An ongoing, continually spreading, outbreak of African swine fever (ASF), following its identification in Georgia in 2007, has resulted in 17 European and 12 Asian countries reporting cases by April ...2020, with cases occurring in both wild boar and domestic pigs. Curtailing further spread of ASF requires understanding of the transmission pathways of the disease. ASF is self‐sustaining in the wild boar population, and they have been implicated as one of the main drivers of transmission within Europe. We developed a spatially explicit model to estimate the risk of infection with ASF in wild boar and pigs due to natural movement of wild boar that is applicable across the whole of Europe. We demonstrate the model by using it to predict the probability that early cases of ASF in Poland were caused by wild boar dispersion. The risk of infection in 2015 is computed due to wild boar cases in Poland in 2014, compared against reported cases in 2015, and then the procedure is repeated for 2015–2016. We find that long‐ and medium‐distance spread of ASF (i.e. >30 km) is unlikely to have occurred due to wild boar dispersal, due in part to the generally short distances wild boar will travel (<20 km on average). We also predict the relative success of different control strategies in 2015, if they were implemented in 2014. Results suggest that hunting of wild boar reduces the number of new cases, but a larger region is at risk of ASF compared with no control measure. Alternatively, introducing wild boar‐proof fencing reduces the size of the region at risk in 2015, but not the total number of cases. Overall, our model suggests wild boar movement is only responsible for local transmission of disease; thus, other pathways are more dominant in medium‐ and long‐distance spread of the disease.
Bat-borne viruses have been linked to a number of zoonotic diseases; in 2014 there have been human cases of Nipah virus (NiV) in Bangladesh and Ebola virus in West and Central Africa. Here we ...describe a model designed to provide initial quantitative predictions of the risk of entry of such viruses to European Union (EU) Member States (MSs) through four routes: human travel, legal trade (e.g. fruit and animal products), live animal movements and illegal importation of bushmeat. The model utilises available datasets to assess the movement via these routes between individual countries of the world and EU MSs. These data are combined with virus specific data to assess the relative risk of entry between EU MSs. As a case study, the model was parameterised for NiV. Scenario analyses showed that the selection of exporting countries with NiV and potentially contaminated trade products were essential to the accuracy of all model outputs. Uncertainty analyses of other model parameters identified that the model expected number of years to an introduction event within the EU was highly susceptible to the prevalence of NiV in bats. The relative rankings of the MSs and routes, however, were more robust. The UK, the Netherlands and Germany were consistently the most likely points of entry and the ranking of most MSs varied by no more than three places (maximum variation five places). Legal trade was consistently the most likely route of entry, only falling below human travel when the estimate of the prevalence of NiV in bats was particularly low. Any model-based calculation is dependent on the data available to feed into the model and there are distinct gaps in our knowledge, particularly in regard to various pathogen/virus as well as host/bat characteristics. However, the strengths of this model lie in the provision of relative comparisons of risk among routes and MSs. The potential for expansion of the model to include other routes and viruses and the possibility of rapid parameterisation demonstrates its potential for use in an outbreak situation.
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DOBA, IZUM, KILJ, NUK, PILJ, PNG, SAZU, SIK, UILJ, UKNU, UL, UM, UPUK
Food safety criteria for Listeria monocytogenes in ready‐to‐eat (RTE) foods have been applied from 2006 onwards (Commission Regulation (EC) 2073/2005). Still, human invasive listeriosis was reported ...to increase over the period 2009–2013 in the European Union and European Economic Area (EU/EEA). Time series analysis for the 2008–2015 period in the EU/EEA indicated an increasing trend of the monthly notified incidence rate of confirmed human invasive listeriosis of the over 75 age groups and female age group between 25 and 44 years old (probably related to pregnancies). A conceptual model was used to identify factors in the food chain as potential drivers for L. monocytogenes contamination of RTE foods and listeriosis. Factors were related to the host (i. population size of the elderly and/or susceptible people; ii. underlying condition rate), the food (iii. L. monocytogenes prevalence in RTE food at retail; iv. L. monocytogenes concentration in RTE food at retail; v. storage conditions after retail; vi. consumption), the national surveillance systems (vii. improved surveillance), and/or the bacterium (viii. virulence). Factors considered likely to be responsible for the increasing trend in cases are the increased population size of the elderly and susceptible population except for the 25–44 female age group. For the increased incidence rates and cases, the likely factor is the increased proportion of susceptible persons in the age groups over 45 years old for both genders. Quantitative modelling suggests that more than 90% of invasive listeriosis is caused by ingestion of RTE food containing > 2,000 colony forming units (CFU)/g, and that one‐third of cases are due to growth in the consumer phase. Awareness should be increased among stakeholders, especially in relation to susceptible risk groups. Innovative methodologies including whole genome sequencing (WGS) for strain identification and monitoring of trends are recommended.
