This time is different Reinhart, Carmen M; Rogoff, Kenneth S
2009., 2009, 2009-09-11, 20090101, c2009
eBook
Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing--and recovering--their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have ...chimed, "this time is different"--claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters. With this breakthrough study, leading economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff definitively prove them wrong. Covering sixty-six countries across five continents, This Time Is Different presents a comprehensive look at the varieties of financial crises, and guides us through eight astonishing centuries of government defaults, banking panics, and inflationary spikes--from medieval currency debasements to today's subprime catastrophe. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, leading economists whose work has been influential in the policy debate concerning the current financial crisis, provocatively argue that financial combustions are universal rites of passage for emerging and established market nations. The authors draw important lessons from history to show us how much--or how little--we have learned.
Abstract
This article provides a comprehensive history of anchor or reference currencies, exchange rate arrangements, and a new measure of foreign exchange restrictions for 194 countries and ...territories over 1946–2016. We find that the often cited post–Bretton Woods transition from fixed to flexible arrangements is overstated; regimes with limited flexibility remain in the majority. Even if central bankers’ communications jargon has evolved considerably in recent decades, it is apparent that many still place a large implicit weight on the exchange rate. The U.S. dollar scores as the world's dominant anchor currency by a very large margin. By some metrics, its use is far wider today than 70 years ago. In contrast, the global role of the euro appears to have stalled. We argue that in addition to the usual safe assets story, the record accumulation of reserves since 2002 may also have to do with many countries’ desire to stabilize exchange rates in an environment of markedly reduced exchange rate restrictions or, more broadly, capital controls: an important amendment to the conventional portrayal of the macroeconomic trilemma.
We examine the evolution of real per capita GDP around 100 systemic banking crises. Part of the costs of these crises owes to the protracted nature of recovery. On average, it takes about 8 years to ...reach the pre-crisis level of income; the median is about 6.5 years. Five to six years after the onset of crisis, only Germany and the United States (out of 12 systemic cases) have reached their 2007-2008 peaks in real income. Forty-five percent of the episodes recorded double dips. Post-war business cycles are not the relevant comparator for the recent crises in advanced economies.
Capital flow and commodity cycles have long been connected with economic crises. Sparse historical data, however, has made it difficult to connect their timing. We date turning points in global ...capital flows and commodity prices across two centuries and provide estimates from alternative data sources. We then document a strong overlap between the ebb and flow of financial capital, the commodity price super-cycle, and sovereign defaults since 1815. The results have implications for today, as many emerging markets are facing a double bust in capital inflows and commodity prices, making them vulnerable to crises.
We identify the major public debt overhang episodes in the advanced economies since the early 1800s, characterized by public debt to GDP levels exceeding 90 percent for at least five years. ...Consistent with Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and most of the more recent research, we find that public debt overhang episodes are associated with lower growth than during other periods. The duration of the average debt overhang episode is perhaps its most striking feature. Among the 26 episodes we identify, 20 lasted more than a decade. The long duration belies the view that the correlation is caused mainly by debt buildups during business cycle recessions. The long duration also implies that the cumulative shortfall in output from debt overhang is potentially massive. These growth-reducing effects of high public debt are apparently not transmitted exclusively through high real interest rates, as in eleven of the episodes, interest rates are not materially higher. PUBLICATION ABSTRACT
China's overseas lending Horn, Sebastian; Reinhart, Carmen M.; Trebesch, Christoph
Journal of international economics,
November 2021, 2021-11-00, Letnik:
133
Journal Article
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Compared with China's pre-eminent status in world trade, its role in global finance is poorly understood. This paper studies the size, terms and destination of Chinese official international lending ...on the basis of a new “consensus” database of 4900 loans and grants to 146 countries, 1949–2017. Using the loan-level lending data we estimate outstanding debt stocks owed to China for more than 100 developing and emerging economies since 2000. As of 2017, China had become the world's largest official creditor, surpassing the World Bank and the IMF. The terms of China's state-driven international loans typically resemble commercial rather than official lending. We also find that 50% of China's official lending to developing countries is not reported in the most widely used official debt statistics. These “hidden” debts have important implications for debt sustainability.
From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis Reinhart, Carmen M.; Rogoff, Kenneth S.
The American economic review,
08/2011, Letnik:
101, Številka:
5
Journal Article
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Newly developed historical time series on public debt, along with data on external debts, allow a deeper analysis of the debt cycles underlying serial debt and banking crises. We test three related ...hypotheses at both "world" aggregate levels and on an individual country basis. First, external debt surges are an antecedent to banking crises. Second, banking crises (domestic and those in financial centers) often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises; we find they help predict them. Third, public borrowing surges ahead of external sovereign default, as governments have "hidden domestic debts" that exceed the better documented levels of external debt.
Growth in a Time of Debt Reinhart, Carmen M.; Rogoff, Kenneth S.
The American economic review,
05/2010, Letnik:
100, Številka:
2
Journal Article
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We exploit a new multi-country historical dataset on public (government) debt to search for a systemic relationship between high public debt levels, growth, and inflation. Our main result is that ...whereas the link between growth and debt seems relatively weak at normal debt levels, median growth rates for countries with public debt over roughly 90% of GDP are about one percent lower than otherwise; average mean growth rates are several percent lower. We find no systematic relationship between high debt levels and inflation for advanced economies as a group (albeit with individual country exceptions including the United States). By contrast, in emerging market countries, high public debt levels coincide with higher inflation.
SOVEREIGN DEBT RELIEF AND ITS AFTERMATH Reinhart, Carmen M.; Trebesch, Christoph
Journal of the European Economic Association,
February 2016, Letnik:
14, Številka:
1
Journal Article
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This paper studies sovereign debt relief in a long-term perspective. We quantify the relief achieved through default and restructuring in two distinct samples: 1920-1939, focusing on the defaults on ...official (government to government) debt in advanced economies after World War I; and 1978-2010, focusing on emerging market debt crises with private external creditors. Debt relief was substantial in both eras, averaging 21% of GDP in the 1930s and 16% of GDP in recent decades. We then analyze the aftermath of debt relief and conduct a difference-in-differences analysis around the synchronous war debt defaults of 1934 and the Baker and Brady initiatives of the 1980s/1990s. The economic landscape of debtor countries improves significantly after debt relief operations, but only if these involve debt write-offs. Softer forms of debt relief, such as maturity extensions and interest rate reductions, are not generally followed by higher economic growth or improved credit ratings.
I discuss the multifaceted economic and financial vulnerabilities that have been created or exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic on a foundation of already weak economic fundamentals in many ...countries. Crises often do not travel alone. Banking, sovereign debt, exchange rate crashes, sudden stops, inflation often intersect to become severe
conglomerate
crises. Historically, whether of the
individual
or
conglomerate
variety, crises influence the shape and speed of economic recovery. As the health crisis morphs into a financial or debt crisis in some countries, I discuss what may lie ahead in terms of the
stages
in crisis resolution and brief reflection how the resolution process can be expedited.
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