Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and ...decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice. The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises. With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels.
Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and ...decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice. The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises. With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels.
Abstract
The move towards unlimited financial penalties in the UK for sewerage systems that do not operate in line with their discharge permits (and the even more extreme suggestion that there should ...be a financial penalty every time an overflow spills) sets a challenge to whether our existing sewerage models are accurate enough to provide certainty of avoiding those penalties. This article sets out proposed improved practice in the preparation of urban drainage models to improve their accuracy and usefulness and identifies areas where research, particularly into machine learning techniques, could deliver further improvements.
Key points
Explains why mass disability data capture is potentially transformative for the scholarly publishing industry.
Considers major challenges, particularly focusing on cultural and systemic ...roadblocks.
Offers practical suggestions for a framework, using the accessibility movement as a case study.
May's theorem shows that if the set of alternatives contains two members, an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule is positively responsive if and only if it is majority rule. We show that if ...the set of alternatives contains three or more alternatives only the rule that assigns to every problem its strict Condorcet winner satisfies the three conditions plus Nash's version of "independence of irrelevant alternatives" for the domain of problems that have strict Condorcet winners. We show also that no rule satisfies the four conditions for domains that are more than slightly larger.
Volcanic eruptions can cause significant disruption to society, and numerical models are crucial for forecasting the dispersion of erupted material. Here we assess the skill and limitations of the ...Met Office's Numerical Atmospheric-dispersion Modelling Environment (NAME) in simulating the dispersion of the sulfur dioxide (SO.sub.2) cloud from the 21-22 June 2019 eruption of the Raikoke volcano (48.3.sup." N, 153.2.sup." E). The eruption emitted around 1.5±0.2 Tg of SO.sub.2, which represents the largest volcanic emission of SO.sub.2 into the stratosphere since the 2011 Nabro eruption. We simulate the temporal evolution of the volcanic SO.sub.2 cloud across the Northern Hemisphere (NH) and compare our model simulations to high-resolution SO.sub.2 measurements from the TROPOspheric Monitoring Instrument (TROPOMI) and the Infrared Atmospheric Sounding Interferometer (IASI) satellite SO.sub.2 products.
Abstract
Global mean lower stratosphere temperatures rose abruptly in January 2020 reaching values not experienced since the early 1990s. Anomalously high lower stratospheric temperatures were ...recorded for 4 months at highly statistically significant levels. Here, we use a combination of satellite and surface-based remote sensing observations to derive a time-series of stratospheric biomass burning aerosol optical depths originating from intense SouthEastern Australian wildfires and use these aerosol optical depths in a state-of-the-art climate model. We show that the S.E. Australian wildfires are the cause of this lower stratospheric warming. We also investigate the radiatively-driven dynamical response to the observed stratospheric ozone perturbation and find a significant strengthening of the springtime Antarctic polar vortex suggesting that biomass burning aerosols play a significant role in the observed anomalous longevity of the ozone hole in 2020.
Information Aggregation with Costly Reporting Osborne, Martin J; Rosenthal, Jeffrey S; Stewart, Colin
The Economic journal (London),
01/2020, Letnik:
130, Številka:
625
Journal Article
Recenzirano
Odprti dostop
Abstract
A group of privately informed individuals with common interests chooses a binary option. Each individual chooses whether to reveal her signal, at a cost. If the group is large and cannot ...commit to a decision rule then it takes the correct decision with high probability in one state but with probability bounded away from one in the other. It cannot do better by committing to an anonymous decision rule without transfers, but can achieve the first best if transfers between individuals are possible, and can approximately achieve the first best with a non-anonymous decision rule.