This publication is linked to the following EFSA Supporting Publications article: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/sp.efsa.2018.EN-1352/full
African swine fever (ASF) is currently spreading westwards throughout Europe and eastwards into China, with cases occurring in both wild boar and domestic pigs. A generic risk assessment framework is ...used to determine the probability of first infection with ASF virus (ASFV) at a fine spatial scale across European Union Member States. The framework aims to assist risk managers across Europe with their ASF surveillance and intervention activities. Performing the risk assessment at a fine spatial scale allows for hot-spot surveillance, which can aid risk managers by directing surveillance or intervention resources at those areas or pathways deemed most at risk, and hence enables prioritization of limited resources. We use 2018 cases of ASF to estimate prevalence of the disease in both wild boar and pig populations and compute the risk of initial infection for 2019 at a 100 km
cell resolution via three potential pathways: legal trade in live pigs, natural movement of wild boar, and legal trade in pig meat products. We consider the number of pigs, boar and amount of pig meat entering our area of interest, the prevalence of the disease in the origin country, the probability of exposure of susceptible pigs or boar in the area of interest to introduced infected pigs, boar, or meat from an infected pig, and the probability of transmission to susceptible animals. We provide maps across Europe indicating regions at highest risk of initial infection. Results indicate that the risk of ASF in 2019 was predominantly focused on those regions which already had numerous cases in 2018 (Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, and Latvia). The riskiest pathway for ASFV transmission to pigs was the movement of wild boar for Eastern European countries and legal trade of pigs for Western European countries. New infections are more likely to occur in wild boar rather than pigs, for both the pig meat and wild boar movement pathways. Our results provide an opportunity to focus surveillance activities and thus increase our ability to detect ASF introductions earlier, a necessary requirement if we are to successfully control the spread of this devastating disease for the pig industry.
A circular economy relies on demonstrating the quality and environmental safety of wastes that are recovered and reused as products. Policy-level risk assessments, using generalised exposure ...scenarios, and informed by stakeholder communities have been used to appraise the acceptability of necessary changes to legislation, allowing wastes to be valued, reused and marketed. Through an extensive risk assessment exercise, summarised in this paper, we explore the burden of proof required to offer safety assurance to consumer and brand-sensitive food sectors in light of attempts to declassify, as wastes, quality-assured, source-segregated compost and anaerobic digestate products in the United Kingdom. We report the residual microbiological and chemical risks estimated for both products in land application scenarios and discuss these in the context of an emerging UK bioeconomy worth £52bn per annum. Using plausible worst case assumptions, as demanded by the quality food sector, risk estimates and hazard quotients were estimated to be low or negligible. For example, the human health risk of E. coli 0157 illness from exposure to microbial residuals in quality-assured composts, through a ready-to-eat vegetable consumption exposure route, was estimated at ~10−8 per person per annum. For anaerobic digestion residues, 7 × 10−3cases of E. coli 0157 were estimated per annum, a potential contribution of 0.0007% of total UK cases. Hazard quotients for potential chemical contaminants in both products were insufficient in magnitude to merit detailed quantitative risk assessments. Stakeholder engagement and expert review was also a substantive feature of this study. We conclude that quality-assured, source-segregated products applied to land, under UK quality protocols and waste processing standards, pose negligible risks to human, animal, environmental and crop receptors, providing that risk management controls set within the standards and protocols are adhered to.
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•Quality assured, source-segregated composts and digestates have agronomic benefits.•Removal of these wastes from regulation requires prior risk assessment.•Risks to humans, animals, crops and the environment are negligible, assuming controls in place.•Products from these wastes play an important role in a circular bioeconomy.•The burden of proof to secure market confidence however is substantive.
As part of the evidence base for the development of national control plans for Salmonella spp. in pigs for E.U. Member States, a quantitative microbiological risk assessment was funded to support the ...scientific opinion required by the EC from the European Food Safety Authority. The main aim of the risk assessment was to assess the effectiveness of interventions implemented on‐farm and at the abattoir in reducing human cases of pig meat–borne salmonellosis, and how the effects of these interventions may vary across E.U. Member States. Two case study Member States have been chosen to assess the effect of the interventions investigated. Reducing both breeding herd and slaughter pig prevalence were effective in achieving reductions in the number of expected human illnesses in both case study Member States. However, there is scarce evidence to suggest which specific on‐farm interventions could achieve consistent reductions in either breeding herd or slaughter pig prevalence. Hypothetical reductions in feed contamination rates were important in reducing slaughter pig prevalence for the case study Member State where prevalence of infection was already low, but not for the high‐prevalence case study. The most significant reductions were achieved by a 1‐ or 2‐log decrease of Salmonella contamination of the carcass post‐evisceration; a 1‐log decrease in average contamination produced a 90% reduction in human illness. The intervention analyses suggest that abattoir intervention may be the most effective way to reduce human exposure to Salmonella spp. However, a combined farm/abattoir approach would likely have cumulative benefits. On‐farm intervention is probably most effective at the breeding‐herd level for high‐prevalence Member States; once infection in the breeding herd has been reduced to a low enough level, then feed and biosecurity measures would become increasingly more effective.
