's own payoff exceeds that of the other player by a fixed percentage. Here, we analyze the evolutionary performance of this new class of strategies. We show that in reasonably large populations, they can act as catalysts for the evolution of cooperation, similar to tit-for-tat, but that they are not the stable outcome of natural selection. In very small populations, however, extortioners hold their ground. Extortion strategies do particularly well in revolutionary arms races between two distinct populations. Significantly, they benefit the population that evolves at the slower rate, an example of the so-called "Red King" effect. This may affect the evolution of interactions between host species and their endosymbionts.
Social dilemmas among unequals Hauser, Oliver P; Hilbe, Christian; Chatterjee, Krishnendu ...
Nature (London),
08/2019, Letnik:
572, Številka:
7770
Journal Article
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Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions
. It requires that interacting individuals are sufficiently equal, such that everyone ...faces similar consequences when they cooperate or defect. Yet inequality is ubiquitous among humans
and is generally considered to undermine cooperation and welfare
. Most previous models of reciprocity do not include inequality
. These models assume that individuals are the same in all relevant aspects. Here we introduce a general framework to study direct reciprocity among unequal individuals. Our model allows for multiple sources of inequality. Subjects can differ in their endowments, their productivities and in how much they benefit from public goods. We find that extreme inequality prevents cooperation. But if subjects differ in productivity, some endowment inequality can be necessary for cooperation to prevail. Our mathematical predictions are supported by a behavioural experiment in which we vary the endowments and productivities of the subjects. We observe that overall welfare is maximized when the two sources of heterogeneity are aligned, such that more productive individuals receive higher endowments. By contrast, when endowments and productivities are misaligned, cooperation quickly breaks down. Our findings have implications for policy-makers concerned with equity, efficiency and the provisioning of public goods.
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