An increase in confirmed human salmonellosis cases in the EU after 2014 triggered investigation of contributory factors and control options in poultry production. Reconsideration of the five current ...target serovars for breeding hens showed that there is justification for retaining Salmonella Enteritidis, Salmonella Typhimurium (including monophasic variants) and Salmonella Infantis, while Salmonella Virchow and Salmonella Hadar could be replaced by Salmonella Kentucky and either Salmonella Heidelberg, Salmonella Thompson or a variable serovar in national prevalence targets. However, a target that incorporates all serovars is expected to be more effective as the most relevant serovars in breeding flocks vary between Member State (MS) and over time. Achievement of a 1% target for the current target serovars in laying hen flocks is estimated to be reduced by 254,400 CrI9598,540; 602,700 compared to the situation in 2016. This translates to a reduction of 53.4% CrI9539.1; 65.7 considering the layer‐associated human salmonellosis true cases and 6.2% considering the overall human salmonellosis true cases in the 23 MSs included in attribution modelling. A review of risk factors for Salmonella in laying hens revealed that overall evidence points to a lower occurrence in non‐cage compared to cage systems. A conclusion on the effect of outdoor access or impact of the shift from conventional to enriched cages could not be reached. A similar review for broiler chickens concluded that the evidence that outdoor access affects the occurrence of Salmonella is inconclusive. There is conclusive evidence that an increased stocking density, larger farms and stress result in increased occurrence, persistence and spread of Salmonella in laying hen flocks. Based on scientific evidence, an impact of Salmonella control programmes, apart from general hygiene procedures, on the prevalence of Campylobacter in broiler flocks at the holding and on broiler meat at the end of the slaughter process is not expected.
The burden of Salmonella entering pig slaughterhouses across the European Union is considered a primary food safety concern. To assist E.U. member states with the development of national control ...plans, we have developed a farm transmission model applicable to all member states. It is an individual‐based stochastic susceptible‐infected model that takes into account four different sources of infection of pigs (sows, feed, external contaminants such as rodents, and new stock) and various management practices linked to Salmonella transmission/protection (housing, flooring, feed, all‐in‐all‐out production). A novel development within the model is the assessment of dynamic shedding rates. The results of the model, parameterized for two case study member states (one high and one low prevalence) suggest that breeding herd prevalence is a strong indicator of slaughter pig prevalence. Until a member state's’ breeding herd prevalence is brought below 10%, the sow will be the dominant source of infection to pigs raised for meat production; below this level of breeding herd prevalence, feed becomes the dominant force of infection.
The qualified presumption of safety (QPS) concept was developed to provide a harmonised generic pre‐evaluation to support safety risk assessments of biological agents performed by EFSA's scientific ...Panels. The identity, body of knowledge, safety concerns and antimicrobial resistance of valid taxonomic units were assessed. Safety concerns identified for a taxonomic unit are, where possible and reasonable in number, reflected as ‘qualifications’ which should be assessed at the strain level by the EFSA's scientific Panels. No new information was found that would change the previously recommended QPS taxonomic units and their qualifications. Between the end of September 2016 and March 2017, the QPS notification list was updated with 87 applications for market authorisation. From these, 32 biological agents already had a QPS status, and 37 were not included in the evaluation as they are filamentous fungi or enterococci. Streptomyces species (Streptomyces cinnamonensis, Streptomyces mobaraensis and Streptomyces violaceoruber), Bacillus circulans (three notifications) and Escherichia coli (seven notifications) were re‐confirmed not suitable for QPS. Streptomyces rubiginosus and Streptomyces netropsis, not evaluated within the previous mandate, were also not recommended for QPS. Streptomyces spp. and E. coli will be excluded from further QPS evaluations within the current QPS mandate. Hyphomicrobium denitrificans, which has never been evaluated before, was not recommended for the QPS list and for Pseudomonas amyloderamosa, the QPS assessment was not applicable because it is not a validated species. Lactobacillus animalis was a new taxonomic unit recommended to have the QPS status.
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